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Abstract
Recent behavioural and neural research suggests that awareness is intimately 
related to top-down cognitive functions such as attention. Here I present a 
characterization of this relationship, guided by Lavie’s load theory. Load theory 
proposes that perception has limited capacity but proceeds automatically on all 
stimuli (whether relevant to the task at hand or not) until capacity is exhausted, 
and that the allocation of processing resources to certain stimuli (rather than to 
other, competing ones) is guided by executive control functions such as working 
memory. The theory predicts that increasing the perceptual load of a task will 
consume capacity, therefore reducing processing of stimuli external to that task; 
it also predicts that increasing working memory load will impair executive 
control, leading to increased processing of salient ignored stimuli. Here I show 
that these predictions hold not only for indirect measures of perceptual 
processing, as has been demonstrated previously, but also for visual awareness -  
the subjective experience of seeing and being able to report the nature of a visual 
stimulus. I find that under high perceptual load, observers become less aware of 
the very presence of other stimuli, even when these stimuli are fully expected and 
serve as targets. I also show that perceptual load affects the temporal resolution 
of visual awareness -  under high load, the ability to detect a temporal pattern 
(luminance flicker) is reduced, leading to a subjective percept of steady 
illumination. In a neuroimaging study, I show that subjective awareness of 
flicker is associated with activity in frontal and parietal brain regions previously 
associated with attention and awareness. Next, I investigate the role of executive 
control in visual awareness by examining the effect of working memory load on
binocular rivalry, a fundamental form of visual competition. I find that high 
working memory load reduces dominance durations in rivalry, suggesting that 
working memory may serve to maintain perceptual biases during competitive 
interactions in visual awareness. Finally, I use Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
to establish a causal role for the previously described right parietal involvement 
in the control of binocular rivalry. This research therefore indicates that top- 
down cognitive and neural mechanisms are involved in determining whether 
visual stimuli will reach awareness, and in shaping the subjective nature of the 
experience such stimuli evoke.
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Subjective experience suggests that attention plays an important role in 
shaping perceptual awareness. This can become particularly apparent in 
situations that place extreme demands on attention. Landing a plane, for 
example, requires a great deal of concentration. Pilots have to monitor speed, 
altitude, wind direction and many other factors. Highly trained pilots can cope 
with these demands, but are not infallible. When experienced pilots ‘landed’ an 
aircraft in a flight simulator, and on some approaches were suddenly presented 
with the image of a large aircraft obstructing the runway -  one in four pilots 
failed to notice the obstacle, simply landing through it (Haines, 1991). This 
example illustrates two fundamental properties of the visual system. First, its 
limited capacity for processing information, and second, its selectivity (e.g. 
Broadbent, 1958). Complex visual scenes are often cluttered with many different 
stimuli. At any given time, only a fraction of the information received from the 
retina can be selected for further processing and used to control behaviour. 
Furthermore, as I discuss below, despite our subjective impression that our visual 
experience is a full, rich representation of the world around us, not all stimuli 
with which we are presented -  not even all behaviourally relevant ones -  actually 
reach awareness (O’Regan & Noe, 2001; Simons & Rensink, 2005).
What factors determine conscious visual experience? In recent years there 
has been a growing interest in perceptual awareness within cognitive 
neuroscience. Research in this area has attempted to characterize the cognitive 
and neural mechanisms that mediate awareness (Baars, 1988; 1997; Crick & 
Koch, 2003; Driver & Mattingley, 1998; Kanwisher, 2001; Naghavi & Nyberg,
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2005; Posner, 1994; Rees, Kreiman & Koch, 2002; Rees & Lavie, 2001). 
Behavioural and neural evidence suggests that awareness is intimately related to 
cognitive functions such as attention. However, the cognitive mechanisms and 
the neural substrates of top-down influences on awareness require further 
elucidation. In this thesis I investigate the relationship between visual awareness 
and top-down cognitive functions, examining the extent to which these functions 
determine conscious perception. This investigation is guided by Lavie’s load 
theory of selective attention and cognitive control (Lavie, 1995; 2005; Lavie, 
Hirst, De Fockert & Viding, 2004).
Load theory proposes that perception has limited capacity but proceeds 
automatically on all stimuli (whether relevant to the task at hand or not) until 
capacity is exhausted (Lavie, 1995). It also proposes that executive control 
functions such as working memory are responsible for the allocation of 
processing resources to certain stimuli over others (Lavie et al, 2004; Lavie, 
2005). The idea that attention is generated by executive control has been 
stipulated previously (e.g. Baddeley, 1996; Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Load 
theory, however, proposes a specific role for working memory in the control in 
selective attention, that of maintaining stimulus processing priorities.
A fundamental prediction of load theory is that increasing the perceptual load 
of a task will consume capacity, therefore reducing processing (and awareness) 
of stimuli external to that task (Lavie, 1995). However, nearly all previous 
evidence supporting this hypothesis has been based on indirect measures of 
perceptual processing, such as reaction times (Beck & Lavie, 2005; Lavie, 1995; 
Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie & Fox, 2000) and neural activity (Pessoa, McKenna, 
Gutierrez, & Ungerleider, 2002; Pinsk, Doniger, & Kastner 2003; Schwartz et al,
14
2005; Rees, Frith & Lavie, 1997; Yi, Woodman, Widders, Marois, & Chun, 
2004) in selective attention tasks, rather than direct assessments of awareness.
The suggestion that working memory serves to maintain stimulus processing 
priorities leads to the prediction that exhausting working memory will reduce 
executive control of attention, and will therefore results in increased processing 
(and awareness) of ignored stimuli (Lavie, et al, 2004; Lavie, 2005). This 
prediction has also received empirical support, from studies showing that loading 
working memory increases interference from irrelevant distractors, as measured 
by reaction times (De Fockert, Rees, Frith & Lavie, 2001; Lavie & De Fockert, 
2005; Lavie et al, 2004) and neural activity (De Fockert et.al, 2001) in Stroop- 
like and attentional capture tasks.
But perceptual processing does not necessarily imply conscious awareness of 
stimuli -  it can occur in the absence of awareness (Dehaene et al, 1998; Driver & 
Mattingley, 1998; Marshall & Halligan, 1988; Rees & Frith, 1997; Rees et al, 
2000). Here I will describe experiments that employed manipulations of 
perceptual load (in Chapters 2 and 3) and working memory load (in Chapter 5) to 
examine whether the predictions derived from load theory generalize to 
conscious visual perception -  the reported, subjective experience of a visual 
percept. The involvement of a high-level network of frontal and parietal brain 
regions in visual awareness was investigated in a neuroimaging study (Chapter 
4), and the causal role of right parietal cortex in resolving competitive 
interactions in visual awareness was examined using Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation (TMS; Chapter 5).
In the next sections I briefly review the research that prompted the questions 
addressed in this thesis. I begin with the debate regarding the locus of selection
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in visual attention. This is followed by a description of load theory, which offers 
a resolution to the debate, and an examination of the experimental evidence 
supporting load theory to date. I then outline of the evidence for the effects of 
different types of load on awareness, and various criticisms of this evidence that I 
address in the research presented in this thesis.
1.2 Early versus late selection in visual attention and 
awareness
When attention is directed towards certain stimuli, to what extent are 
unattended stimuli perceived? This question has been the focus of a long­
standing debate in the selective attention literature. On the one hand, proponents 
of early selection (e.g., Broadbent, 1958; Treisman, 1969) suggest that attention 
serves a perceptual system whose capacity is limited. Attention can therefore 
effectively prevent early perceptual processing of irrelevant, or ignored, 
information, and perception is restricted to attended items. On the other hand, the 
late selection viewpoint (e.g., Deutch & Deutch, 1963; Duncan, 1980) proposes 
that perception is an automatic (i.e. effortless, limitless in capacity and 
involuntary) process, which proceeds on all stimuli regardless of their task 
relevance. Attention, according to this view, can only affect post-perceptual 
processing stages such as response selection or memory. The debate’s longevity 
is due to the fact that substantial empirical support has been found for both points 
of view. In fact, as late as 1993 it was still suggested that the contradictions 
thrown up by this research may never be resolved (Allport, 1993).
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1.2.1 Evidence favouring early selection
A large body of research indicates that focusing attention on task-relevant 
information can significantly reduce -  even completely eliminate -  knowledge of 
simultaneously-presented irrelevant information. Early studies of the auditory 
modality employed the dichotic listening method, in which participants 
selectively attend to one of two streams of words, each presented to a different 
ear. These studies showed that participants were later unable to report unattended 
information (Cherry, 1953; Moray, 1959). Analogous research in the visual 
domain used the selective reading paradigm to show that when participants read 
a text printed in a particular colour while ignoring text in a different colour 
printed in alternating lines, they were later unable to report the ignored text 
(Neisser, 1969).
To counter the criticism that the generality of the conclusions drawn from the 
above examples may be limited due to their use of complex verbal material, 
researchers employed various versions of a (non-verbal) selective looking 
paradigm. For example, participants were required to make aesthetic judgments 
on a stream of objects that crossed the screen in one direction, while ignoring an 
overlapping stream moving in the other direction. When later given an 
unexpected recognition test, they were at chance in identifying ignored objects 
(Rock, Shauer & Halper, 1976).
In a static version of the same task, participants attended to one of two 
superimposed images (distinguished by their colour), and later recognized 
attended (but not unattended) images above chance level when given a surprise 
recognition test (Goldstein & Fink, 1981; Rock & Gutman, 1981). A similar
17
paradigm was used in a more recent neuroimaging study (Rees, Russell, Frith & 
Driver, 1999), in which participants were presented with a rapid, fixated stream 
of words and meaningless letter strings, each superimposed on a line drawing. 
Participants were instructed to attend to either the drawings or the letters, and to 
detect immediate repetitions of stimuli within the attended stream. Similarly to 
previous studies, a later recognition test showed that memory for unattended 
words was significantly impaired compared to attended words (in fact, correct 
identification of unattended words was indistinguishable from erroneous false 
alarms for ‘foil* words not presented during scanning, indicating that the 
unattended words were not remembered at all). Furthermore, when attending to 
drawings, participants’ brain activity no longer differentiated between 
meaningful words and meaningless letter strings (as it did when letters were 
attended), indicating that unattended words may not have been processed despite 
clearly appearing at fixation (Figure 1.1).
The selective looking paradigm was also used in studies presenting lengthy 
real-life scenes. In a number of studies (Becklen & Cervone, 1983; Neisser & 
Becklen, 1975; Littman & Becklen, 1976), researchers superimposed two video­
clips and instructed participants to attend to one of them (e.g. by counting the 
number of passes a team throwing a ball around made). When later questioned, 
participants showed no knowledge of unexpected and unusual events occurring 
in the unattended clip, such as a woman with an umbrella walking across the 
screen, or a change in the kind of activity taking place. The possibility that eye- 
movements could account for this effect (e.g. due to blurring of unattended 
stimuli as attended stimuli were tracked) was ruled out in one study (Littman & 
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Figure 1.1. No perception of words when attending to superimposed drawings. (A) Stimuli 
used in Rees et al (1999). Common nouns or word strings were superimposed on line drawings, 
and such displays were shown at 500 ms intervals, for 250 ms each. Participants detected 
immediate repetitions, either in the letter or drawing stimuli. (B) Percentages of ‘yes’ responses 
in a post-scanning recognition memory test. When presented with test words, participants were 
likely to recognize words attended during scanning, but equally likely to say they remembered 
unattended words as they were to ‘remember’ foil words that had not been presented beforehand. 
(C) Time course of Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependent (BOLD) activation foci in left frontal (upper 
panels) and left posterior basal temporal cortex (lower panels). Unshaded regions (left half of 
each panel) show activation during task performance, and shaded areas (right) show activation 
during a passive fixation baseline. The brain regions whose time courses are shown here were 
those which showed the greatest differentiation between meaningful words and meaningless letter 
strings when letters were attended (left two panels). These differences, however, were abolished 
when participants attended to the drawings. Adapted from Rees et al (1999).
maintained at fixation.
The use of displays in which an unexpected (and often unnoticed) event 
occurs has been revived in a recent series of studies, as part of a renewed surge
of interest in ‘inattentional blindness’ (Mack & Rock, 1998). Inattentional 
blindness is defined as the failure of observers to report awareness for a visual 
object appearing unexpectedly in a display while they are attending to a task. In a 
typical procedure, participants perform a perceptual task related to a stimulus 
presented briefly on each trial (e.g., deciding which arm of a cross is longer). 
After a few trials, on the ‘critical trial’, an additional, task-irrelevant stimulus is 
presented as well. After responding to the task, when questioned about whether 
they saw any extra stimulus, participants often fail to report it (see Mack & Rock, 
1998). Experiments using long-duration presentations, similar to those used in 
the original studies performed in the 1970s (e.g. the ‘umbrella woman’ in Neisser 
& Becklen, 1975), are now known as studies of ‘sustained’ inattentional 
blindness (Most, Simons, Scholl & Chabris, 1998). In addition to replicating the 
findings from the early studies, such new studies have found that it was 
unnecessary to superimpose two semi-transparent video clips, indicating that the 
effect was not due to the unusual, degraded appearance of such films: Simons & 
Chabris (1999) showed participants a single clip, in which two teams -  one 
wearing white shirts, the other black -  passed balls between members of the 
same team. While participants monitored one of the games (by counting passes), 
a person in a gorilla suit walked across the screen. When asked at the end of the 
clip, participants often failed to report the gorilla (Figure 1.2). The same type of 
effect has also been shown to occur when simpler, highly controlled displays 
were used. In one study (Most et al, 2001), participants monitored a set of 
randomly-moving shapes (black letters) for the number of times they bounced off 
the edge of the screen, while ignoring a different set of shapes (white letters).
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Figure 1.2. The unnoticed gorilla. A single frame from the video clip used by Simons &
Chabris (1999). While participants monitored either the white- or black-shirt team, a man in a 
gorilla suit walked across the screen, banged his chest (as seen here) and continued walking until 
exiting from the other side. When questioned at the end of the 25-second clip, participants often 
failed to report the gorilla, despite it being perfectly visible for 9 seconds.
They often failed to notice an unexpected shape (a grey cross) entering the screen 
and crossing it horizontally until it exited on the other side.
The evidence reviewed so far seems to indicate that selective attention can 
prevent perceptual processing and awareness of stimuli irrelevant to the task at 
hand, thus lending support to the early selection view. However, there is also a 
considerable amount of experimental work supporting the opposite position.
21
1.2.2 Evidence favouring late selection
Research bolstering the late selection view has employed diverse 
experimental methods, most of which are variations of the classic Stroop 
paradigm (Stroop, 1935). Rather than asking participants whether they remember 
unattended items, as in most studies supporting early selection, such research has 
usually utilized indirect measures of perceptual processing, such as the effects 
unattended stimuli have on target RTs.
In the classic Stroop paradigm, participants are required to report a particular 
attribute of a stimulus. The stimulus also contains information in a different 
dimension that is either congruent or incongruent with the correct response. For 
example, in the colour-word Stroop task participants are shown a colour name 
printed in a colour which may be the same (e.g. RED) or different (e.g. RED) 
from the one the colour name denotes. Participants required to make a speeded 
response, reporting the ink colour, have been found to be faster and make fewer 
mistakes when the ink and name are congruent than when they are incongruent 
(Stroop, 1935). The fact that the irrelevant dimension affects responses to the 
relevant one indicates that it is processed to the level of semantic meaning 
despite its irrelevance. This effect could thus be construed as representing late 
selection.
However, in Stroop tasks both the relevant and irrelevant information reside 
within the same stimulus, occupying the same spatial location. Furthermore, 
different attributes of the same object are known to enjoy a processing advantage 
(compared to similar attributes belonging to different objects; Baylis & Driver, 
1993; Duncan, 1984). Thus, the fact that the irrelevant dimension could not be
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ignored may not generalize to other cases in which distractors are presented.
Congruency effects are still found, though, in spatially-separated versions of 
the classic word-colour Stroop task, using separate target colour patches and 
distractor colour-names (printed in black ink), and varying the distance between 
them (Gatti & Egeth, 1978; Hagenaar & van der Heijden, 1986; Merikle & 
Gorewich, 1979). Similarly, interference from incongruent (compared to 
congruent or neutral) emotional faces has been found when the task was to 
categorize words superimposed on them as positive or negative (Stenberg, 
Wiking & Dahl, 1998).
A different method in which targets and distractors are separate is known as 
the flanker paradigm (e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). In flanker experiments, a 
choice response to a centrally-presented target must be made (e.g., reporting 
whether a letter appearing somewhere along the screen’s horizontal meridian is, 
for example, an H or a K) while distractors appearing in different, peripheral 
spatial locations (e.g., above or below the horizontal meridian) are ignored. The 
distractors may be congruent or incongruent with the target (for example, a 
peripheral H would be congruent with a target H, and incongruent with a target 
K), or they may be neutral (for example, the letter Y). The result is known as the 
flanker effect (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Miller, 1987). Target RTs are typically 
slower when accompanied by incongruent than by congruent or neutral 
distractors, indicating that despite knowing where the target would appear, 
participants are not able to ignore the irrelevant information, which is processed 
to a level at which it affects behaviour. Furthermore, the flanker effect is still 
found when the spatial separation between targets and distractors is increased 
(Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Flowers & Willcox, 1982; Miller, 1987), even when
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the distance is as large as 6° (Murphy & Eriksen, 1987). Though the interference 
from distractors is reduced as their distance from targets increases, this trend can 
be abolished if distractors and targets are perceptually grouped by being 
connected (Kramer & Jacobson, 1991), or having similar motion trajectories 
(Driver & Baylis, 1989) or colour (Baylis & Driver, 1992).
Flanker effects have also been observed when the target and distractor were 
separated not only in space, but in time as well (i.e. when there was a temporal 
delay between distractor and target), as long as the distractor did not appear later 
than the target (Flowers & Wilcox, 1982; Gathercole & Broadbent, 1987). 
Finally, distractors can become incongruent with targets despite not being 
initially associated with the alternative response, simply as a result of being 
repeatedly paired with a different target (Miller, 1987), demonstrating that 
associative learning related to ignored stimuli can occur.
Another finding supporting late selection is the phenomenon of negative 
priming (Tipper, 1985). If a target has served as a distractor in a previous trial, 
RTs to it will be longer than if it has not. This occurs even if distractors and 
targets are presented in different symbolic domains (e.g., distractors as pictures 
and targets as words; Tipper & Driver, 1988), indicating that distractors are not 
only perceived but are processed to an abstract semantic level so that a 
categorical representation, rather than simply a crude structural description, is 
created (Tipper, 1985).
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1.2.3 Discrepancies and failed resolutions
A great deal of empirical evidence seems therefore to support each of the two 
sides in the debate regarding the locus of attentional selection. How can these 
conflicting experimental results be resolved?
It is worth noting that most paradigms used in research supporting the early 
selection view require participants to remember and explicitly report the presence 
of irrelevant stimuli after they have disappeared. Conversely, most research 
supporting the late selection position used paradigms in which processing of 
irrelevant distractors was assessed online, through indirect effects on task 
performance. Could the methodological differences between the experimental 
paradigms used in each strand of research account for the different results 
obtained in them?
One possibility is that due to the temporal delay between exposure to the 
stimuli and being asked about them, early selection results obtained with 
paradigms such as selective looking actually reflect a failure of memory rather 
than one of awareness or of perceptual processing. Though this proposal makes 
sense logically, it seems very unlikely that participants could be fully aware of 
unusual events lasting several seconds (e.g., a gorilla crossing the screen for 9 of 
the 25-second presentation in Simons & Chabris, 1999), yet completely forget 
them by the time they are prompted to report them a few seconds later.
A different account distinguishes awareness from perceptual processing. 
Perhaps irrelevant information is perceived and processed, but does not reach 
awareness. Therefore, when participants are explicitly asked about task-irrelevant 
stimuli of which they are unaware, they are unable to report anything about them
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(as in the research supporting early selection). However, in tasks where response 
conflict could arise (as in the research supporting late selection), the unconscious 
processing of task-irrelevant stimuli leads to measurable effects.
Unfortunately, this account also seems unlikely, as it depends heavily on the 
methodological distinction between paradigms that explicitly assess awareness 
and those that indirectly assess perceptual processing. According to this 
explanation, the former kind should always lead to results supporting early 
selection, whereas the latter should consistently lead to results supporting late 
selection. This, however, is not the case. The paradigms typically yielding results 
showing no awareness of irrelevant stimuli have occasionally shown that 
unattended information does indeed reach awareness -  as occurs, for example, 
when participants hear their own name in an unattended auditory stream of words 
(the cocktail party effect; Cherry, 1953).
Similarly, a variety of factors modulating the rates of inattentional blindness 
has been identified. These include the size of the unattended stimulus (Mack & 
Rock, 1998), its position relative to the target (Most et al, 1998; Newby & Rock, 
1998), and its salience (Mack & Rock, 1998), as well as the attentional set of 
participants (Most, Scholl, Clifford & Simons, 2005). Such findings indicate that 
unattended visual stimuli can indeed reach awareness under certain conditions.
Conversely, though the results of most response-conflict studies have 
supported late selection, some have shown no effect of distractors (consistent 
with early selection). In the flanker paradigm, the effect of distractors is 
significantly reduced when they are ‘diluted’ in displays containing an additional 
distractor (Jenkins, Lavie & Driver, 2003), and effective cuing towards targets 
nearly eliminates distractor interference (Eriksen & Hoffman, 1972, 1973; Yantis
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& Johnston, 1990). Similarly, in the spatially-separated Stroop task adding a 
response-neutral stimulus (a word or row of ‘X’s) to the display strongly reduces 
the effects of distractors (Brown, Gore & Carr, 2002; Kahneman & Chajczyk, 
1983). Finally, negative priming is eliminated when the exact location of the 
target in a letter-identification task is known (Ruthruff & Miller, 1995).
These discrepancies demonstrate that the differences in the findings of 
studies supporting early and late selection cannot be attributed to purely 
methodological considerations, such as the differences between indirect 
measures and explicit retrospective measures. Indeed, discrepancies have been 
found between studies using the same tasks. A different theoretical approach, 
accounting for evidence of both early and late selection within the same 
experimental paradigms, is clearly needed.
1.3 Load theory: A resolution to the debate
In a series of studies, Lavie and colleagues (Lavie & Tsai, 1994; Lavie, 1995, 
2000, 2001; Lavie et. al., 2004) have proposed a hybrid model, which combines 
aspects of both the early and late selection viewpoints and accounts for the 
contradictory results found in earlier research. Lavie’s load theory of selective 
attention and cognitive control not only allows a reinterpretation of previous 
experimental work, but gives rise to novel empirically-testable predictions. In 
this section I describe the theory and the new empirical evidence supporting it 
with regard to perceptual processing and attentional selection. In the next section
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I outline the remaining open questions concerning the implications of load theory 
for awareness.
1.3.1 Theory, definitions and predictions
Load theory synthesises the early and late selection approaches by making 
two central assumptions: The first is that the perceptual system does indeed have 
limited capacity (as proposed by early selection). The second, however, is that all 
stimuli, regardless of their relevance to the task at hand, are processed 
automatically (as in late selection) -  but only until perceptual capacity is 
exhausted (Lavie & Tsai, 1994; Lavie, 1995).
From these assumptions load theory proceeds to postulate two mechanisms of 
selective attention. First, a relatively passive selection mechanism in which the 
level of perceptual load determines the degree to which irrelevant distractor 
stimuli will be excluded from perception. When the level of perceptual load 
involved in processing task-relevant stimuli is sufficiently high to exhaust 
perceptual capacity, no capacity remains for processing of distractors, leading to 
their exclusion from perception. Therefore, in situations of high perceptual load 
early selection will occur and distractor interference will be prevented. If, 
however, the perceptual load imposed by the task at hand is low and does not 
exhaust capacity, any residual capacity will ‘spill over’ and lead to mandatory 
processing of irrelevant distractors. Low perceptual load will therefore result in 
late selection, thus enabling distractor interference (Lavie, 1995; 2000; 2001).
The second mechanism is an active attentional control mechanism 
determining stimulus processing priorities, e.g. between targets and irrelevant
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distractors. The importance of such active control is immediately apparent in 
situations where irrelevant stimuli are perceived and can compete with relevant 
stimuli for further processing and control of behaviour (i.e. under low perceptual 
load, when late selection occurs). This requires an active control process, to 
ensure that both the choice of stimuli for further processing (beyond initial 
perception) and eventual response selection are in line with current behavioural 
goals. Load theory proposes that this kind of control depends on high-level 
cognitive functions such as working memory, which are required to actively 
maintain current processing priorities. Critically, this proposed mechanism 
predicts that high working memory load should have an opposite effect to that 
obtained under high perceptual load. Exhausting the capacity of active cognitive 
control functions should reduce the ability to maintain prioritization of current 
behavioural goals, leading to more (rather than less, as under high perceptual 
load) processing of irrelevant distractors (Lavie et. al., 2004; Lavie, 2005).
The two mechanisms involved in selective attention are thus dissociable, and 
it should be possible to demonstrate this through the effects that different kinds 
of load will have on interference from irrelevant distractors. Load theory predicts 
that whereas perceptual load will decrease distractor interference, working 
memory load will increase it (when perceptual capacity is not exhausted).
Before proceeding, it is important to define the term ‘load’ for perception and 
working memory, in the context of load theory. An increase in perceptual load is 
conceptualized as either (a) an increase in the number of items in a display while 
performing the same task (e.g., increasing the search array in a visual search 
task), or (b) an increase in the perceptual demands of a task, while viewing the 
same display (e.g., making a response based on a conjunction of features rather
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than a single attribute; Lavie, 1995; Treisman, 1988). The extra items presented 
or additional operations required under high perceptual load exhaust capacity, 
thus precluding processing of irrelevant stimuli.
Similarly, an increase in working memory load can be defined as either (a) an 
increase in the number of items to be maintained in working memory for the 
same period of time, while performing the same unrelated activities (e.g., 
remembering a single item versus remembering several items; Lavie et al, 2004), 
or (b) an increase in the demands that the task places on working memory for the 
same number of items (e.g., remembering the order of randomly-arranged items 
versus items always presented in the same order; De Fockert et. al., 2001; Lavie 
& De Fockert, 2005). The increase in working memory load reduces the ability 
of cognitive control functions to maintain prioritization of stimuli unrelated to 
the memory task, leading to increased processing of distractors.
The above definitions entail that what constitutes an ‘item’ must also be 
defined within any manipulation of perceptual or working memory load. This 
definition need not be absolute -  for example, a string of letters could constitute 
a single item (a word) in one task, or several items (separate letters) in another. 
Therefore, whenever a manipulation of load involves varying the number of 
items, or keeping this number constant while varying task demands, it is 
important that items in the different experimental conditions are defined in the 
same way.
Finally, it is important to note that the opposite effects predicted by the 
theory for increases in perceptual and working memory load rule out any 
explanation of such effects in terms of increases in general task difficulty.
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1.3.2 Evidence for load theory: Perceptual load
The selection mechanism proposed by load theory entails that the perceptual 
load imposed by a task determines the extent of distractor processing. Previous 
research on the locus of selective attention can be re-interpreted in light of this 
suggestion. In an extensive review of this literature, Lavie & Tsai (1994) showed 
that evidence of early selection was usually found in studies in which the task 
involved considerable perceptual load. For example, results indicating no 
distractor interference in response-competition paradigms (e.g., the flanker task; 
Yantis & Johnston, 1990; or the spatially-separated Stroop task; Kahneman & 
Chajczyk, 1983) occurred when the task involved a large number of stimuli in 
each display. As load theory predicts, this could lead to an exhaustion of 
perceptual capacity and therefore reduce distractor interference.
Conversely, in the more common case of studies that did find distractor 
interference using these paradigms (e.g., Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974 in the flanker 
task; Gatti & Egeth, 1978; and Hagenaar et al, 1986 in Stroop tasks), the display 
usually consisted of a single target and single distractor. Such low perceptual 
load would leave enough spare capacity for the irrelevant distractor to be 
perceived, processed, and affect behaviour.
Lavie and Tsai (1994) focused their review on flanker tasks and the effects of 
load via increased set size, but in a similar manner it could be argued that 
selective looking and sustained inattentional blindness paradigms have employed 
tasks characterized by high perceptual load, leading to results supporting early 
selection. These paradigms usually required participants to follow multiple 
targets moving in a random fashion (e.g., Neisser & Becklen, 1975; Simons &
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Chabris, 1999), or monitor rapidly-alternating targets (e.g., Rees et al, 1999).
Accounting for the previous literature in terms of load theory, however, does 
not in itself provide sufficient support for the theory. Perceptual load was not 
directly manipulated in any of the previous studies, making it possible to 
attribute the discrepancies in findings to alternative factors. The reduction in 
distractor interference when the number of irrelevant stimuli was large could be 
attributed, for example, to a reduction in the salience of response-relevant 
distractors under conditions of increased display clutter, rather than to the 
exhaustion of perceptual capacity under high perceptual load.
Therefore, in a series of studies Lavie and colleagues directly manipulated 
perceptual load, and measured the effect this had on processing of irrelevant 
distractors. Using the flanker paradigm, perceptual load was varied by changing 
the number of items in the attended set (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997). 
Participants searched for a target letter, deciding whether it was an X or an N on 
each trial. The target could appear in one of six pre-defined locations. Under low 
load it could either appear alone (Lavie, 1995) or accompanied by the letter ‘O’ 
in all other locations (Lavie & Cox, 1997). Under high load, the other five 
relevant locations were occupied by non-target angular letters that were 
dissimilar to each other. Distractor letters, which were to be ignored and could be 
either congruent or incongruent with the target, appeared in the periphery (see 
Figure 1.3a). Results supported the predictions of load theory. Under low 
perceptual load, response conflict due to distractor interference was evident -  
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Figure 1.3. M anipulations of perceptual load in the flanker task and their effect on 
distractor processing. In these tasks, participants make a speeded response, indicating which of 
two target letters (X or N) appears in one of several pre-defined locations while trying to ignore 
an irrelevant distractor. Distractor interference (and therefore processing) is indicated by slower 
responses in the presence of an incongruent compared with a congruent distractor. (A) Perceptual 
load is manipulated by changing the number of non-target items in relevant locations that are 
similar to the target (angular) and dissimilar to each other, from none under low load (left), to 
five under high load (right). The distractor appears outside the circle o f relevant locations (Lavie 
& Cox, 1997). (B) Perceptual load is manipulated by increasing the processing requirements for 
the same displays. Under low load the presence of any blue shape indicates ‘go’ -  a response to 
the target should be made (the other colour, red, indicates ‘no go’). Under high load stimulus 
conjunctions (e.g., blue square or red circle) indicate ‘go’ (Lavie, 1995). (C) Distractor 
interference effects (incongruent minus congruent RTs) are greater under low than under high 
perceptual load. Adapted from Lavie, 2005.
trials with a congruent one. Under high perceptual load, however, such 
differences were eliminated, indicating that distractors had not been processed 
(Figure 1.3c). A similar effect of perceptual load was found when distractors
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were presented at fixation (Beck & Lavie, 2005). They were also found for 
interference exerted by pictures of meaningful 3D distractor objects in a word- 
categorization task (fruits versus musical instruments; Lavie, Ro & Russell, 
2003). Target words appeared somewhere on the screen’s vertical meridian, 
either on their own (low load) or accompanied by meaningless letter strings (high 
load). Distractor pictures appearing in the left or right hemifield produced 
interference effects only under low perceptual load. Interestingly, when the task 
was to classify a famous name as either a singer or a politician, and a picture of a 
famous person’s face (either the same person as the target name, or someone 
from the other category) served as the distractor, the interference from such faces 
was not modulated by perceptual load. Similarly, covert priming (faster 
identification following previous exposure) to task-irrelevant famous faces was 
not modulated by the perceptual load of the task carried out during initial 
exposure to the faces (Jenkins, Burton & Ellis, 2002). This could indicate that 
faces are unique, drawing perceptual resources in a mandatory manner regardless 
of the task, perhaps due to their social significance. On the other hand, the social 
significance of faces might just imply that higher levels of perceptual load are 
required to modulate their processing (e.g., Pessoa et al, 2002).
The manipulations of perceptual load described above varied the number of 
items in relevant locations in the display. The condition of high and low load 
thus differed in their physical appearance as well as the demands they made on 
attention. Other experiments (Lavie, 1995) therefore invoked the second 
definition of perceptual load, as described in the previous section, employing 
identical displays in all conditions while varying task demands. Distractor 
interference effects were measured while participants performed a task in which
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the correct response was determined either by a single stimulus feature (low 
load) or a conjunction of features (high load, see Figure 1.3b); alternatively, 
perceptual load was manipulated for identical displays by using a demanding 
position and size discrimination (high load) versus a simple detection of presence 
(low load). Again, results showed that distractors exerted greater interference 
under low (compared to high) perceptual load.
Manipulating perceptual load was also shown to affect implicit learning of 
the spatial configuration of irrelevant distractors (Jiang & Chun, 2001), as well as 
negative priming (the slowing of responses to targets previously presented as 
distractors; Tipper, 1985). Lavie & Fox (2000) found that increasing the number 
of items in relevant locations of a display not only decreased interference from 
concurrently-displayed distractors, but also eliminated the negative priming 
effect (which was present under low perceptual load) when such distractors were 
later used as targets. Negative priming is considered to indicate active inhibition 
of distractors (Allport, Tipper & Chmiel, 1985). Therefore, it is unlikely that the 
reduction in distractor interference found in the above studies was due to an 
increase in distractor inhibition under high perceptual load. Rather, these results 
are more consistent with an attenuation of distractor perception under high load.
Evidence from neuroimaging studies also converges on the same conclusion. 
Neural activity in stimulus-sensitive brain regions has been shown to decrease 
under high (compared to low) perceptual load, when the specific stimulus these 
regions respond to preferentially was task-irrelevant. Rees et al (1997) measured 
brain activity with fMRI while participants performed a linguistic task, either 
deciding whether words appearing at fixation were printed in lower or UPPER 
case (low load) or how many syllables they contained (high load). An irrelevant
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motion stimulus was presented in the periphery concurrently with the fixated 
words. Rees et al (1997) found activation in the motion-sensitive area MT+/V5 
under low perceptual load, but not under high load. Similarly, Yi et al (2004) 
presented irrelevant pictures of places in the periphery while participants 
performed a repetition-detection task for faces presented at fixation. They found 
that activity in the place-sensitive parahippocampal place area (Epstein & 
Kanwisher, 1998) was significantly reduced when the face task was made more 
difficult. Moreover, repetition suppression (attenuation of the fMRI signal when 
a stimulus is repeated; Grill-Spector & Malach, 2001) was only found in the 
parahippocampus for peripheral images of places under low load in the face task, 
indicating that processing of the irrelevant stimuli under high load was reduced 
to the extent that repetition was not detected. Modulation by perceptual load of 
activity in the colour-sensitive region V4 has also been demonstrated. Increasing 
load related to a target presented in one hemifield reduced activity related to 
colourful images presented in the other hemifield (Pinsk et al, 2003). In a 
different study, activation in the amygdala in response to attended emotional 
(angry, fearful or happy, compared to neutral) faces was abolished when 
participants attended to a demanding orientation-discrimination task (Pessoa et 
al, 2002). This shows that activity not only in cortical, but in subcortical regions 
such as the amygdala can also be modulated by perceptual load, and challenges 
previous claims that amygdala responses to emotional stimuli do not require 
attention (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver & Dolan, 2001), suggesting instead that 
previous failures to find attentional modulation of amygdala activity were due to 
the use of tasks that did not place sufficient load on perceptual capacity.
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Modulation of neural activity has been found not only in stimulus-selective 
brain regions, but also in early visual cortex. Schwartz et al (2005) measured 
retinotopic visual cortex activity evoked by checkerboard patterns presented in 
the periphery while participants performed a task related to a rapid stream of 
stimuli presented at fixation. The task was performed under either low or high 
perceptual load (Figure 1.4a). Visual cortex activity evoked by the task- 
irrelevant checkerboards was reduced under high load. This effect was found in 
areas VI, V2, V3 and ventral V4. Though the magnitude of the effect increased 
with successive visual areas, it was clearly present as early as VI (Figure 1.4b).
An event-related potentials (ERP) study also supports the suggestion that 
perceptual load can modulate activity related to task-irrelevant stimuli in early 
visual cortex (Handy, Soltani & Mangun, 2001). This study found that compared 
to low load (simple feature detection), high perceptual load (harder letter 
discrimination) reduced the amplitude of the occipital ERP component PI 
evoked by irrelevant distractors. The PI occurs 80-130 ms after stimulus 
presentation, and is believed to reflect early sensory processing. Another similar 
fMRI result was obtained by O’Connor, Fukui, Pinsk & Kastner (2002), who in 
addition to showing a reduction in V1-V4 activity under high perceptual load, 
also showed that compared to a low load task (monitoring for a colour change in 
a rapid stream of fixated stimuli), a high load task (monitoring for letters among 
other characters in the stream) caused a reduction in activity in the lateral 
geniculate nucleus (LGN) evoked by irrelevant peripheral visual stimulation. The 
LGN is often viewed as the main gateway passing visual information on to visual 




Figure 1.4. The effect of perceptual load on retinotopic visual cortex activity evoked by 
irrelevant stimuli. Stimuli and results in Schwartz et al (2005). (A) Stimuli: A rapid stream of 
coloured crosses was presented at fixation, and participants monitored for targets defined at the 
beginning of each stream. Under low load, targets were defined by a single feature (colour; red 
crosses). Under high load, targets were defined by a conjunction of features (colour and 
orientation; upright yellow or inverted green crosses). Irrelevant contrast-reversing 
checkerboards were presented in the periphery either bilaterally (shown), on one side or on 
neither side. (B) Results: Visual cortex activity evoked by the checkerboards (pooled across 
unilateral and bilateral conditions, contrasted with the no-checkerboard condition) is greater 
under low than under high perceptual load in the central task. The bar chart shows that the 
difference increases monotonically from visual area VI to V4. Adapted from Schwartz et al 
(2005).
(i.e. the optic chiasm and retina) have been discovered in mammals. Perceptual 
load may therefore affect visual processing at the earliest point in the visual 
pathway that top-down signals could possibly reach.
The studies reviewed above used various manipulations of perceptual load 
and various measures of distractor processing. Taken together, they therefore
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provide strong convergent evidence for the claim that high perceptual load can 
reduce and even eliminate distractor perception.
1.3.3 Evidence for load theory: Working memory load
The research reviewed so far provides support for the first selection 
mechanism proposed by load theory, demonstrating that the extent of distractor 
processing is indeed determined by the level of perceptual load in a task. I now 
turn to evidence supporting the second mechanism the theory postulates, that of 
active cognitive control over distractor rejection. In agreement with previous 
suggestions (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995), that working memory is required 
to successfully resolve competition according to current perceptual preferences, 
load theory (Lavie et al, 2004; Lavie, 2005) proposes specifically that high level 
cognitive control functions such as working memory maintain prioritisation 
(between relevant targets and irrelevant distractors) of current behavioural goals. 
Loading working memory should therefore reduce the cognitive system’s ability 
to exert such control, leading to increased (rather than decreased, as in perceptual 
load) interference from irrelevant distractors competing with targets for 
processing.
Some evidence regarding the role working memory plays as a top-down 
control mechanism, defining and maintaining the bias between competing visual 
stimuli, has come from single-unit research. A number of studies (Fuster & 
Jervey, 1981; Miller, Li & Desimone, 1993; Miyashita & Chang, 1988) found 
cue- or template-related activity in monkeys’ inferior temporal (IT) cortex -  a 
region associated with working memory (Chelazzi, Miller, Duncan & Desimone,
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1993) -  during delay periods before the appearance of visual stimuli. Enhanced 
responses to targets matching a prior cue have also been found in the same area 
(Miller & Desimone, 1994). Activity in frontal cortex has also been associated 
with working memory (Courtney, Ungerleider, Keil & Haxby, 1997; D’Esposito 
& Postle, 2000; Goldman-Rakic & Friedman, 1991) and indeed, 
electrophysiological studies (Miller, Erickson & Desimone, 1996; Rainer, Asaad 
& Miller, 1998) found preffontal neurons involved in the maintenance of task 
relevant information.
Findings regarding the maintenance of task requirements in frontal cortex 
were also obtained using fMRI: During a delay between task instructions and 
stimulus onset, anterior preffontal cortex was activated. In addition, depending 
on the kind of task used, either verbal or spatial processing areas in the posterior 
preffontal lobe were active during the delay (Sakai & Passingham, 2003). In 
themselves, these results do not mean that neurons in those regions exert top- 
down control, but they do imply that activity associated with working memory is 
relevant to visual tasks.
Another line of evidence suggesting the involvement of frontal cortex in 
biasing visual processing in humans has come from neuropsychological reports 
of selective attention deficits following frontal lobe damage (e.g., Shallice & 
Burgess, 1991). Such patients appear to be particularly distracted by dominant 
but goal-irrelevant distractors. Consistent with this, the process of aging has been 
associated with loss of cells in the brain, most notably in frontal cortex (e.g., 
Kramer, Humphrey, Larish, Logan & Strayer, 1994), and older adults have 
indeed been shown to exhibit higher rates of failure to inhibit irrelevant 
responses than young adults (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988), a tendency which may
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be associated with an aging-related deterioration in frontal lobe function. Support 
for this was found in a study (Maylor & Lavie, 1998), which showed increased 
distractor interference in old (compared to young) participants under low 
perceptual load, indicating that older participants were less able to inhibit 
interference from perceived distractors.
Evidence for the involvement of working memory in the cognitive control of 
selective attention has come from studies of individual differences that found a 
correlation between working memory span and performance in selective 
attention tasks. For example, Conway, Cowan & Bunting (2001) found that when 
participants attended to one of two auditory streams in a dichotic listening task, 
more low-span (65%) than high-span (20%) participants detected their name in 
the ignored channel (i.e. showed a cocktail party effect). Similarly, in another 
study low-span participants made more errors than high-span participants 
responding to incongruent words in a Stroop task (Kane & Engle, 2003), 
suggesting that people with a high working memory span are better able to focus 
attention on relevant information.
The evidence reviewed above is correlational, though, and until recently there 
has been little direct behavioural evidence in healthy humans for the causal role 
of working memory in the top-down control of attentional selection. A new 
series of studies (De Fockert et al, 2001; Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al, 2004; Lavie & 
De Fockert, 2005; Lavie & De Fockert, in press) has provided new insight into 
the way this system operates. These studies reduced the availability of working 
memory by loading it in a concurrent unrelated task. According to load theory, 
this should result in reduced ability to maintain task priorities, leading to greater 
interference from irrelevant distractors.
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Figure 1.5. The behavioural effect of manipulating working memory load in the flanker 
task. (A) Working memory load was manipulated in Lavie et al (2004) by having participants 
remember a set comprising either one (low load) or six (high load) digits presented at the 
beginning o f the trial. During the retention interval, participants performed a flanker task, 
identifying a central target letter while ignoring a peripheral distractor that could be either 
congruent or incongruent with the target. At the end of the trial participants responded to a probe 
digit, indicating whether it had been present or absent in the memory set. (B) Distractor 
interference effects (incongruent minus congruent RTs) are greater under high than under low  
working memory load, demonstrating that loading working memory leads to the opposite effect 
on distractor processing to perceptual load. Adapted from Lavie (2005).
This hypothesis was confirmed in behavioural experiments (Lavie et al,
2000; 2004). Working memory load was manipulated by having participants 
rehearse either a set of six digits (high load) or just one digit (low load; see 
Figure 1.5a). Distractor interference in the flanker task was significantly 
increased under high working memory load (Figure 1.5b).
Moreover, in an fMRI study (De Fockert et al, 2001) working memory load 
was manipulated during performance of a face-name Stroop-like task. While 
performing an unrelated working memory task under either high or low load, 
participants categorized famous written names as politicians or pop stars and 
attempted to ignore distractor faces that could be either congruent or incongruent 
with the name (Figure 1.6a). Behaviourally, results showed greater interference 
from incongruent (compared to congruent) distractors under high than under low 
working memory load, indicating more processing of distractor faces under high 
load. fMRI results showed that neural responses related to the presence (vs. 
absence) of a distractor face in the fusiform face area (Kanwisher, McDermott & 
Chun, 1997) were greater under high than under low working memory load 
(Figure 1.6b). These findings demonstrate that maintaining task-relevant 
perceptual biases depends on the availability of working memory for the control 
of goal-directed performance in a selective attention task.
The effects of working memory load are not restricted to control of visual 
selection in Stroop-like response-competition tasks. Lavie and De Fockert (2005) 
tested the effect of working memory load on attentional capture. Attentional 
capture occurs when one of the nontargets in a visual search array differs from 
others in a salient way, making it a unique ‘singleton’ on an irrelevant dimension 
(e.g. a red distractor among green stimuli in a shape-discrimination task). Such 
singletons tend to distract participants from the relevant stimuli, impairing 
performance on the search task (Theeuwes, 1991; 1992; Yantis, 1996; 2000). In 
line with the prediction of load theory, when working memory load was 
manipulated, attentional capture was exacerbated under high (versus low) load. 
This result is consistent with that of an fMRI study (De Fockert, Rees, Frith &
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Figure 1.6. The effect of working memory load on face processing in a neuroimaging study.
(A) Trial procedure and example stimuli used in De Fockert et al (2001). At the beginning of 
each trial, participants were presented with a set comprising the digits 0 to 4 in either a fixed 
ascending order (i.e. ‘01234’, low load) or a random order (as shown, high load). At the end of 
the trial a probe digit was presented, and participants had to report the digit that followed it in the 
original set (here the correct answer would be ‘4 ’). During the retention interval participants 
performed a Stroop-like task, categorizing names as politicians or singers while attempting to 
ignore distractor faces that appeared on some trials and were either congruent or incongruent with 
the name. (B) The BOLD signal difference between face present and face absent conditions is 
greater (bars) and the spatial extent o f voxels where the difference reached statistical significance 
is larger (brain images) under high than under low working memory load, indicating more 
processing of distractor faces when the availability o f working memory to control attention was 
reduced. Adapted from De Fockert et al (2001).
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Lavie, 2004) that found a negative correlation between singleton interference and 
frontal activity in an attentional capture task. Top-down control functions 
mediated by frontal cortex may therefore be involved in preventing interference 
from irrelevant singletons; when the control exerted by frontal cortex was 
reduced, interference from the irrelevant stimulus increased.
As Lavie and De Fockert (2005) point out, previous studies on the role of 
working memory in visual search (Logan, 1978; Woodman, Vogel & Luck,
2001) failed to find any effect of working memory load on performance; the 
slopes of the search set-size functions did not interact with working memory 
load. Also, in a recent neuroimaging study high working memory load also did 
not enhance neural responses to irrelevant place images presented in the 
background (Yi et al, 2004). Importantly, however, unlike those studies, which 
involved ordinary search items and ignored background pictures, the attentional 
capture experiments described here examined the effect of working memory load 
when the ignored item was an irrelevant but highly salient singleton distractor. 
This suggests that the cognitive control of perceptual biases exerted by working 
memory is only needed in situations where preferences must be maintained 
despite the presence of strong competition from distractors.
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1.4 Load theory and visual awareness
1.4.1 Do the effects of load tell us anything about awareness?
A large number of studies, using both behavioural and neuroimaging 
methods, has provided empirical support for load theory. However, in most of 
these studies the predictions derived from load theory have not explicitly 
distinguished between awareness and perceptual processing (which may not 
necessarily be conscious; e.g., Driver & Mattingley, 1998; Marshall & Halligan, 
1988; Rees & Frith, 1997; Rees et al, 2000). Indeed, these studies (with two 
exceptions, see below) have used indirect measures of perceptual processing 
(such as reaction times and neural activity) to make inferences about attention. 
For example, the effects of irrelevant distractors on target RTs in response 
competition flanker tasks (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997) are modulated by 
both perceptual load (which decreases distractor interference) and working 
memory load (which increases it). Similarly, functional neuroimaging studies 
have demonstrated that visual cortex activity related to task-irrelevant stimuli is 
reduced or even eliminated under high perceptual load in the attended task (e.g., 
Rees et al, 1997; Schwartz et al, 2005) but increases under high working memory 
load (De Fockert et al, 2001).
However, neither brain activity nor RT effects can, in themselves, provide 
direct evidence regarding the way conscious perception is modulated by load. RT 
effects convincingly demonstrate that various types of load can determine the 
degree of behavioural interference from distractors (and by implication, how 
effectively these distractors were processed), and neural measures show that
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brain activity correlated with perceptual processing is modulated by load. But 
neither measure allows for any direct conclusions regarding awareness -  whether 
conscious perception, the ability to report the occurrence of a stimulus, is 
affected by load. It is possible that the perceptual processing indicated by these 
measures has nothing to do with awareness. For example, it could be that 
distractors are never perceived consciously, and RT effects obtained with both 
types of load manipulation reflect unconscious processing influences on 
stimulus-response associations. On the other hand, it is possible that distractors 
are always consciously perceived, and RT effects merely reflect processes related 
to response selection and production. By the same token, it is also possible that 
neural activity reflects perceptual processes that correlate with awareness, but 
occur independently.
1.4.2 Preliminary evidence for the role of load in awareness
Promising preliminary evidence for the role of perceptual load in awareness 
comes from one of the neuroimaging studies described above (Rees et al, 1997, 
in which activity related to an irrelevant motion stimulus in the motion-sensitive 
area MT+/V5 was attenuated under high perceptual load). Rees et al (1997) also 
measured the duration of the motion after effect caused by the irrelevant motion 
stimulus, and found that participants reported a significantly shorter duration 
under high (compared to low) perceptual load. Since participants reported their 
subjective experience of motion, these results indicate that conscious visual 
awareness may indeed be modulated by perceptual load. However, though the 
motion after effect can be considered a measure of awareness, in this case it was
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assessed after the load manipulation had been terminated. Any direct conclusions 
regarding the conscious perception of the (real) motion stimulus during 
performance of the task are therefore precluded.
A different study (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2006) has recently attempted to 
assess awareness of a task-irrelevant stimulus, and its modulation by perceptual 
load, using an inattentional blindness paradigm. Awareness of an unexpected, 
task-irrelevant stimulus presented on the critical trial was found to be 
significantly reduced for participants who performed a high perceptual load task, 
compared to those who performed a low load task.
However, it has been argued that inattentional blindness does not necessarily 
reflect a lack of visual awareness. In inattentional blindness paradigms, 
awareness of the unexpected, irrelevant stimulus is assessed after the response to 
the task. It is therefore possible that the effect of perceptual load on inattentional 
blindness does not reflect reduced awareness, but reduced encoding of the 
unexpected stimulus into memory1 (‘inattentional amnesia’; Wolfe, 1999). The 
fact that both the presence and appearance of the extra stimulus are unexpected 
may cause the stimulus to be perceived, but to generate a weak trace that is 
forgotten by the time of the surprising and delayed retrospective assessment 
(Barber & Folkard, 1972; Bashinski & Bacharach, 1980; Davies, Kramer & 
Graham, 1983; Teichner & Krebs, 1974). Inattentional blindness could therefore 
be limited to unexpected stimuli (for example, one could claim that attention is 
critical for weakly encoded, unexpected stimuli to be remembered), and may 
teach us very little about awareness in general.
1 As discussed earlier, this point is less convincing in the case o f long-duration salient stimuli, 
such as a gorilla walking across the screen (Simons & Chabris, 1999).
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Furthermore, if the terms of signal detection theory are applied to 
inattentional blindness, a limitation of this phenomenon as an experimental 
paradigm becomes apparent: Only reports of whether the critical stimulus was 
seen (hits) or not (misses) can be collected. Presentation of the critical stimulus 
precludes the occurrence of false alarms and correct rejections, making it 
impossible to assess visual sensitivity independently of response criterion. For 
example, it is possible that participants in the high load conditions of Cartwright- 
Finch and Lavie (2006) adopted a more stringent criterion than the low-load 
participants did for reporting the critical stimulus. The effect of perceptual load 
may therefore have been due to a criterion shift, rather than a true change in 
visual sensitivity.
1.5 General methodological approach and overview
In this thesis I investigate whether the predictions of load theory extend to 
visual awareness. If they do, then conscious awareness should depend on the 
level and type of load involved in the task performed. To examine whether this is 
the case, it is necessary to directly assess awareness of stimuli while 
manipulating load in a concurrent task, using paradigms that avoid the above 
criticisms.
This can be accomplished by manipulating perceptual load with regard to one 
set of stimuli, and measuring awareness of other stimuli that (unlike in previous 
research) are fully expected and presented repeatedly. In Chapter 2 1 establish the 
role of perceptual load in the conscious detection of stimuli. In a series of
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experiments, I investigate whether performing a task under high perceptual load 
makes observers less aware than they are under low load of the very presence of 
other stimuli, even though these stimuli are fully expected and serve as a 
different type of target.
In Chapter 3 I present a series of experiments focusing on whether perceptual 
load affects the subjective experience of a temporal visual pattern (rapid 
luminance flicker). These experiments are the first to ask whether perceptual load 
can alter temporal aspects of visual experience. It has recently been claimed that 
whereas attention improves the spatial resolution of vision, it impairs its temporal 
resolution (Yeshurun & Levy, 2003; Yeshurun, 2004). As load theory does not 
make such a distinction, it seemed particularly important to test whether the 
predictions of load theory generalize to awareness in the temporal domain.
In Chapter 4 I present a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
study investigating the neural correlates of temporal visual awareness. Previous 
neuroimaging studies and the results of Chapters 2 and 3 implicate attentional 
mechanisms in perceptual awareness, leading to the prediction that frontal and 
parietal regions of cortex will be involved in the conscious perception of flicker.
The effects of working memory load on conscious awareness have not been 
examined as yet. In Chapter 5 I examine whether higher cognitive control 
functions play a role in the selection of visual stimuli for awareness. A striking 
phenomenon in which stimuli compete for awareness is binocular rivalry, the 
alternating pattern of dominance in awareness that transpires when the eyes are 
presented with different images (e.g., Blake & Logothetis, 2002). If working 
memory acts as a top-down control function when there is competition over 
awareness and a need to bias perception by suppressing salient stimuli, then
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loading working memory should have an effect on the competition in binocular 
rivalry, reducing the visual system’s ability to maintain a stable and coherent 
percept.
Finally, Chapter 6 examines the causal role of right parietal cortex in the top 
down control of binocular rivalry. Activity in right-lateralized frontal and parietal 
cortex has previously been associated with perceptual transitions in rivalry 
(Lumer, Friston & Rees, 1998). However, the correlational nature of 
neuroimaging data precludes the attribution of a causal role to activated regions. 
Such causal attributions can be made when using Transcranial Magnetic 
Stimulation (TMS), which directly interferes with brain activity (Walsh & 
Cowey, 2000; Walsh & Pascual-Leone, 2003). In this chapter I use TMS to 
establish the nature of the causal role right parietal cortex plays in the control of 
binocular rivalry. If this role is to induce perceptual alternations, disrupting the 
activity of right parietal cortex with TMS should prolong dominance durations in 
rivalry. Conversely, if right parietal cortex serves to maintain biases, such 
disruption should shorten dominance durations.
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Chapter 2:




What is the relationship between attention and perceptual awareness? Does 
conscious perception depend on attention to perceived stimuli? As reviewed in 
the General Introduction chapter, a resolution to the long standing debate 
between early (e.g. Broadbent, 1958; Treisman, 1960) and late (e.g. Deutsch & 
Deutsch, 1963; Duncan, 1980) selection views of attention has recently been 
proposed in the form of a load theory of selective attention and cognitive control 
(Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Tsai, 1994; Lavie, 2000; Lavie et al, 2004).
According to early selection views, the capacity of perception is limited; 
therefore, what will be perceived depends on how attention is allocated. 
According to late selection views, the capacity of perception is unlimited and it 
proceeds automatically on all stimuli, independent of attention. Since there is a 
great deal of empirical research supporting each of these views, as recently as the 
1990s it was suggested that the early/late selection debate may never be resolved 
(e.g. Allport, 1993). Load theory, however, combines aspects of both views to 
determine whether stimuli will be perceived or not. Like the early selection view, 
load theory acknowledges that perception does indeed have limited capacity; but 
like the late selection view, it proposes that perception proceeds automatically on 
all stimuli it is exposed to until (and this is where the theory departs from the late 
selection view) capacity is consumed. The level of perceptual load in a task, 
therefore, dictates whether the outcome will conform to the early or late selection 
view: Tasks with high perceptual load will exhaust capacity in processing task­
relevant stimuli, leading to task-irrelevant stimuli not being perceived (as in early 
selection). On the other hand, tasks with low perceptual load will not fully
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consume capacity, and the left-over capacity will inevitably lead to perception of 
task-irrelevant stimuli (as in late selection).
The above prediction has received support from a large variety of behavioural 
and neuroimaging studies (see Section 1.3.2 for a detailed review). However, 
most of those studies used indirect measures of irrelevant-stimulus processing 
(e.g., RTs in flanker tasks or neural activity related to irrelevant stimuli) rather 
than direct (conscious) reports to assess the effects of perceptual load. As I 
argued in the General Introduction (Section 1.4.1), while RT effects and neural 
measures do provide compelling evidence regarding the effects of perceptual 
load on visual processing, they cannot provide conclusive evidence regarding 
visual awareness. It is logically possible that such measures solely reflect effects 
on conscious processes of response selection, or conversely, on unconscious 
stimulus-response associations; and it has been shown that perceptual processing 
can occur, and lead to both behavioural and neural effects, in the absence of 
awareness (e.g. in priming tasks, Dehaene et al, 1998; and in pathologies such as 
unilateral neglect, Marshall & Halligan, 1988; Rees et al, 2000).
To test whether increasing perceptual load affects visual awareness, 
awareness of stimuli must be assessed directly while manipulating perceptual 
load in a concurrent task. One study (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2006) has 
recently done so using an inattentional blindness paradigm. However, it is 
difficult to interpret the reduced awareness of an unexpected, task-irrelevant 
stimulus, found in that study under high load: This effect may reflect reduced 
encoding of the unexpected stimulus into memory rather than a true loss of 
awareness. Furthermore, it was not possible to distinguish changes of visual
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sensitivity from shifts of response criterion within the paradigm used by 
Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2006).
The purpose of the present study was therefore to directly investigate the 
effect of perceptual load on visual awareness, using a paradigm that would avoid 
the criticisms detailed above. Participants simultaneously monitored for the 
appearance of two types of target -  one at fixation (central targets), the other in 
the periphery (peripheral targets). Perceptual load was manipulated for central 
targets.
Unlike in inattentional blindness, peripheral stimuli were both relevant and 
fully expected (participants knew that they would appear and what they would 
look like). Moreover, the paradigm entailed continuous monitoring over an 
extended duration, with the two types of target appearing only occasionally and 
never presented at the same time. As responses to both types of target were given 
as soon as they were perceived, rapid forgetting or interference from producing 
responses to a concurrent target cannot account for any effect of perceptual load 
found.
It has been suggested (Duncan, 1980) that when a single target is present in 
the display, there will be little or no performance decrement due to divided 
attention, and that for divided attention costs to arise it is necessary for targets to 
appear simultaneously and require independent identification and a separate 
response. However, in this paradigm the non-simultaneous presentation of the 
two types of target rules out any account of perceptual load effects in terms of 
such a two-target cost.
Finally, the paradigm used allowed for responses from each participant to be 
collected for a large number of trials under different load conditions, enabling a
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within-subject assessment of visual awareness using an objective measure of 
reported visual sensitivity, d’ (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991).
Load theory predicts that the depletion of capacity under high load for central 
targets will lead to lower levels of attention being deployed to peripheral 
locations, resulting in reduced awareness of peripheral targets, even when they 
are not concurrent with central targets. This direct implication of load theory to 
visual awareness has not been tested before.
2.2 Experiment 1
2.2.1 Introduction
To assess the effect of perceptual load on visual awareness, a paradigm 
requiring participants to concurrently monitor different locations and detect two 
types of target was used. The load manipulation was applied to the targets 
presented at fixation (central targets): For identical stimuli (a rapid succession of 
crosses) participants performed either a low-load feature search (responding to 
the occasional appearance of red crosses among other colours), or a high-load 
conjunction search (responding to upright yellow and inverted green crosses). 
This is a well-established manipulation of perceptual load, shown to be effective 
in both behavioural studies (where RTs increased and accuracy declined under 
high load, e.g., Lavie, 1995; Triesman, 1988) and neuroimaging studies (where 
parietal activity increased under high load, Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 1999). This 
task has also been previously shown to modulate brain activity in response to
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irrelevant stimuli in peripheral locations in retinotopic visual cortex (Schwartz et 
al, 2005).
Simultaneously, participants also continuously monitored two pre-defined 
locations (situated diagonally from each other at equal distances from fixation 
and marked by place-holder squares) while ignoring two other locations (situated 
on the other diagonal), for the occasional appearance of a small, meaningless 
grey shape (the peripheral target). If perceptual load consumes capacity that is 
required for awareness, then high (compared to low) perceptual load at fixation 
should lead to lower detection sensitivity to peripheral targets.
2.2.2 Method
Participants: Twelve volunteers participated in the experiment. All had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. One participant could not reliably identify 
the peripheral stimulus (<30% hits) and was therefore excluded from the 
analysis. The remaining eleven participants had a mean age of 27.4 (range 18- 
35). Four were female and eight right-handed.
Stimuli and apparatus: Participants sat in a dark room, viewing an 18” 
screen (Mitsubishi Diamond Pro 920, resolution 640*480, 60 Hz refresh rate) 
from a distance of 57 cm. Head position was stabilized by a chin rest. Stimuli 
were created and presented using Matlab on a Dell PWS650 computer.
Visual stimuli were presented on a black background, and included (Figure 
2.1) centrally-presented crosses, spanning 0.7° (vertical line) by 0.4° (horizontal 
line). Crosses could appear in any of six colours (red, green, yellow, blue, cyan,
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Figure 2.1. Experiment 1: The visual stimuli in a trial. The purple upright cross is a non-target 
central stimulus. Central targets (red crosses in either orientation under low load; upright yellow  
and inverted green crosses under high load) were defined at the beginning of each trial. A grey 
meaningless shape, which served as the peripheral stimulus, appears in the top left place-holder 
square. For display purposes, the peripheral stimulus shown is brighter than the one used in the 
actual experiment. Peripheral stimuli appeared in random locations within any of the four 
squares. The two attended squares in each trial were indicated by a diagonal line appearing at the 
beginning of the trial. This image only shows the central portion of the screen, the rest o f which 
was a uniform black.
and purple) and two orientations (upright or inverted; the horizontal line of the 
cross was placed either one pixel above or below the centre of the vertical line). 
In addition, four grey place-holder squares (3.8° by 3.8°), arranged at the vertices 
of an imaginary square centred on fixation and at an eccentricity of 5.3° (distance 
from the squares’ centre to fixation) were presented continuously throughout the 
trial. A small (0.6° * 0.6°), grey (RGB values: 15, 15, 15) meaningless shape
which served as the peripheral stimulus could appear anywhere within the four 
place-holder squares. During inter-trial intervals, a small grey dot appeared at 
fixation. Instructions preceding the next trial were given in white text which 
indicated the target crosses for the next trial (‘Red crosses’ or ‘Upright yellow / 
inverted green’). On experimental trials (see below), a diagonal line appearing 
below fixation indicated the attended diagonal for the next trial. On control trials 
the word ‘ONLY’ appeared instead of the diagonal line.
Design: Participants attended to a rapid succession of crosses presented at 
fixation (central stimuli; Figure 2.2). Perceptual load was manipulated so that for 
identical stimulus parameters, participants performed either a low-load feature 
search (responding to red crosses among other cross colours), or a high-load 
conjunction search (responding to upright yellow and inverted green crosses). 
Concurrently, participants were required to detect the occasional appearance of a 
small, meaningless grey shape (the peripheral stimulus) in two of four peripheral 
locations marked by squares (attended locations were always positioned 
diagonally to each other), while ignoring the shape when it appeared in 
unattended locations. Target crosses are henceforth referred to as central targets, 
and presentations of the peripheral stimulus in the attended diagonal are referred 
to as peripheral targets. Central targets and peripheral stimuli never appeared 
simultaneously. On experimental trials participants monitored for the appearance 
of both central and peripheral targets. Control trials, in which participants only 
monitored for central targets, were also included to verify that the load 














Figure 2.2. Experiment 1: The sequence of events during a trial. At the beginning of each 
trial, a written instruction defined the central targets for that trial. Here red crosses were 
designated as central targets, making this a low perceptual load trial. A diagonal line indicated the 
two attended squares for peripheral target detection (the word ‘ONLY’ replaced the line on 
control trials). Here the top right and bottom left squares were attended. The instructions were 
displayed for 2 s. Subsequent stimulus presentation consisted of a series of central stimuli 
appearing for 250 ms each with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) of 750 ms; peripheral place­
holder squares which were presented constantly; and peripheral stimuli appearing occasionally at 
random locations within the squares. Note that the stimulus sequence parameters were identical 
under all conditions. Indicated are central stimuli serving as targets under low and high 
perceptual load. Also indicated are target and non-target peripheral stimuli. Image not to scale.
For central targets, a 2 (load: Low, high) by 2 (experimental or control trial) 
factorial design was therefore employed. Participants were only required to 
detect peripheral targets on experimental trials. Performance measures were 
recorded separately for low and high perceptual load. RTs and accuracy rates 
were measured for central targets in both experimental and control trials. For 
peripheral targets, detection (hit) and false alarm rates, as well as d ’ (a criterion-
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free measure of sensitivity1) and c (a measure of reporting criterion2) scores were 
recorded.
Procedure: Trial instructions appeared on the screen for 2 s before each trial. 
The instructions indicated the perceptual load for central targets (‘Red crosses’ 
for low load; ‘Upright yellow / inverted green’ for high load), and the attended 
locations for peripheral targets (one or the other diagonal line on experimental 
trials, or the word ‘ONLY’ on control trials). The instructions disappeared and 
were replaced by the central crosses and four peripheral place-holder squares 
(see Figure 2.2 for a schematic diagram of trial sequence). Each cross was 
displayed for 250 ms, followed by a blank period of 500 ms before the 
appearance of the next cross. Participants were instructed to press a keyboard key 
(the left arrow) with their right index finger as quickly as possible whenever a 
central target appeared. Responses were recorded as correct if they were made 
within a response window of 1500 ms following central target onset. Cross order 
(colour and orientation) was randomized, with the constraint that two target 
crosses could not appear on successive presentations (to avoid overlap of 
response windows). Each trial lasted 39.75 s, during which 53 crosses were 
presented. Of these, four (7.5%) were target crosses (two upright and two 
inverted red crosses under low load; two upright yellow and two inverted green 
crosses under high load).
1 This measure was calculated using the formula d'= Z( H ) — Z(F ), where Z(H) stands for 
the Z-score associated with the probability of a Hit, and Z(F) for that associated with the 
probability of a False alarm (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991).
2 This measure was calculated using the formula C = —0.5[Z(H) + Z(F)] (Macmillan & 
Creelman, 1991).
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The place-holder squares were constantly present throughout the trial. At 
random times (but not within the first 2.5 s of a trial, to allow participants to 
become engaged in the central target search), the grey shape serving as 
peripheral stimulus appeared in a random location within one of the squares. 
Peripheral stimuli appeared for 250 ms, always simultaneously with a central 
stimulus. Importantly, peripheral stimuli never appeared at the same time as a 
central target. Participants were instructed to press a keyboard key (the left alt) 
with their left index finger whenever they detected a peripheral target (a 
peripheral stimulus presented in an attended location). Responses were recorded 
as correct if they were made within a response window of 2000 ms following 
peripheral target onset. To avoid an overlap of response windows, peripheral 
stimuli could not appear within 2000 ms of a previous peripheral stimulus 
(regardless of whether it was a target or not). To avoid any priming effects, 
peripheral stimuli could also not appear in the same location within less than 7 s 
of the previous presentation. On each trial, around 9-12 stimuli were presented in 
peripheral locations. On average, half of them were peripheral targets (appearing 
in the attended diagonal).
An inter-trial interval of 5 s followed each 39.75 s trial. During this period a 
grey central fixation dot appeared on the screen. This was followed by the 
instructions for the next trial. Each block comprised six trials, one trial of each 
type (2 load conditions by 3 possible instructions regarding peripheral targets: 
Attend to one or the other diagonal on experimental trials, or the word ‘only’ for 
control trials in which only central targets were to be detected). The experiment 
consisted of six blocks, with a participant-terminated break between blocks.
Trials of the same type could not occur in the same place in different blocks, and
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perceptual load within a block alternated between low and high. The load of the 
first trial in a block alternated between blocks. The load of the first trial in the 
first block was counterbalanced across participants.
At the beginning of the experimental session, each participant was shown an 
image of the peripheral stimulus. Participants then performed one practice block 
in which the peripheral stimulus was brighter than it would be in the actual 
experiment (RGB values: 26, 26, 26), and another practice block in which the 
peripheral stimulus was the same as that used in the experiment. The order of 
trials in the practice blocks was the same as in the first block of the experiment.
2.2.3 Results and discussion
Central target detection: To verify that the perceptual load manipulation 
was effective, RTs and accuracy rates for central target detection were entered 
into 2 (Load: Low, high) by 2 (trial type: experimental, control) repeated- 
measures ANOVAs. For RTs, the analysis revealed a main effect of load (F(i,io) = 
157.36, MSE = 1747.04, p < 0.001) and a main effect of trial type (F(i,io) = 19.63, 
MSE = 1340.34; p = 0.001), but no interaction (F(i,io) = 2.33, MSE = 489.51, ns; 
see Table 2.1).
For accuracy rates (the percentage of detected central targets), the analysis 
again revealed a main effect of load (F(i,io) = 22.91, MSE = 9.9* 10'3, p = 0.001) 
and a main effect of trial type (F(i,io) = 8.83, MSE = 4.35* 10'3; p = 0.014), but no 
interaction (F < 1, ns\ see Table 2.2).
For both measures, the main effects are easy to interpret: RTs were slower 
and accuracy rates lower under high (compared to low) perceptual load.
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Table 2.1. Experiment 1: Mean RTs for central target detection, in ms (numbers 
in parentheses represent 1 standard error of the mean)
Perceptual load Effect of load
Low High (high -  low)
Control trials 534 (21) 682 (20) 148
Experimental trials 573 (23) 741 (21) 168
Similarly, Reaction times were slower and accuracy rates lower in 
experimental (compared to control) trials. This indicates a performance cost 
associated with higher perceptual load, as well as with the extra requirements of 
peripheral target detection. Importantly, the absence of an interaction indicates 
that the cost incurred by adding the peripheral detection did not significantly 
modulate the effect of perceptual load. Hence, the load manipulation can be 
considered reliable regardless of whether it is being performed on its own or 
concurrently with detection of unrelated targets. Therefore, the next experiments 
did not include control trials.
Table 2.2. Experiment 1: Mean accuracy rates for central target detection, in 
percentages (numbers in parentheses represent 1 standard error of the mean)
Perceptual load Effect of load
Low High (low -  high)
Control trials 98.2(1) 85.8 (4) 12.4
Experimental trials 94.3 (2) 77.9 (4) 16.4
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Peripheral target detection: The mean d’ scores, mean percentages of hits 
and false alarms and c (criterion) scores for peripheral target detection, as a 
function of perceptual load, are presented in Table 2.3. In order to assess 
sensitivity while taking both detection and false alarm rates into account, 
criterion-free d’ scores were calculated for each participant under low and high 
perceptual load. As predicted, peripheral target detection was affected by 
perceptual load at fixation, d’ scores were reduced under high load compared to 
low load, t(io) = 3.169, SEM = 0.13, p = 0.01 (two-tailed). Visual sensitivity in 
the periphery was therefore impaired by high perceptual load at fixation. The 
constituent measures of the d’-score were similarly affected: Detection rates 
(hits) were lower under high load compared to low load, and participants made 
more false alarms under high load than under low load, though these trends only 
reached significance using one-tailed tests (hits: t(i0) = 1.869, SEM = 0.016, p = 
0.046; false alarms: t(io) = 2.08, SEM = 0.0013, p = 0.032). It should be noted 
that across all participants and conditions, only a single false alarm could have 
been due to a failure to respond within the specified response window for
Table 2.3. Experiment 1: Mean percentages of hits and false alarms and mean d’ 
and c scores for peripheral target detection as a function of perceptual load at 
fixation (numbers in parentheses represent 1 standard error of the mean)
Perceptual load Hit rate (%) FA rate (%) d’ c
Low 87.6 (2.6) 0.09 (0.04) 4.35 (0.12) 0.93 (0.07)
High 84.5 (2.9) 0.34 (0.1) 3.93 (0.14) 0.87 (0.09)
FA = false alarm
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peripheral targets (as it was given more than 2000 ms after an undetected 
peripheral target). Finally, a paired-sample t-test revealed no effect of perceptual 
load on the criterion-measure c (t(io) = 0.7, SEM = 0.08, ns). The effect of load 
on hit rates, therefore, cannot be attributed to a criterion shift (e.g., participants 
adopting a more stringent criterion for reporting peripheral targets under high 
load).
Importantly, the effects described above occurred despite peripheral targets 
never occurring simultaneously with a central target. These effects cannot, 
therefore, be attributed to a two-target cost (e.g., Duncan, 1980). The effect of 
central-target perceptual load on peripheral target detection can also not be 
attributed to a form of ‘attentional blink’ (Shapiro, Amell, & Raymond, 1997). 
Here, peripheral targets could only appear a minimum of 750 ms after the onset 
of a central target (and on average they were presented over 2 s from the onset of 
the last central target), whereas the attentional blink subsides completely by 500 
ms after the onset of the first target (Shapiro et al, 1997).
However, a different issue may have had led to an artefactual inflation of d’ 
scores under both load conditions. This issue was addressed in Experiment 2.
2.3 Experiment 2
2.3.1 Introduction
The results of Experiment 1 showed that increasing perceptual load for 
central targets caused a reduction in visual sensitivity to peripheral targets.
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Participants became less aware of peripheral targets when central target detection 
exhausted their attentional resources. However, it should be noted that for both 
high and low perceptual load, the sensitivity measure d’ was very high (3.93 and 
4.35 for high and low load, respectively). Peripheral target detection was thus 
nearly optimal under both conditions (a d’ score of 4.65 conforms to 99% 
detection and 1% false alarms, and is often considered the effective ceiling for 
sensitivity measurement; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). For such extreme 
results, very small differences in detection or false alarm rates can make a big 
difference to the final d’ score. Importantly, the d’ score takes into account the 
probability of false alarms (i.e. the number of false alarms as a fraction of the 
number of opportunities for a false alarm). As described above, the number of 
false alarms was greater under high perceptual load. However, as there were no 
specific, designated times during trials when participants were required to decide 
whether or not a peripheral target had appeared, calculating the probability of 
false alarms entailed dividing the number of false alarms by the total number of 
non-target central-stimulus presentations. This led to extremely small probability 
values (see Table 2.3), which may have artificially inflated d’ scores under both 
high and low perceptual load. As at extreme values, small differences in false 
alarm rates can make a big difference to d’ scores, it is possible that the 
magnitude (though not the direction) of the effect of load at fixation on 
peripheral target detection in Experiment 1 was exaggerated.
The aim of Experiment 2 was to address these issues by making peripheral 
target detection more challenging, as well as constraining the opportunities (and 
therefore the probabilities) for both hits and false alarms when detecting 
peripheral targets. Presentations of the peripheral target were again time-locked
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to the onset of a central stimulus, but were shorter than in Experiment 1, and 
were followed by a mask appearing over all four peripheral place-holder squares. 
In addition, masks would occasionally appear without a peripheral stimulus 
preceding them. Thus, the probability of hits could be calculated as the 
proportion of detected peripheral targets out of all target + mask presentations, 
and the probability of false alarms could be calculated as the proportion of 
responses to masks (not preceded by peripheral targets) out of all presentations of 
such masks. The number of mask presentations was much smaller than the 
number of non-target central stimulus presentations (which served as the basis 
for the calculation of false alarm probability in Experiment 1). Therefore, 
sensitivity measures obtained in Experiment 2 should not be inflated by 
artificially low false-alarm probabilities. This should lead to more realistic d’ 
measures than in Experiment 1, under both high and low perceptual loads. If the 
effect of load on visual sensitivity found in Experiment 1 was not exaggerated 
due to extreme probability values, the effect should be replicated, with similar 
magnitude, in Experiment 2.
2.3.2 Method
Participants: Ten new volunteers took part in the experiment. Their mean 
age was 27 (range 19-39), six were female and all were right-handed. All had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli and apparatus: These were the same as in Experiment 1, except for 
the addition of a mask consisting of grey lines (RGB values: 128, 128, 128) on a
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black background. The dimensions of the mask were similar to the inner 
dimansions of the peripheral place-holder squares. It appeared over all four 
squares after each peripheral stimulus and, occasionally, without a preceding 
peripheral stimulus (see Figure 2.3).
Design and procedure: These were similar to Experiment 1, except for the 
following differences: First, there were no control trials. Participants performed 
both central and peripheral target detection on all trials. In addition, masks 
(Figure 2.3) appeared after each peripheral target, after each peripheral non­





Figure 2.3. Experiment 2: Sequence of stimuli with masks. The sequence during trials was 
similar to that o f Experiment 1, except that peripheral stimuli were only shown for the 100 o f the 
250 ms of central stimulus presentation. During the remaining 150 ms, a mask (shown enlarged, 
top right) was presented over all four peripheral squares. When masks were presented without a 
preceding peripheral stimulus, they appeared during the last 150 ms of central stimulus 
presentation.
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any preceding peripheral stimulus (the proportion was a third for each of these 
three types of mask). Like peripheral stimuli, masks could also not appear 
simultaneously with a central target. Peripheral stimuli were still presented 
simultaneously with non-target central stimuli, but were now presented during 
the first 100 ms of the 250 ms central-stimulus presentation. Masks were 
presented during the remaining 150 ms. When masks were presented on their 
own, they appeared during the last 150 ms of central-stimulus presentation.
Another difference was that more central targets were presented than in 
Experiment 1 -  instead of 4, between 8 and 16 (average 12.5) central targets 
were presented on each trial. This was done in order to prevent a shift in 
prioritization towards peripheral target detection, which may have occurred as 
the inclusion of masks, both after peripheral non-targets and on their own, meant 
there were many more attention-capturing events in the periphery than in 
Experiment 1.
The addition of more central targets, and the constraint that peripheral targets 
and masks could not appear simultaneously with central targets, meant that trials 
had to be made longer for a sufficiently large number of peripheral targets and 
masks to be presented. Trials were therefore 48 s long; 64 central stimuli were 
presented in each trial.
Finally, each participant completed four blocks of trials. Each block 
comprised eight trials, arranged in an ABBABAAB order (with A and B 
denoting high and low perceptual load or vice-versa) to minimize order effects. 
Trials of the same type did not occur more than once in the same place in a 
block. The perceptual load of the first trial within a block alternated between 
blocks, and was counterbalanced across participants.
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2.3.3 Results and discussion
Central target detection: As in Experiment 1, RTs under high perceptual 
load (M = 592 ms) were longer than under low perceptual load (M = 462 ms), t(9 ) 
= 12.548, SEM = 10.384 ms, p < 0.001. Accuracy rates were lower under high 
(M = 89%) than under low load (M = 94.2%), t(9) = 3.905, SEM = 1.3%, p = 
0.004. Therefore, the load manipulation was again effective.
Peripheral target detection: The mean d’ scores, c scores and mean 
percentages of hits and false alarms for peripheral targets, as a function of 
perceptual load, are presented in Table 2.4. As in Experiment 1, perceptual load 
for central targets significantly affected sensitivity to peripheral targets: d’ scores 
were lower under high than under low perceptual load; t(9) = 3.166, SEM = 
0.1235, p = 0.011. Note that the d’ scores found in this experiment are much 
lower than those found in Experiment 1 (a difference of 1.59 for low load and 
1.57 for high load). Introducing masks as a basis for calculating false-alarm 
probabilities (by having a similar amount of opportunities for hits and false
Table 2.4. Experiment 2: Mean percentage hits and false alarms, and mean d’ 
and c scores for peripheral target detection as a function of perceptual load at 
fixation (numbers in parentheses represent 1 standard error of the mean)
Perceptual load Hit rate (%) FA rate (%) d’ c
Low 69 (5.36) 1 .7  (0.52) 2.75 (0.19) 0.83 (0.09)
High 62 (5.44) 2.9 (0.82) 2.36 (0.22) 0.85 (0.09)
FA = false alarm
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alarms) therefore prevented inflation of d’ scores. Importantly, though the d’ 
scores were significantly lower than in Experiment 1, the magnitude of the load 
effect was almost identical (a difference of 0.39 here versus 0.42 in Experiment 
1).
As in Experiment 1, hit rates for peripheral targets were again affected by 
perceptual load: They were higher under low than under high perceptual load, t<9 ) 
= 4.072, SEM = 0.0172, p = 0.003.
Two kinds of false alarm were examined: Reports of a peripheral target 
following a mask preceded by a peripheral stimulus in an unattended location, 
and reports of a peripheral target following a mask alone. There was a non­
significant trend for more false alarms under high (compared to low) load both 
when masks followed non-target peripheral stimuli (M = 1% versus 3% for low 
and high load, respectively; t(9 ) = 1.242, SEM = 0.0113, ns), and when masks 
appeared without a preceding stimulus (M = 1-5% versus 2.5% for low and high 
load, respectively; t(9 ) = 1.5, SEM = 0.0067, ns). As the average percentage of 
false alarms was the same for both types (2%), they were combined into a single 
measure incorporating all false alarms, which was used in the calculation of the 
d’ score. The combined false alarm rates again showed a non-significant trend 
toward more false alarms under high than under low perceptual load (t(9 ) = 1.585, 
SEM = 0.0076, ns‘, see Table 2.4).
Finally, a paired-sample t-test, used to see whether the effect of load on hit 
rates may not be partly attributed to a criterion shift (e.g., by participants 
adopting a more strict criterion for reporting the peripheral target under high 
load), revealed no effect of perceptual load on the criterion-measure c (t(9 ) = 0.33, 
SEM = 0.07, ns).
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The current design made it possible to examine whether the effect of 
perceptual load on visual sensitivity was due to the higher demands placed 
continuously on attentional resources under high load, or whether it was related 
to central target detection. It is possible, for example, that the effect found for 
peripheral target detection may be driven by a decline in sensitivity to peripheral 
targets immediately following a central target, and that this decline would be 
stronger under high than under low load. If this were the case, then for peripheral 
targets occurring after a longer time, similar performance under both loads would 
be expected and the overall level of performance should be higher than 
immediately following a central target.
To investigate this issue, d’ scores were calculated under each load separately 
for peripheral presentations occurring during the first stimulus presentation 
following a central target (‘near’ presentations), and during presentations 
occurring more than one stimulus after the last central target (‘far’ presentations). 
An examination of the data reveals no effects of target-proximity: Performance 
was worst under high load in the ‘far’ condition (M = 2.38) and slightly better 
under high load in the ‘near’ condition (M = 2.4). Performance under low load 
was better, not worse, in the ‘near’ than in the ‘far’ condition (M = 3.03 and 2.58 
for the ‘near’ and ‘far’ conditions, respectively). Indeed, when the d’ scores were 
entered into a 2 (load: Low or high) by 2 (proximity to the last central target: 
‘near’ or ‘far’) repeated measures ANOVA, a main effect of load was found 
(F(1,9 ) = 11.913, MSE = 0.14; p = 0.007), but there was no significant effect of 
proximity to the last target (F ^ ) = 2.544, MSE = 0.22, ns) and no interaction 
(F(lf9) = 2.756, MSE = 0.177, ns). Rather than a target-related cost, this pattern of 
results is consistent with a view of high perceptual load at fixation as
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continuously exhausting attentional resources to a greater degree than low load, 
leading to a lower level of attentional deployment to the periphery.
2.4 Experiment 3
2.4.1 Introduction
In Experiments 1 and 2, peripheral target detection involved attending to two 
locations while ignoring two others. This raises the question of whether the effect 
of perceptual load for central targets on visual sensitivity to peripheral targets is 
indeed due to reduced attentional capacity under high perceptual load, or whether 
it depends on the need to inhibit input from irrelevant locations. If the former 
option is correct, then the effect of load should occur even when all peripheral 
locations are attended. This possibility was investigated in Experiment 3, in 
which there were no ignored locations -  all four peripheral locations were 
designated as target locations. If the effect of perceptual load on peripheral visual 
sensitivity depends on the need to coordinate attending to relevant stimuli while 
inhibiting irrelevant ones, then this effect should now disappear. If, on the other 
hand, the effect is indeed due to a reduction in attentional capacity, it should be 
found again in this experiment.
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2.4.2 Method
Participants: Ten new volunteers participated in the experiment. Their mean 
age was 22.9 (range 19-39), four were female and eight were right-handed. All 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli, design and procedure: The visual stimuli used in the experiment 
were identical to those of Experiment 2, except that no diagonal lines appeared in 
the trials’ instructions. The design and procedure were similar to those of 
Experiment 2, except for the following differences: All four peripheral locations 
were now used as peripheral target locations, and no locations were to be ignored 
during trials. Peripheral target + mask and mask-only presentations therefore 
appeared with equal probability. To allow for more peripheral targets to be 
presented, the minimal time between peripheral targets in the same location was 
shortened from 7 to 5 s.
2.4.3 Results and discussion
Central target detection: As in the previous two experiments, the perceptual 
load manipulation for central targets was effective. Participants’ RTs were longer 
under high load (M = 568 ms) than under low load (M = 441 ms), t(9 ) = 11.602, 
SEM = 11.01, p < 0.001; and their accuracy levels were lower under high load 
(M = 92%) than under low load (M = 97.8%), t(9) = 3.914, SEM = 1.48%, p = 
0.004.
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Peripheral target detection: The mean d’ and c scores, and mean 
percentages of hits and false alarms for peripheral targets, as a function of 
perceptual load, are presented in Table 2.5. There was a significant effect of 
perceptual load on the sensitivity measure, d’ (t(9 ) = 2.57, SEM = 0.14, p = 0.03). 
High perceptual load at fixation therefore reduced visual sensitivity in the 
periphery even when there was no need to coordinate attention to some locations 
with inhibition of others. Hit rates were lower under high than under low 
perceptual load, but this difference only approached significance in a one-tailed 
t-test (t(9 ) = 1.802, SEM = 2.55%, p = 0.052, one-tailed). Similarly false alarm 
rates were higher under high (compared to low) load, a difference which again 
only approached one-tailed significance (t(9 ) = 1.616, SEM = 0.37%, p = 0.07, 
one-tailed). As in the previous experiments, the criterion measure c did not differ 
significantly between low and high load (t(9 ) = 0.48, SEM = 0.07, ns).
As in Experiment 2, an examination of sensitivity to peripheral targets 
occurring either immediately after a central target (‘near’; mean d’ scores: 3 and 
2.49 for low and high load, respectively) or after a longer period (‘far’; mean d’ 
scores: 2.86 and 2.67 for low and high load, respectively) revealed that the effect
Table 2.5. Experiment 3: Mean percentage hits and false alarms and mean d’ and 
c scores for peripheral target detection as a function of perceptual load at fixation 
(numbers in parentheses represent 1 standard error of the mean)
Perceptual load Hit rate (%) FA rate (%) d’ c
Low 70.5 (5.9) 1 (0.26) 3.03 (0.25) 0.85 (0.09)
High 65.9 (5) 1.6 (0.4) 2.67 (0.2) 0.89 (0.07)
FA = false alarm
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of perceptual load is not driven by a decline in performance under high load 
immediately following a central target. A 2 (load: Low or high) by 2 (proximity 
to last target: ‘near’ of ‘far’) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect 
of load (F(i,9 ) = 8.536, MSE = 0.14, p = 0.017), but no effect of proximity to the 
last target (F(i,9 ) < 1, ns) and no interaction (F(i,9 ) = 1.449, MSE = 0.167, ns).
The results of Experiment 3 rule out the possibility that the effect of 
perceptual load at fixation on visual sensitivity to peripheral targets depends on 
the requirement to coordinate attention to certain peripheral locations while 
ignoring others. Rather, it is consistent with the proposition that when attentional 
resources are consumed by high perceptual load at fixation, lower levels of 
attention are deployed to peripheral locations, resulting in lower sensitivity, and 
therefore reduced awareness of stimuli, in those locations.
The results of Experiments 1 to 3 have established that perceptual load at 
fixation reduces visual sensitivity in the periphery. Furthermore, this effect does 
not require simultaneous presentation of peripheral targets and central ones -  
attending to central stimuli continuously, rather than the actual detection of 





In Experiments 1 to 3, high perceptual load at fixation reduced visual 
sensitivity in the periphery, implying a reduction in the deployment of attention 
to the periphery under high load. However, peripheral targets were always 
presented simultaneously with a central stimulus (albeit not a target). It is 
therefore possible that the presence of central stimuli, which competed with 
peripheral targets for processing (Desimone and Duncan, 1995), was in itself 
sufficient to reduce sensitivity to peripheral targets, and that this effect was 
exacerbated under high perceptual load. Load theory does not stipulate that the 
presence of a competing stimulus is necessary for load effects to occur, though. 
In order to assert that the depletion of attentional resources under high load 
causes the effect, it is necessary to demonstrate that the reduction in peripheral 
visual sensitivity under high perceptual load can occur independently of the 
simultaneous presence of a competing central stimulus.
If the effect of load is indeed due to the depletion of attentional resources 
during processing of central stimuli, then this effect should occur even if 
peripheral targets are presented on their own, during the inter-stimulus-interval 
of central stimuli, rather than simultaneously with a central stimulus. If, on the 
other hand, the effect is due to competition from simultaneously-presented 
central stimuli, then it should only occur during such simultaneous presentations, 
and not when the peripheral stimulus is presented on its own. In the present 
experiment, these possibilities were investigated by presenting peripheral targets
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both simultaneously with central stimuli (as in Experiments 1 to 3) and during 
the central stimuli’s inter-stimulus-interval.
2.5.2 Method
Participants: Eleven new participants took part in this experiment. Their 
mean age was 23.5 (range 21-30), six were female and ten were right handed. All 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli, design and procedure: The stimuli and procedure were identical to 
those of Experiment 3, except for the following changes. Peripheral targets and 
masks could appear either at the same time as central stimuli (as in the previous 
experiments; this is henceforth referred to as the simultaneous condition) or 
during central stimuli’s inter-stimulus-interval (the non-simultaneous condition; 
see Figure 2.4). In the non-simultaneous condition, the target + mask 
presentation occurred in the latter 250 ms period of the central stimuli’s 500 ms 
inter-stimulus-interval. In both the simultaneous and non-simultaneous 
conditions masks could be presented without a preceding peripheral target. The 
timing of the masks was the same (100 ms or 600 ms after central stimulus onset) 
regardless of whether they were preceded by a peripheral target. On each trial, 
around half of the peripheral targets and masks were randomly assigned to the 
simultaneous condition, and around half to the non-simultaneous condition.
As before, central targets could not be presented simultaneously with a 
peripheral target (in the simultaneous condition). In addition, the central stimulus 
following a peripheral target in the simultaneous condition, and the central
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Figure 2.4. Experiment 4: Schematic timeline of the central and peripheral stimulus 
presentations. In the simultaneous condition (top line) the onset o f the peripheral target was 
simultaneous with that o f the central stimulus. The peripheral target was presented for 100 ms, 
followed by a mask presented for 150 ms. The offset of the mask was simultaneous with that of 
the central stimulus. In the non-simultaneous condition, the sequence was the same except the 
onset o f the peripheral target occured 250 ms after the offset of the last central stimulus.
stimuli before and after non-simultaneous peripheral targets, could not be central 
targets.
The experiment therefore had a 2 (load: low, high) by 2 (peripheral target 
timing: simultaneous, non-simultaneous) factorial design for peripheral target 
detection. As there were four conditions (rather than two as in the previous 
experiments), each participant performed eight blocks of trials (rather than four 
as in Experiments 2 and 3), to ensure a sufficient amount of target presentations 
in each condition.
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2.5.3 Results and discussion
Central target detection: As in the previous experiments, mean RTs were 
longer under high perceptual load (M = 576) than under low load (M = 440), t(io) 
= 10.424, SEM = 13.082, p < 0.001. Accuracy was lower under high (M =
93.2%) than under low (M = 98.7%) perceptual load, t(io) = 6.055, SEM = 0.91%,
p<  0.001.
Peripheral target detection: If the effect of perceptual load at fixation on 
visual sensitivity in the periphery is indeed due to lower levels of attention being 
continuously deployed to the periphery under high load, then this should occur 
for the non-simultaneous condition as well as the simultaneous one. Therefore, 
there should be a main effect of load on peripheral target detection, with no 
effect of peripheral-target timing and no interaction. If, on the other hand, the 
effect of load is due to competition from the central stimulus, then it should 
occur for the simultaneous but not the non-simultaneous condition. There should, 
therefore, be a main effect of timing and an interaction between timing and load 
(though not necessarily a main effect of load, due to the absence of an effect in 
the non-simultaneous condition).
The mean d’ scores, mean percentages of hits and false alarms and the 
criterion measure c for peripheral targets as a function of perceptual load are 
presented in Table 2.6. d’ scores, hit rates, false alarm rates and the criterion 
measure c were entered into 2 (load: low, high) by 2 (peripheral target timing: 
simultaneous, non-simultaneous) repeated-measures ANOVAs. For d’ scores, 
there was a main effect of load (F^jo) = 5.056, MSE = 7.2* 10'2, p = 0.048),
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Table 2.6. Experiment 4: Mean percentages of hits and false alarms, and mean d’ 
and c scores for peripheral target detection as a function of perceptual load at 
fixation and of peripheral target timing (numbers in parentheses represent 1 










Low Simultaneous 80 (3.1) 4.8 (2.9) 2.92 (0.27) 0.56 (0.08)
Low Non-simultaneous 78.2 (2.7) 5.2 (2.8) 2.82 (0.28) 0.59 (0.09)
High Simultaneous 77 (3.2) 4.8 (2.8) 2.76 (0.27) 0.61 (0.07)
High Non-simultaneous 74.3 (3.4) 6.1 (3.7) 2.61 (0.3) 0.62 (0.07)
FA = false alarm
indicating reduced sensitivity under high perceptual load (Table 2.6). There was 
no main effect of timing (F(i,io) = 1.322, MSE = 0.131, ns), and no interaction 
between load and timing (F(i,io) < 1, ns). For hit rates, there was a main effect of 
load (F(i,io) = 6.083, MSE = 2.18*10'3, p = 0.033), indicating lower hit rates 
under high load. There was no main effect of peripheral target timing (F(i,io) = 
1.763, MSE = 3.19*10'3, ns) and no interaction (F(i,io) < 1, ns). For false alarms 
there were no significant effects (load: F(i,io) < 1, ns; timing: F(uo) = 2.347, MSE 
= 3.74* 10'4, ns; interaction: F(i,io) < 1, ns). There were also no significant effects 
for the criterion measure c (F < 1 for load, timing and their interaction).
These results clearly show that while attentional resources were being 
consumed by high central perceptual load, visual sensitivity in the periphery 
decreased. Importantly, this effect occurred independently of the simultaneous 
physical presence of a central stimulus. This demonstrates that the effect of 
perceptual load at fixation on visual sensitivity in the periphery was the result of 
lower levels of attention being continuously deployed to the periphery under high




The results of Experiment 4 showed that the depletion of attentional 
resources under high perceptual load at fixation -  rather than the mere presence 
of a competing stimulus -  leads to a reduction in peripheral visual sensitivity. It 
should be noted that under high perceptual load, peripheral target presentation in 
the non-simultaneous condition occurred within the period in which the central 
stimulus was being processed. This can be inferred from the fact that the mean 
RT to central targets under high load (nearly 600 ms) was longer than the 
difference between the onsets of peripheral targets and the central stimuli 
preceding them (500 ms). The recruitment of attentional resources by central 
stimuli may therefore occur within a limited temporal window following each 
central stimulus. Hence, even in the context of continuous high-load central 
target detection, sensitivity to peripheral stimuli presented outside this window 
may improve compared to presentations within the window. Alternatively, it is 
possible that the effects of load observed in Experiments 1 to 4 simply reflect 
strategic effects due to attentional set (e.g., Theeuwes, Kramer & Belopolsky, 
2004), with central stimuli being prioritized over peripheral ones to a greater 
extent under high perceptual load. If this is the case, the temporal asynchrony
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between central stimulus and peripheral target onset should not matter.
Therefore, in this experiment the inter-stimulus-interval of the central stimuli 
was lengthened to 750 ms (compared with 500 ms in the previous experiments), 
to allow for the inclusion of a period of time after the processing of the central 
stimulus has ended (-600 ms under high load) where attentional resources should 
be free for deployment to the periphery. Peripheral stimuli were presented at two 
possible points within the inter-stimulus-interval: Either 500 ms after central- 
stimulus onset (near condition, similar to the non-simultaneous condition of 
Experiment 4, and within the processing window of the central stimuli under 
high load), or 750 ms after central-stimulus onset (far condition). If the 
engagement of attentional resources in central-stimulus processing is indeed the 
cause of the perceptual load effect, then this effect should be replicated for the 
near, but not the far condition, leading to an interaction between load and 
peripheral target timing.
2.6.2 Method
Participants: Twelve new volunteers took part in the experiment. One 
participant was excluded from the analysis due to poor central target detection 
(<70% under high load) and one for slow RTs to central targets (mean under high 
load: 790 ms), which meant his responses were given within the timeframe of the 
far condition, which was designed to occur after processing of the central 
stimulus was over. The remaining ten participants had a mean age of 25.8 (range
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21-34). Five were female and nine were right handed. All had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli, design and procedure: These were identical to those of Experiment 
4, except for the following differences. The inter-stimulus interval for central 
stimuli was 750 ms (an SOA of 1000 ms), as opposed to 500 ms (or a 750 ms 
SOA) in the previous experiments. Additionally, peripheral targets were never 
presented simultaneously with central stimuli. They were presented either 500 
ms after central-stimulus onset (near condition, similar to the non-simultaneous 
condition of Experiment 4), or 750 ms after central stimulus onset (far condition; 
see Figure 2.5). The experiment therefore had a 2 (load: low, high) by 2 






Figure 2.5. Experiment 5: Schematic timeline of the central and peripheral stimulus 
presentations. The SOA of the central stimuli in this experiment was 1000 ms (as opposed to 
750 ms in the previous experiments). The near condition was similar to the non-simultaneous 
condition of Experiment 4, with peripheral target onset 500 ms after the onset o f a central 
stimulus. In the far condition peripheral target onset was 750 ms after central stimulus onset. In 
the actual experiment only a single peripheral target could appear in the interval between two 
central stimuli.
Target (100ms) Mask (150ms) 
/
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As in the previous experiments, half of the peripheral stimuli were masks not 
preceded by a peripheral target. Timing of masks was the same (600 and 850 ms 
after central-stimulus onset for the near and far conditions, respectively) 
regardless of whether they were preceded by a peripheral target or not. The 
longer SOA between central stimuli meant each trial was longer than in the 
previous experiments (64 versus 48 s). Therefore, the experiment comprised only 
six (rather than eight) blocks of trials. The total number of peripheral targets was 
roughly the same as in the previous experiments, though, as peripheral targets 
were presented with the same frequency as in Experiments 3 and 4 (i.e. a 5 s 
minimum between peripheral target presentations in the same location).
2.6.3 Results and discussion
Central target detection: Mean RTs were again longer under high 
perceptual load (M = 622) than under low load (M = 464), t(io) = 18.225, SEM = 
8.62 ms, p < 0.001. Accuracy was lower under high (M = 96.5%) than under low 
(M = 99.1%) perceptual load, tqo) = 3.881, SEM = 0.67%, p = 0.004.
Peripheral target detection: The mean d’ and c scores and mean percentages of 
hits and false alarms for peripheral targets, as a function of perceptual load, are 
presented in Table 2.7. d’ scores, hit and false alarm rates and c scores were 
entered into 2 (perceptual load: low, high) by 2 (peripheral target timing: near, 
far) repeated-measures ANOVAs. Critically, for d’ scores there were no main 
effects (load: F(i,9 ) < 1, ns; timing: F(i,9 ) = 1.17, MSE = 0.121, ns), but there was 
a significant interaction (F ^ ) = 12.018, MSE = 2.55* 10‘2, p = 0.007). Paired
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Table 2.7. Experiment 5: Mean percentage hits and false alarms and mean d’ and 
c scores for peripheral target detection as a function of perceptual load at fixation 
and of peripheral target timing (numbers in parentheses represent 1 standard 







F A  rate
(%)
d’ c
Low near 75.1 (3.6) 1 (0.6) 3.06 (0.21) 0.80 (0.07)
Low far 76.2 (3.3) 1.1 (0.3) 3.01 (0.14) 0.78 (0.06)
High near 67.8 (3.9) 1.3 (1.1) 2.83 (0.19) 0.93 (0.08)
High far 76.5 (3.6) 1 (0.7) 3.13 (0.19) 0.79 (0.06)
FA = false alarm
sample t-tests revealed that the interaction was driven by a strong effect of load 
in the near condition (t(9) = 2.451, SEM = 0.095, p = 0.037), indicating a 
reduction in sensitivity under high load, coupled with the absence of an effect in 
the far condition (t(9) < -.96, ns). For hit rates there was no main effect of timing 
(F(i,9) = 1.845, MSE = 1.3*10'2, ns), but there was a main effect of load (F ^ ) = 
5.803, MSE = 2.11*10'3, p = 0.039), and importantly, there was a significant 
interaction between load and timing (F(i,9 ) = 15.271, MSE = 9.46* 10'4, p = 
0.004). Paired-sample t-tests revealed that whereas in the near condition there 
was a strong effect of load (t(9 ) = 4.168, SEM = 0.017, p = 0.002), this effect was 
completely absent in the far condition (t(9 ) < -.172, ns). There were no significant 
effects for either false alarms, (load: F(i,9 ) < 1, ns; timing: F(i>9 ) < 1, ns; 
interaction: F(i>9 ) = 2.25, MSE = 1.78* 10'5, ns) or the criterion measure c (load: 
F(i,9) = 3.962, MSE = 1.34*10'2, ns; timing: F(i,9) = 1.34, MSE = 4.88*10’2, ns; 
interaction: F(i,9 ) = 4.817, MSE = 8.24* 10’3, ns).
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As predicted, the results of the present experiment replicate the effect of 
perceptual load at fixation on visual sensitivity in the periphery for the near, but 
not the far condition. This confirms that the effect of load indeed reflects the 
depletion of attentional resources during processing of the central stimulus.
When this processing is finished, attention levels -  and therefore sensitivity -  are 
no longer reduced in the periphery. These results rule out the possibility that 
strategy, or attentional set (Theeuwes et al, 2004) determine performance in the 
different perceptual load conditions.
2.7 Chapter Discussion
The results of the present study demonstrate a clear relationship between 
attention and perceptual awareness, thus addressing the question posed at the 
beginning of this chapter regarding the extent to which conscious perception 
depends on attention. Furthermore, they establish that the predictions of load 
theory (Lavie 1995, 2005) hold not only for perceptual processing (which may or 
may not be conscious) but for visual awareness as well. Manipulating perceptual 
load at fixation modulated conscious awareness of concurrently-presented 
peripheral stimuli: Experiments 1 and 2 established that under high (compared to 
low) central perceptual load, visual sensitivity in the periphery is reduced. 
Experiment 3 showed that this effect is indeed due to a reduction in attentional 
capacity, rather than the need to coordinate attention and inhibition in different 
locations. Experiment 4 confirmed that the effect of load is independent of the 
physical presence of a competing central stimulus, by replicating the effect for
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peripheral targets presented in the absence of any other stimuli. Finally, 
Experiment 5 showed that the effect of load indeed reflects the depletion of 
attentional resources during processing of the central stimulus, rather than an 
effect of strategy. Taken together, these results support a view of visual 
awareness as a function of available processing resources. As proposed by load 
theory, the level of available perceptual capacity influences whether or not a 
visual stimulus will reach awareness.
The effects of perceptual load on indirect measures of stimulus detection, 
such as RTs and stimulus-evoked neural activity, have been demonstrated before 
(Beck & Lavie, 2005; La vie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie & Fox, 2000; 
Pessoa et al, 2002; Pinsk et al, 2003; Rees et al, 1997; Schwartz et al, 2005; Yi et 
al, 2004). However, a direct effect of load on visual awareness has previously 
been demonstrated only by showing a load effect on inattentional blindness 
(Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2006). While those results were suggestive of the 
role of attention in visual awareness, the present study overcomes various 
problems associated with the inattentional blindness paradigm. The possibility 
that inattentional blindness reflects rapid forgetting of an unexpected stimulus 
(Barber & Folkard, 1972; Bashinski & Bacharach, 1980; Davies et al, 1983; 
Teichner & Krebs, 1974 ; Wolfe, 1999) was avoided by using stimuli that were 
fully expected, and by being able to collect responses to these stimuli 
immediately (and not following another response, as in inattentional blindness) 
due to using a continuous monitoring paradigm where the two types of target 
were never presented simultaneously.
Previous research has suggested that divided attention only leads to reduced 
performance when targets appear in a display simultaneously and require
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independent identification and a separate response (Duncan, 1980). The non­
simultaneity of the two types of target in all five experiments of this chapter (and 
of central and peripheral stimuli in Experiments 4 and 5) rules out any 
explanation of the results in terms of such a two-target cost.
The results can also not reflect a de-prioritization of responding to peripheral 
targets under high load (goal neglect), as this would have led to fewer false 
alarms in addition to the decline in hit rates, leading to an effect of load on the 
criterion measure c -  but in fact the trend was for more false alarms under high 
load, and load had no effect on criterion in all five experiments.
Finally, the present paradigm also made it possible to individually assess hit 
and false alarms rates. This made it possible to calculate an objective, unbiased 
measure of visual sensitivity for each participant under both low and high 
perceptual load (rather than simply collecting a single data point indicating a hit 
or a miss, as in inattentional blindness).
Though the present results are predicted by load theory, they seem to 
contradict previous evidence supporting the claim that though visual 
discrimination requires attentional capacity, detection occurs in a capacity free, 
automatic manner: When two visual discrimination tasks are performed 
concurrently, performance on one task comes at the expense of performance on 
the other -  but when one of the tasks involves simple detection, there is no such 
decline in performance (Braun, Koch, Lee, & Itti, 2001). Similarly, detection of 
luminance increments seems to be capacity free, whereas discriminating 
luminance increments from decrements depends on the allocation of attention 
(Bonnel, Stein, & Bertucci, 1992). However, in neither of the above cases was 
perceptual load manipulated directly. This precludes conclusions regarding the
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role of load in perception. Furthermore, the stimuli used in these studies were 
highly salient and unlikely to test the limitations of the visual system.
More relevant, perhaps, are the results of experiments that also used salient 
stimuli but compared single with dual-task performance: Braun & Sagi (1990; 
1991) showed that the detection of a differently-oriented line that pops out of a 
uniformly oriented texture does not seem to decline with the addition of a 
concurrent discrimination task, whereas the discrimination of different 
orientations does (see also Sagi & Julesz, 1985a; 1985b). However, a later study 
(Joseph, Chun & Nakayama, 1997) showed that while oriented-line detection is 
indeed unimpaired under dual-task compared to single-task conditions when the 
other task involves orientation discrimination, a dual-task cost does arise when 
the other task is a demanding RSVP letter task. This implies that a sufficient 
level of demands on attention can indeed reduce detection performance for other, 
concurrent stimuli. With regard to the findings presented here, it is also important 
to remember that a single versus dual-task manipulation does not parallel 
perceptual load manipulations. The addition of a task affects not only the load on 
attention, but also adds demands on response production and memory, which 
may cause effects accounted for in terms of goal neglect, reprioritization of tasks 
and postponement of responses to secondary task stimuli which could lead to a 
higher probability of memory decay. The results presented in this chapter, on the 
other hand, demonstrate an effect of perceptual load on visual sensitivity which 
cannot be explained by any of these alternative accounts. These results, therefore, 
provide direct evidence that conscious perception depends on the allocation of 
limited-capacity attention, and that depleting attentional resources by imposing 
high perceptual load on one stimulus can reduce awareness of another.
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Chapter 3:
The effect of perceptual load on the 
temporal resolution of visual awareness
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3.1 Chapter Introduction
In the previous chapter, I employed a perceptual load manipulation (Lavie 
1995, 2005) to establish that the availability of processing resources influences 
visual awareness. In the series of experiments described in that chapter, detection 
of particular shapes in specific spatial locations was required. But subjective 
experience of the physical world depends not only on the spatial arrangement of 
the environment. It also depends on the temporal pattern of stimulation. For 
example, flickering and steady light can be presented in the same location yet 
evoke a very different conscious experience due to their different temporal 
patterns. Does attention play a role in temporal aspects of visual awareness? In 
this chapter I use perceptual load to investigate whether the availability of 
processing resources affects the temporal resolution of visual awareness -  the 
ability to distinguish rapid changes in light intensity, thus detecting temporal 
patterns embedded in visual stimuli (Levine, 2000; Yeshurun & Levy, 2003; 
Yeshurun, 2004).
Although the temporal pattern of visual stimulation clearly has a great 
influence on our subjective experience of the world, surprisingly little research 
(compared to the amount of research on attention to spatial patterns) has 
attempted to directly investigate the effects of attention in this domain. This 
could be due to our subjective experience of time as a continuous, seamless 
perceptual dimension. But does this intuition reflect the way the visual system 
works? It is indeed conceivable that the temporal aspects of visual perception are 
continuous and capacity-free -  that is, limited only by the firing-rate ceiling of
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visual neurons. If this is the case, attentional manipulations should not affect the 
visual system’s ability to perceive temporal patterns.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that rather than being continuous, 
visual awareness relies on discrete processing epochs, or ‘snapshots’ (Crick & 
Koch, 2003; VanRullen & Koch, 2003). Research supporting this proposition 
includes the finding that the ‘wagon-wheel illusion’ -  in which wheels in movies 
or under stroboscopic lighting conditions may appear to rotate backwards -  can 
also occur in real life under natural lighting (Purves, Paydarfar, & Andrews, 
1996). This has been interpreted as indicating that normal motion perception 
consists of processing a series of separate snapshots (Crick & Koch, 2003). 
Recently, this illusion has been shown to be modulated by attention, almost 
disappearing in the absence of focused attention (VanRullen, Reddy & Koch, 
2005). But though this finding demonstrates that attention can modulate the way 
temporal information is integrated within a spatial pattern, it does not shed light 
on the extent to which attention is necessary in the actual detection of temporal 
patterns.
In a different study, an attentional blink paradigm was used to observe the 
effects of limited attentional capacity on temporal integration (the ability to 
combine different stimuli separated by a temporal gap into a single unified 
percept; Visser & Enns, 2001). In the attentional blink two targets are presented, 
separated by a brief temporal interval, and participants are required to identify 
both. Identification of the second target is severely impaired if it is displayed a 
short time (usually less than 500 ms) after the first target (Shapiro et al, 1998). 
Detection of the second target is worse the shorter the lag between the first and 
second target, a finding that has been attributed to attentional resources being
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consumed by the first target, rendering them temporarily unavailable to process 
the second target (Chun & Potter, 1995; Shapiro et al, 1998). Visser and Enns 
(2001) used this phenomenon to demonstrate that when task performance for the 
second target depended on temporally integrating two images (temporally- 
separate dot-matrices which together formed the second target -  a square with 
one missing dot that had to be spatially localized), a typical attentional blink 
pattern was found, with performance improving as the lag from the first target 
increased. The greater attentional availability increased both accuracy and the 
duration over which successive stimuli could be integrated. Attentional 
resources, therefore, play a role in temporal integration. But temporal integration 
of spatial patterns (perceptually unifying temporally distinct events) is not the 
same as temporal resolution (being able to tell such events apart).
Another recent study (Carrasco & McElree, 2001) showed that transient 
attention, induced for a brief duration by a spatial cue, accelerates the rate of 
information processing for stimuli appearing at the cued location. Carrasco & 
McElree (2001) asked participants to report a stimulus attribute (e.g., grating 
orientation). Rather than collecting RTs, they had participants respond after one 
of several latencies from stimulus presentation, and found that accuracy at short 
latencies was better for cued stimuli. However, the increase in processing speed 
observed by Carrasco & McElree (2001) was obtained for attended stimuli 
(gratings), which were again not temporal patterns themselves. These findings 
may therefore reflect faster processing of attended static patterns, which does not 
necessarily mean that attention alters the rate at which visual information is 
perceived (i.e., the speed at which separate events can be distinguished -  the 
temporal resolution of the visual system).
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Perhaps most pertinent to the current chapter is a recent set of studies which 
demonstrated that spatial attention can actually impair the temporal resolution of 
vision (Yeshurun & Levy, 2003; Yeshurun, 2004). These studies investigated the 
effect of transient attention on observers’ ability to detect a temporal gap (rapid 
disappearance and reappearance) in a stimulus. Interestingly, and in contrast to 
the findings of Carrasco & McElree (2001), these studies found that the ability to 
detect such temporal events at cued locations was impaired compared to 
performance at uncued locations. The authors’ proposed explanation for this 
effect was that spatial cuing facilitates the activity of parvocellular neurons in 
retinotopic regions corresponding to the attended location, which in turn leads to 
inhibition of magnocellular neurons at the same location. Parvocellular neurons 
have smaller receptive fields than magnocellular neurons, allowing attended 
locations to enjoy improved spatial resolution; but they also have longer response 
durations than magnocellular neurons (Merigan & Maunsell, 1993; Schiller & 
Logothetis, 1990), leading to lower temporal resolution. This account offers a 
plausible mechanism by which spatial cuing evokes transient attention. 
Importantly, however, transient attention is reflexively drawn to the cue in a 
bottom-up manner for a limited duration (less than 250 ms; Carrasco & McElree, 
2001). Whether or not similar mechanisms mediate the effects of top-down, goal- 
driven resource-dependent attention remains unclear. Furthermore, transient 
attention is evoked by a cue toward a specific spatial location, confounding 
attention to a spatial location with attention to temporal patterns.
The finding that transient attention impairs temporal resolution leads to the 
prediction that when attentional resources are reduced, the ability to detect 
temporally-distinct events should improve (as there would be less parvocellular
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activity at attended locations, and therefore less inhibition of magnocellular 
activity). This is at odds with load theory (Lavie, 1995; 2005), which does not 
distinguish between spatial and temporal patterns, and predicts that exhausting 
attentional resources should impair perception in both the spatial and temporal 
domains.
The purpose of the present series of experiments was therefore to investigate 
this issue by manipulating perceptual load for shapes, and examining the effect 
this had on conscious awareness of flicker presented at fixation. Flicker is a rapid 
train of discrete luminance changes, and thus makes a good tool for studying 
temporal aspects of vision (Wells, Bernstein, Scott, Bennett, & Mendelson,
2001). When sufficiently fast, the luminance changes of flicker are no longer 
perceived as flickering but as steady, or fused, illumination (Curran & Wattis, 
1998; Kristofferson, 1967). At the Critical Ricker Fusion (CFF) threshold (~25- 
50Hz, depending on specific conditions; Andrews, White, Binder, & Purves, 
1996; Curran & Wattis, 1998; Kristofferson, 1967), a flickering light has an 
equal probability of being perceived as flickering or fused. The same physical 
stimulus -  flicker at the CFF threshold -  can therefore give rise to two different 
percepts. This is an example in the temporal domain of a dissociation between 
physical stimulation and perceptual outcome -  the hallmark of phenomena 
considered particularly useful in the study of perceptual awareness (like 
binocular rivalry or change blindness in the spatial domain; Blake & Logothetis, 
2002; Frith, Perry & Lumer, 1999; Rees et al, 2002). Furthermore, the 
involvement of spatial patterns in the processing of flicker can be minimized 
with the use of a small, fixated point-source of light, where only the temporal 
pattern will determine the qualitative nature (flicker or fused) of the percept.
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Like conscious awareness of shapes (Chapter 2), awareness of flicker may 
depend on attentional resources. However, it is possible that awareness of flicker 
may actually be improved by the depletion of such resources (Yeshurun & Levy, 
2003; Yeshurun, 2004). It is also possible that the rapid serial onsets of flicker 
attract attention in a bottom-up fashion, rendering directed attention unnecessary 
for flicker awareness. Moreover, it has been suggested that the spatial and 
temporal dimensions of visual stimuli are processed independently (Lehky, 1985; 
Wilson, 1980), which would mean that a manipulation of perceptual load using 
shapes in particular locations, as in Chapter 2, would not affect temporal 
awareness.
To investigate whether visual awareness of temporal patterns requires 
processing resources (or, conversely, is impaired by their availability, as 
suggested by Yeshurun & Levy, 2003), in the present series of experiments 
participants were asked to detect flicker in a fixated light-emitting diode (LED) 
which flickered at or around the individually-adjusted CFF threshold, while 
searching for a target letter presented either on its own (low load) or among other 
letters (high load) in the periphery. Previous research (Lavie & Cox, 1997; Lavie 
& Fox, 2000) has established the effectiveness of this manipulation of perceptual 
load, demonstrating that it modulates the processing of distractors. If processing 
resources are required for conscious awareness of flicker, then reducing the 
availability of such resources by increasing perceptual load should impair 




Participants fixated a red LED mounted on the centre of a computer screen. 
On each trial, participants were briefly presented with a target letter in the 
periphery and asked to report whether this letter was an X or an N. The target 
letter could appear in one of six locations, arranged in a hexagon around fixation. 
Under low perceptual load the other five locations were occupied by small 
circles; under high load, they were occupied by non-target letters. The fixated 
LED flickered simultaneously with the peripheral letter presentation, at or around 
participants’ individually-assessed CFF threshold (see Method below). After 
reporting the identity of the target letter, participants reported whether or not they 
had perceived the LED to be flickering. If perceptual load in a spatial search 
affects flicker perception at fixation, then for the same frequencies participants 
should report flicker percepts on fewer trials under high than under low 
perceptual load.
3.2.2. Method
Participants: Six volunteers participated in the experiment. Their mean age 
was 30.3 (range 22-44), three were female and five were right-handed. All had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
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Stimuli and apparatus: Participants sat in a room with ambient lighting, 
viewing a 14” screen (Dell D825TM, resolution 640*480, 60 Hz refresh rate) 
from a distance of 57 cm. Head position was stabilized by a chin rest. Stimuli 
were created and presented using Matlab on a Dell Inspiron 4000 computer.
During the experiment, the stimulation on each trial consisted of flicker 
events at fixation and letter presentations in the periphery. Flicker and letter 
presentations were simultaneous. Participants fixated a single red LED (CIE 
chromaticity coordinates jc=0.655, y=0.344) which was mounted at the centre of 
the screen and subtended 0.5° visual angle. On each trial the LED would flicker 
(square-wave flicker, 1:1 duty cycle; luminance 29 cd/m2 at 30 Hz).
Letter stimuli consisted of a target letter (an uppercase X or N), which could 
appear in any one of six locations (the vertices of a perfect hexagon, each 2.9° 
from fixation). Under low perceptual load, small place-holder circles (diameter 
0.2°) appeared in the other five locations. Under high perceptual load, the other 
five locations were occupied by non-target uppercase letters (always the letters 
U, F, S, P & J, placed randomly; see Figure 3.1). Letter dimensions were 0.7° 
vertically by 0.5° horizontally. Letters and place holders were presented in white 
on a black background.
Critical flicker fusion threshold measurement: The CFF threshold (the 
frequency at which a flickering light has an equal probability of being perceived 
as flickering or fused) was measured for each participant individually at the 
beginning of the experimental session, using the method of constant stimuli. This 
assessment consisted of 120 trials in which flicker events were presented on their 
own (without concurrent letter presentations as in the experiment). Flicker events
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Low load High load
Figure 3.1. Experiment 6: Schematic illustrations of the visual stimuli. On each trial, a flicker 
event in the centrally-fixated red LED (represented here by a red circle) was presented 
simultaneously with peripheral letters. Under low perceptual load (left), a single target letter (in 
this case X) was presented at one of six locations. Small circular place-holders were presented at 
the other five locations. Under high load (right), the target (in this case N) was accompanied by 
five other letters at the other five locations. Figure not to scale.
at 6 different frequencies were presented in random order (26 to 36 Hz, in steps 
of 2 Hz; 20 trials for each frequency). The duration of each flicker event was 200 
ms, and participants were given 2500 ms from stimulus onset to report whether 
they perceived the light to be flickering or fused (by pressing the left arrow key 
for ‘flicker’ and the down arrow for ‘fused’) before the next stimulus was 
presented. Participants were informed that the LED would illuminate briefly on 
each trial, and would sometimes flicker; they were not told that the stimulus 
would always, in fact, be flickering, or that the same frequency may lead to 
different percepts. This part of the experimental session was described to 
participants as practice in distinguishing flicker and fused illumination. The data 
obtained were used to estimate the participant’s threshold frequency (the 
frequency at which the participant would be equally likely to categorize the
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stimulus as flickering or fused). The threshold frequency was rounded to the 
nearest whole number, which was then used to determine the frequencies 
displayed during the experiment (see below).
Design: On each trial, participants were asked whether a target letter 
presented in the periphery was an X or an N. Perceptual load was manipulated by 
varying the set size of the search array. In addition, participants were asked to 
report whether they had perceived the illumination of the fixated LED, which 
occurred simultaneously with the letter presentation, as flickering or fused. Pilot 
tests revealed that when combined with letter detection, the CFF threshold was 
lower compared to the threshold assessment. To accommodate this, the threshold 
frequency in the experiment was therefore set to 3 Hz lower than that found in 
the threshold measurement procedure. Three frequencies were used in the 
experimental conditions to prevent a constant response1: The adjusted threshold, 
and frequencies 1 Hz lower and 1 Hz higher.
Two factors were therefore manipulated independently in a factorial design: 
Perceptual load (two levels: low or high), and flicker frequency (three levels: 
threshold, and frequencies 1 Hz below and above threshold). The main 
dependent variable was the percent of trials in which the flicker event was 
categorized as ‘flicker’.
1 A preliminary study revealed that even when shown the pre-assessed threshold frequency, 
participants tended to adopt a constant response if  only a single frequency were used in all trials.
Procedure: The experiment was conducted in a single session lasting about 
1.5 hours. Before the experiment itself, participants underwent the CFF threshold 
measurement, followed by a short practice.
In each trial of the experiment, the letter and flicker stimuli were presented 
simultaneously for 200 ms. The brief presentation was intended to prevent eye 
movements to the letter target, and the foveal presentation and brief duration of 
the flicker minimized temporal adaptation effects (Curran & Wattis, 1998). At 
the end of the presentation the screen went black. A response window of 1500 
ms from stimulus onset was given to report the letter. Participants pressed the left 
arrow to report an ‘X’ and the down arrow for an ‘N \ At the end of the response 
window (regardless of whether a response had been made), the question ‘Flicker 
or fused?’ appeared on the screen above the LED and remained until a response 
was given. Participants responded by pressing the same keys, but this time the 
left arrow was used to report flicker and the down arrow was used to report a 
fused percept. An inter-trial interval of 500 ms followed response to the flicker 
(see Figure 3.2).
Perceptual load conditions were blocked. Participants performed two practice 
blocks (one under each load condition), followed by eight experimental blocks. 
Blocks were arranged in an ABBABAAB order (with A representing low and B 
high perceptual load, or vice versa). The load of the first block was 
counterbalanced across participants. Each block comprised 96 trials, containing 
two repetitions of the 36 possible combinations of letter identity (X or N), letter 
location (6 possible locations) and three flicker frequencies. In addition, there 
were 24 catch trials. On half of these the flicker frequency was 12 Hz below the 
threshold and on half it was 12 Hz above threshold. These were used to control
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Low load High load
Figure 3.2. Experiment 6: Trial sequence. Each trial began with the simultaneous presentation 
of letter stimuli in the periphery and LED flicker at fixation for 200 ms. A response window of 
1500 ms from stimulus onset (during the last 1300 ms of which the screen was black) was given 
for the letter search. This was followed by a prompt for response to the flicker, which remained 
on the screen until a response was given. The trial ended with a 500 ms inter-trial interval. Figure 
not to scale.
for possible response biases and to make sure participants were attending to the 
task. For both load conditions, these frequencies were expected to be far enough 
from threshold to ensure that if participants were indeed attending to the flicker, 
they would almost never report flicker for the threshold plus 12 Hz frequency, 
and nearly always do so for the threshold minus 12 Hz frequency. For each kind
of catch trial, the trials included one presentation of each target letter (X or N) in 
each of the six possible locations. Trial order was randomized within each block. 
A participant-terminated break was given at the end of each block.
3.2.3. Results and discussion
Letter search RTs were significantly longer under high (M = 866 ms) than 
under low (M = 807 ms) perceptual load; t(5 ) = 2.699, SEM = 21.83; p = 0.043, 
two-tailed. Accuracy rates were identical under both load conditions (M = 94%), 
ruling out a speed/accuracy trade-off. The load manipulation was therefore 
effective, with high perceptual load placing higher demands on perceptual 
resources.
For flicker detection, the average threshold frequency used in the experiment 
was 27 Hz (range 25-28 Hz). Only trials in which a correct response in the letter 
search was made were used in the analysis of flicker detection in all the 
experiments reported in this chapter. The percentages of flicker responses were 
entered into a 2 (Perceptual load: low or high) by 3 (Flicker frequency: threshold 
minus 1 Hz, threshold, and threshold plus 1 Hz) repeated-measures ANOVA. 
There was a significant main effect of perceptual load (F(i,5 ) = 15.918, MSE = 
7.62*10'3, p = 0.01), indicating a reduction in flicker perception under high, 
compared to low load (M = 35% versus 47% under high and low load, 
respectively, when collapsed across all three frequencies; see also Figure 3.3).
There was also a significant main effect of frequency (F .^io) = 20.317, MSE =
<2




Figure 3.3. Experiment 6: Flicker detection results. Mean flicker categorization rates were 
lower under high (red circles) than under low (green squares) perceptual load. Flicker detection 
also decreased as frequency increased. The grey bars represent the average differences between 
low and high perceptual load. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean.
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frequency was reduced (Figure 3.3). There was no interaction between 
perceptual load and flicker frequency (F < 1, ns).
The main effect of perceptual load supports the central hypothesis of this 
study. Exhausting processing resources by increasing perceptual load for the 
peripherally-presented letters reduced the temporal resolution of visual 
awareness at fixation (as measured by flicker perception). Attention may 
therefore play a crucial role in the ability to detect temporal patterns in vision.
The main effect of frequency shows that participants were indeed attending 
to the flicker rather than, for example, reverting to responding randomly under 
high perceptual load. This is further supported by the results of the catch trials: 
There was no significant difference between responses to catch trials under low 
and high perceptual load for the threshold minus 12 Hz frequency (M = 97.1% 
versus 97.3% for low and high load, respectively; t@) = 0.115, SEM = 0.014, ns). 
The percentages of trials categorized as flicker for this frequency indicate that 
participants were indeed able to detect flicker while performing the letter search. 
There was also no difference between load conditions in responses to catch trials 
for the threshold plus 12 Hz frequency (M = 10% versus 7% for low and high 
load, respectively; t@) = 0.656, SEM = 0.048, ns), indicating that participants 
were unlikely to report flicker if they did not perceive it. Taken together, the 
present results clearly demonstrate that increasing perceptual load in the 
peripheral letter search decreased flicker perception at fixation.
However, although the catch trial performance rules out a gross response 
bias, it remains possible that more subtle biases were induced by perceptual load 




In Experiment 6, the perception of flicker at fixation was impaired under high 
perceptual load. Participants in that experiment made the letter search response 
before the flicker detection response. This was necessary in order to establish 
that the perceptual load manipulation was indeed effective, leading to longer RTs 
under high (compared to low) load. However, it is possible that the effect of 
perceptual load on flicker perception was due to the delayed response to flicker. 
For example, the longer time it took participants to report the target letter under 
high load may have led to a weaker memory trace for the intended flicker report. 
In addition, high perceptual load may have led to reduced prioritisation (goal 
neglect) of the second response on each trial. In either of these cases, if 
participants were biased toward reporting a fused percept when they were 
uncertain, this could account for the observed results.
Another alternative account for the results of Experiment 6 is that because 
small circular place-holder stimuli (rather than full-size letters) were used in the 
low load condition, the total luminance of the letter stimuli was lower under low 
than under high perceptual load. It is therefore possible that the effect of load 
found in Experiment 6 is in fact due to this low-level difference between load 
conditions, as flicker may be harder to detect under conditions of greater 
illumination.
These possibilities were addressed in Experiment 7 by switching the order in 
which the letter search and flicker detection responses were given, and replacing
108
the small place-holders in the low load condition with the letter ‘O’. In all other 
respects, this experiment was identical to Experiment 6. If the results of 
Experiment 6 were indeed due to the effect of perceptual load (rather than being 
a memory-related artefact or the by-product of luminance differences between 
conditions), they should be replicated here.
3.3.2. Method
Participants: Six new volunteers took part in the experiment. Their average 
age was 23.7 (range 19-28). Five were female, and all were right-handed and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli, design and procedure: These were identical to those of Experiment 
6 except for the following differences. First, the order of responses was switched. 
Participants responded to the flicker first, during the 1500 ms response window. 
Then the question ‘X or N?’ appeared on the screen and remained until a 
response to the letter search was given. Second, In the low perceptual load 
condition, the small, circular place-holders used in Experiment 6 were replaced 
by the letter ‘O’, so that the total size and luminance of visual features presented 
during each trial was similar under low and high load.
3.3.3. Results and discussion
Letter search RTs were not measured in this experiment, as on each trial 
responses to the flicker were made first. Accuracy rates, however, were
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significantly better under low (M = 92.3%) than under high (M = 87.3%) 
perceptual load; t(5 ) = 2.459, SEM = 0.02, p = 0.028.
For flicker, the average threshold frequency used in the experiment was 26 
Hz (range 25-28 Hz). The percentages of trials in which the illumination of the 
LED was categorized as flicker were again entered into a 2 (Perceptual load:
Low or high) by 3 (Flicker frequency: Threshold minus 1 Hz, threshold, and 
threshold plus 1 Hz) repeated-measures ANOVA. There was a significant main 
effect of perceptual load (F(i,5 ) = 9.567, MSE = 3.39* 10'3, p = 0.027). This 
replicates the result of Experiment 6, showing that for the same frequencies, 
flicker was perceived less under high than under low perceptual load (M = 37.5% 
versus 31.8% under low and high load, respectively, when collapsed across all 
three frequencies; see also Figure 3.4). Though the magnitude of the effect of 
load was somewhat reduced compared to Experiment 6, these results 
conclusively rule out alternative explanations, accounting for the effect of load in 
terms of memory-related biases or deprioritization of the second response. The 
fact that letter stimuli in this experiment had similar luminance under both load 
conditions rules out the possibility that the results of Experiment 6 were due to 
low-level luminance differences.
As in Experiment 6, there was also a significant main effect of frequency 
(F(2 ,io) = 19.104, MSE = 1.01*10‘2, p < 0.001), indicating a decline in flicker 
perception rates as frequency increased (Figure 3.4). There was no interaction 
between perceptual load and flicker frequency (F < 1, ns).
Catch-trial results for the threshold minus 12 Hz frequency again showed that 
there was no significant difference in participants’ ability to perceive and report 




Figure 3.4. Experiment 7: Flicker detection results. As in Experiment 6, mean flicker 
categorization rates were lower under high (red circles) than under low (green squares) perceptual 
load. Flicker detection also decreased as frequency increased. The grey bars represent the average 
differences between low and high perceptual load. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the 
mean.
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load, respectively; t(5 ) = 1.185, SEM = 0.02, ns). For the threshold plus 12 Hz 
catch trials, results again showed that participants were equally unlikely, under 
both load conditions, to report flicker if they didn’t perceive it (3.8 and 3.3% for 
low and high load, respectively; t(5) = 0.217, SEM = 0.02, ns). Taken together 
with the main effect of frequency, the results for the catch trials demonstrate that 
participants were indeed attending to the task, rather than responding randomly 
under high perceptual load.
The results of Experiment 7 replicate those of Experiment 6, confirming that 
increasing perceptual load in the periphery can indeed reduce the temporal 
resolution of visual awareness (as measured by flicker perception) at fixation. 
Importantly, this experiment rules out two alternative accounts for the results of 
Experiment 6, showing that these results could not be entirely due to the flicker 
report being the second response on each trial, nor to low-level differences in 
luminance levels of the letter stimuli.
3.4. Experiment 8
3.4.1. Introduction
Experiments 6 and 7 demonstrated that the temporal resolution of visual 
awareness is modulated by attention. When perceptual load in the periphery was 
increased, flicker detection rates at fixation decreased (for the same frequencies). 
However, it is still unclear which element of the process that gives rise to 
conscious awareness of flicker is affected by attentional manipulation. Like any
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other sensory percept, flicker detection can be characterized in terms of signal 
detection theory (SDT). Under conditions of uncertainty (e.g., close to a sensory 
threshold) the conscious, reported percept is the result of both the visual system’s 
sensitivity to the presence of a signal (in this case, whether there is a temporal 
pattern of onsets and offsets in the illumination) and the application of a criterion 
for classifying an event as either containing the signal (in this case, flicker) or not 
(fused; Macmillan & Creelman, 1991). In Experiments 6 and 7, the effect of 
perceptual load may have been the result of a reduction in the visual system’s 
sensitivity to flicker under high load. Alternatively, the effect may have been due 
to a shift in the criterion for categorizing an event as flickering or fused, such that 
under high load participants were simply more reluctant than under low load to 
classify a near-threshold event as flicker.
In Experiment 8 I therefore used a 2-interval forced-choice (2IFC) paradigm 
to distinguish the effects of perceptual load on sensitivity from those on criterion. 
Rather than a single presentation containing flicker at fixation and a search-array 
in the periphery, each trial in Experiment 8 consisted of two consecutive 
presentations. Each of the displays contained a target letter, and the letter search 
now required participants to report whether the two displays contained the same 
target letter or a different one. Attention to the search array was thus required on 
both presentations. For the fixated LED, one of the presentations was of a near­
threshold flicker event (as in the previous experiments), the other was at a high 
frequency (100 Hz) that produces a fused percept, and participants were asked to 
report which of the two intervals contained the flicker. If the effect of perceptual 
load on flicker perception is indeed due to a change in sensitivity, accuracy and
113
d’ scores for flicker detection should both be reduced under high (compared to 
low) perceptual load in the letter search.
3.4.2. Method
Participants: Eight new volunteers took part in the experiment. Their mean 
age was 25 (range 17-32), six were female and all were right-handed. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Critical flicker fusion threshold measurement: The CFF threshold was 
again measured for each participant individually at the beginning of the 
experimental session, using the method of constant stimuli. However, like the 
main experiment it now involved a 2IFC. Each trial consisted of two 200 ms 
flicker presentations (without the letter search array), separated by 300 ms. Of 
the two flicker presentations, one was at a frequency chosen from 6 different 
frequencies (26 to 36 Hz, in steps of 2 Hz). There were 120 trials in total, 20 for 
each frequency. On 10 of each frequency’s trials flicker was presented in the first 
of the two displays and on 10 in the second. The other flicker presentation in 
each trial was at a frequency of 100 Hz, far above the human CFF threshold. A 
high frequency, rather than fused light, was used so that the total amount of 
illumination in each presentation would be the same. Order of trials was 
randomized. 600 ms after the offset of the second display, the question ‘1st or 
2nd?’ appeared on the screen above the LED, and remained until a response was 
given. Participants reported which of the two presentations they thought 
contained flicker by pressing the left arrow key for the first presentation and the
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down arrow key for the second. An inter-trial interval of 1000 ms followed 
response.
Participants were told that the LED would always flicker on one of the two 
presentations, and that it would sometimes be hard to tell which of the two it was 
so they should guess if they were not sure. The data obtained were used to 
estimate the participant’s threshold frequency. Unlike Experiments 6 and 7 
(where the threshold was defined as the frequency at which the participant would 
be equally likely to categorize the stimulus as flickering or fused), here the 
threshold was defined as the frequency at which participants would make correct 
responses on 75% of trials (halfway between chance and perfect performance). 
The threshold frequency was rounded to the nearest whole number, which was 
then used to determine the frequencies displayed during the experiment (see 
below).
Stimuli, design and procedure: The stimuli were similar to those of 
Experiment 6. The design and procedure were similar to those of the previous 
experiments, but each trial now consisted of two stimulus presentations. Each 
presentation lasted 200 ms and the two displays were separated by 300 ms. Each 
of the displays contained a target letter (X or N). As in the previous experiments, 
a frequency 3Hz lower than the threshold found in CFF threshold measurement 
was designated as the threshold for the experiment, and frequencies 1 Hz lower 
and higher were also used. On one of the two stimulus presentations the LED 
flickered at one of these near-threshold frequencies. On the other display, the 
flicker frequency was 100 Hz, far above the CFF threshold (high-frequency 
flicker rather than fused light was used so that the total amount of illumination
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would be equal in the two displays). The question ‘Same or different letter?’ 
appeared on the screen, above the LED, 500 ms after the second stimulus offset. 
Participants were instructed to report whether the target letters in the two 
displays were the same (both X or both N) by pressing the left arrow key, or 
different (X and N in either order) by pressing the down arrow. Once a response 
was given the question disappeared, and was replaced after 250 ms by the 
question ‘Flicker 1st or 2nd?’ Participants pressed the left or down arrow to 
report flicker on the first or second display, respectively. Once a response was 
given the question disappeared, and the next trial began after an inter-trial 
interval of 1000 ms (see Figure 3.5).
The experiment consisted of four blocks in an ABBA order (with A 
representing low and B high perceptual load, or vice versa). The load of the first 
block was counterbalanced across participants. Each block consisted of 144 
trials, and participant-terminated breaks were given after every 72 trials. Each 
block contained all 144 combinations of letter-target identity (X or N) and 
location (six possible locations) on the first and second display. The threshold 
frequency, threshold minus 1 Hz and threshold plus 1 Hz were each used on 25% 
of the trials in each block. Catch trials (half with a frequency of threshold minus 
12 Hz and half with a frequency of threshold plus 12 Hz, as in the previous 
experiments) were used in the remaining 25% of trials. As in the previous 
experiments, the catch trials were used to control for possible response biases 
and to make sure participants were attending to the task. The flicker occurred in 
the first presentation of the trial on half of each frequency’s trials, and in the 
second on the other half. Trial order was randomized independently for the Letter 
search and flicker frequencies within each block. Participants performed two 72-
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Figure 3.5. Experiment 8: Trial sequence. Following two consecutive displays of simultaneous 
letter and flicker stimuli, a question regarding the letter search appeared on the screen until a 
response was given. It was replaced by a question regarding the flicker, which also remained on 
the screen until response. Here, the answer to the letter question would be ‘same’ for the low-load 
example on the left, and ‘different’ for the high-load example on the right. The trial ended with a 
1000 ms inter-trial interval. Figure not to scale.
trial blocks (one under each load condition) as practice before the experiment 
began. The entire experimental session lasted about two hours.
The main dependent variable for flicker detection was d’, the sensitivity 
score1, but accuracy rates and the criterion measure c were also examined.
3.4.3. Results and discussion
Letter search accuracy rates were significantly higher under low (M = 94.6%) 
than under high (M = 86.5%) perceptual load (t(7 ) = 2.767, SEM = 0.03, p = 
0.014), confirming that the load manipulation was effective. As responses in the 
letter search were delayed (participants could not give a response until 700 ms 
after the onset of the second display), RT data were not examined.
For flicker detection, the average threshold frequency used in the experiment 
was 28.9 Hz (range 27-31 Hz). To assess accuracy rates, the percentages of trials 
in which participants correctly reported the display containing flicker were 
entered into a 2 (Perceptual load: Low or high) by 3 (Flicker frequency: 
Threshold minus 1 Hz, threshold, and threshold plus 1 Hz) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. There was a significant main effect of perceptual load (F(ij) = 12.045, 
MSE = 6.376* 10'3, p = 0.01). There was also a marginally significant main effect 
of frequency (F(2 ,i4 > = 3.603, MSE = 6.058* 10"3, p = 0.055), and no interaction 
between load and frequency (F(2 ,i4 ) = 1.472, MSE = 3.604* 10'3, ns). As
1 This measure was calculated using the formula d'= (1/V2)[Z(//) — Z(F)], which is a 
modification o f the standard formula d'= Z(H ) — Z(F)  for 2IFC (or any other 2-altemative 
forced choice) paradigms. Z(H) stands for the Z-score associated with the probability o f a Hit,
and Z(F) for that associated with the probability of a False alarm. A hit was defined as a trial in 
which flicker was reported to have occurred in the first display, when it was indeed presented in 
the first display. A false alarm was defined as a trial in which flicker was again reported to have
occurred on the first display, but was actually presented in the second display. Using reports of 
flicker on the second display would yield complementary probabilities and lead to the same d’ 
values (Macmillan & Creelman, 1991).
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predicted, the main effect of load was due to a reduction in accuracy under high 
perceptual load (M = 75.4% versus 67.1% under low and high load, respectively, 
when collapsed across all three frequencies; 80.2% versus 69.1% for threshold 
minus 1 Hz; 76.4% versus 67.5% for the threshold frequency; and 69.4% versus 
65.4% for threshold plus 1 Hz).
d’ scores were entered into a similar ANOVA as accuracy rates. There was a 
significant main effect of perceptual load (F(ij) = 11.801, MSE = 0.228, p =
0.011), showing a reduction in sensitivity under high perceptual load (see Figure 
3.6). However, the main effect of frequency did not reach significance (F(2 ,i4 ) = 
2.172, MSE = 0.188, ns), and nor did the interaction between load and frequency 
(F(2,i4 ) = 2.232, MSE = 6.459*1O'2, ns).
As in the previous experiments, the results of the threshold plus 12 Hz catch 
trials show that participants were indeed at chance when the two presentations 
were rendered indistinguishable due to being above the CFF threshold, even 
though there was a difference of over 50 Hz between them (49.4 versus 52.1% 
for low and high load, respectively; t(7 ) = 1.045, SEM = 0.03, ns). The results of 
the threshold minus 12 Hz frequency catch trials demonstrate that participants 
were capable of detecting flicker under both load conditions when the flicker was 
at a very low frequency, though here there was a trend toward flicker being less 
detectable under high load (95.7 versus 86.6% for low and high load, 
respectively; t(7 ) = 2.052, SEM = 0.04, p = 0.079). This indicates that the effect of 
load might be powerful enough to affect flicker frequencies far below the 
threshold.
Finally, the criterion measure c, indicating the degree to which participants 




Figure 3.6. Experiment 8: Flicker detection results. Mean d’ scores were lower under high 
(red circles) than under low (green squares) perceptual load. The grey bars represent the average 
differences between low and high perceptual load. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the 
mean.
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flicker, was entered into a similar ANOVA as the accuracy and sensitivity 
measures. There were no main effects for either perceptual load or frequency (F 
< 1, ns for both), and no interaction (F(2 ,i4 > = 1.4, MSE = 4.608*1O'2, ns).
The results of Experiment 8 therefore demonstrate that increasing perceptual 
load in the periphery impairs sensitivity to flicker at fixation, and that the effect 
cannot be due to a difference in bias toward reporting one or the other display 
under different load conditions.
3.5. Experiment 9
3.5.1. Introduction
Experiment 8 showed that high (compared to low) perceptual load in the 
letter search impaired flicker perception at fixation. However, this effect may 
have been due to increased forgetting of the correct response under high load, as 
the response to flicker was given only after the response to the letter search. 
Participants were instructed to guess when they were not sure, and could not 
continue the experiment until they had given a response. Therefore, if more 
forgetting occurred under high load, this would lead to a higher percentage of 
random responses (and lower accuracy rates and d’ scores) under high than under 
low load.
In Experiment 9 this possibility was addressed by switching the order of the 
two responses. As responses to the flicker were collected first, 500 ms after the 
offset of the second display, any effect observed would be very unlikely to be
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memory related. If the effect of perceptual load is indeed due to a loss of 
sensitivity under high load, it should be replicated here.
3.5.2. Method
Participants: Seven new volunteers participated in the experiment. One was 
excluded from the analysis, as his low performance on the letter search (68%) 
under high perceptual load meant an insufficient number of trials was collected. 
The remaining six participants had a mean age of 30.7 (range 21-66). Three were 
female and all were right-handed and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Stimuli, design and procedure: These were identical to Experiment 8, 
except that the order of responses was switched, so that participants first reported 
which display contained flicker, and then whether the target letters in the two 
displays were the same or different.
3.5.3. Results and discussion
As in Experiment 8, accuracy rates in the letter search were significantly 
higher under low (M = 90.2%) than under high (M = 83.2%) perceptual load (t(7 ) 
= 3.24, SEM = 0.02, p = 0.011), indicating the load manipulation was again 
effective.
For flicker, the average threshold frequency used in the experiment was 29 
Hz (range 26-32 Hz). As in Experiment 8, the percentages of trials in which 
participants correctly reported the display containing flicker were entered into a 2
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(Perceptual load: Low or high) by 3 (Ricker frequency: Threshold minus 1 Hz, 
threshold, and threshold plus 1 Hz) repeated-measures ANOVA. There was a 
significant main effect of perceptual load (F^s) = 20.535, MSE = 1.247* 10'3, p = 
0.006). There was also a significant main effect of frequency (F(2,io) = 25.521, 
MSE = 1.472*1O'3, p < 0.001), and no interaction between load and frequency 
(F(2,io) = 1.094, MSE = 2.492*10’3, ns). As in Experiment 8, the main effect of 
load was due to a reduction in accuracy under high perceptual load (M = 76.2% 
versus 71% under low and high load, respectively, when collapsed across all 
three frequencies; 82.5% versus 76.8% for threshold minus 1 Hz; 73.2% versus 
71% for the threshold frequency; and 72.8% versus 64.7% for threshold plus 1 
Hz). The data also show that the main effect of frequency was due to a 
monotonic decrease in accuracy as frequency increased.
d’ scores were entered into a similar ANOVA as accuracy rates. There was a 
significant main effect of perceptual load (F(i,5 ) = 7.618, MSE = 0.118, p = 0.04). 
There was also a significant main effect of frequency (F(2 ,io) = 12.417, MSE = 
9.611*10’2, p = 0.002). There was no interaction between load and frequency (F 
< 1, ns). The main effect of load was again due to a reduction in sensitivity under 
high perceptual load (see Figure 3.7). As with accuracy rates, the data show that 
the main effect of frequency was due to a monotonic decrease in d’ scores as 
frequency increased.
Catch trial results were similar to those of Experiment 8: For the threshold 
minus 12 Hz frequency catch trials, the results again show that participants were 
capable of detecting and reporting flicker, under both load conditions, when it 
was at a very low frequency (97 versus 91.7% for low and high load, 
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Figure 3.7. Experiment 9: Flicker detection results. As in Experiment 8, mean d’ scores were 
lower under high (red circles) than under low (green squares) perceptual load. The grey bars 
represent the average differences between low and high perceptual load. Error bars represent 1 
standard error of the mean.
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1.528, SEM = 0.03, ns). For the threshold plus 12 Hz catch trials, the results 
again show that despite a difference of at least 50 Hz between the two 
presentations, participants were indeed at chance when the two displays were 
rendered indistinguishable due to being above the CFF threshold (48 versus 
57.2% for low and high load, respectively; tp) = 1.799, SEM = 0.05, ns).
The criterion measure c was entered into a similar ANOVA as the accuracy 
and sensitivity measures. There were no main effects for either perceptual load 
(F(i,5 > = 3.363, MSE = 9.214*10‘2, ns) or frequency (F < 1, ns), and no interaction 
(F < 1, ns).
The results of Experiment 9 clearly confirm that sensitivity to flicker at 
fixation is indeed reduced under high perceptual load in the periphery. This 
effect cannot be due to increased forgetting of the correct response under high 
load, as in this experiment participants responded to the flicker first.
Furthermore, performance on the catch trials, taken together with the monotonic 
decrease in accuracy and d’ scores as flicker frequency increased, confirms that 
participants were indeed attending to the flicker. Finally, a difference in bias 
between load conditions cannot account for the pattern of results.
3.6. Chapter Discussion
The central hypothesis of this study was that attention plays a role in visual 
awareness of temporal patterns. Specifically, it was predicted that in accordance 
with perceptual load theory (Lavie 1995, 2005), awareness of a visually- 
presented temporal pattern would depend on the amount of processing capacity
125
allotted to it. The results clearly show that perceptual load does indeed modulate 
flicker perception. Experiments 6 and 7 established that for the same flicker 
frequencies, increasing perceptual load in the periphery leads to reduced 
subjective awareness of flicker at fixation. The same flickering stimulus was 
more likely to be categorized as fused under high load in the peripheral letter 
search. This implies that subjective awareness of flicker depends on the 
availability of processing resources. In Experiments 8 and 9 the effect of 
perceptual load on sensitivity to flicker was established. The effect could not be 
due to either criterion differences between conditions, or to rapid forgetting of 
the correct response under high load.
Increasing perceptual load in a task that involved attention to shapes in 
specific spatial locations reduced the temporal resolution of visual awareness at 
fixation. This is in line with load theory (Lavie, 1995, 2005), which predicts that 
exhausting processing capacity will result in reduced awareness of unrelated 
stimuli. This chapter extends the findings of Chapter 2, showing that this is the 
case not only for awareness of spatial shapes, but also for temporal patterns. As 
load in a shape-related search impaired awareness in the temporal domain, the 
results of this chapter imply that general processing resources, directed by top- 
down attentional mechanisms, may be involved in various, and perhaps in all, 
aspects of visual awareness.
What are the neural mechanisms mediating awareness of temporal patterns, 
and its modulation by load? They are unlikely to be the same as the bottom-up 
mechanism for transient attention to peripheral locations proposed by Yeshurun 
and Levy (2003), whereby spatial cuing facilitates parvocellular activity and 
inhibits magnocellular activity in retinotopic areas corresponding to attended
126
locations. If top-down attention operated in a similar way, directing attention 
away from fixation (under high load) should have prevented magnocellular 
inhibition and thus improved flicker awareness. The fact that the opposite 
occurred indicates that top-down attention may involve different neural 
mechanisms. One possible candidate is the idea of a neuronal ‘coalition’ (Crick 
& Koch, 2003), involving a network of higher brain regions in frontal and 
parietal cortex, which has been associated with visual awareness in various 
experimental paradigms (Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005; Rees et al, 2002). The 
involvement of such a network in visual awareness of temporal patterns has 
never been investigated, and will therefore be the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter 4:
The involvement of frontal and parietal 
cortex in conscious awareness of flicker
128
4.1 Chapter Introduction1
In Chapter 3 I established the involvement of attention in temporal aspects of 
visual awareness, by showing that reducing the availability of attentional 
resources impairs the ability to perceive temporal patterns in vision. Awareness 
of temporal patterns is a fundamental aspect of conscious visual experience. 
However, the neural correlates of such temporally-dependent facets of awareness 
remain largely unknown. Recent studies show that visual awareness is associated 
not only with activity in occipital visual cortex but also in areas of frontal and 
parietal cortex (Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005; Rees, Kreiman, & Koch, 2002).
Neuroimaging research in healthy humans has shown that frontal and parietal 
activation is associated with the conscious detection of visual changes (Beck, 
Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001) and conscious word reading (Kjaer, Nowak, Kjaer, 
Lou, & Lou, 2001; Dehaene, Naccache, Cohen, Le Bihan, Mangin, et al, 2001), 
as well as the onset of stereo pop-out (Portas, Strange, Friston, Dolan, & Frith, 
2000) and object identification (Eriksson, Larsson, Ahlstrom, & Nyberg, 2004). 
Such ffonto-parietal activation is also time-locked to fluctuations in conscious 
perception during binocular rivalry (Lumer, Friston & Rees, 1998; Lumer & 
Rees, 1999) and other forms of bistable perception (Kleinschmidt, Buchel, Zeki, 
& Frackowiak, 1998; Sterzer, Russ, Preibisch, & Kleinschmidt, 2002).
Similarly, lesions to parietal and frontal cortex can lead to deficits in 
awareness such as unilateral neglect, where patients typically fail to consciously 
perceive stimuli in one hemifield despite normal visual acuity (Driver &
1 The research presented in this chapter has been published as: Carmel, D., Lavie, N., & Rees, G. 
(2006). Conscious awareness of flicker in humans involves frontal and parietal cortex. Current 
Biology, 16, 907-911.
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Mattingley, 1998), and (at least partially) intact unconscious processing of such 
stimuli (e.g., Marshall & Halligan, 1988); and Balint’s syndrome, where patients 
are only able to consciously perceive a single object at a time (e.g., Rizzo & 
Vecera, 2002). Furthermore, using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) to 
transiently disrupt frontal and parietal cortex activity in the healthy brain can 
impair conscious visual experience of changes in visual stimuli (Beck, 
Muggleton, Walsh, & Lavie, 2006; Turatto, Sandrini, & Miniussi, 2004).
The common involvement of these regions in diverse experimental 
paradigms suggests that they play a general role in visual awareness, and many 
studies have indeed suggested that attentional functions mediated by these 
regions are critical for awareness. However, it is not known whether activity in 
these areas is also associated with temporal aspects of subjective experience.
4.2 Experiment 10
In the current study I therefore used event-related functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (fMRI) in humans to determine the neural correlates of 
conscious perception of flicker. As described in Chapter 3, the rapid luminance 
changes of flicker make it a good tool for studying temporal aspects of vision 
(Wells et al, 2001). Flicker at the CFF threshold, where a flickering light has an 
equal probability of being perceived as flickering or fused, constitutes a suitable 
stimulus for the study of awareness, as such threshold stimulation makes it 
possible to investigate different perceptual outcomes resulting from the same 
physical stimulus (Frith et al, 1999).
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Despite the difference in the phenomenal quality of conscious perception at 
frequencies below and above the CFF threshold, neural activity corresponding to 
the frequency of a flickering stimulus has been observed in visual cortex at 
flicker frequencies as high as 90Hz, far exceeding the CFF threshold. Such 
observations were made using single-unit (Gur & Snodderly, 1997; Krolak- 
Salmon, Henaff, Tallon-Baudry, Yvert, Guenot, Vighetto, Mauguiere, & 
Bertrand, 2003), multi-unit (Rager & Singer, 1998) and EEG (Hermann, 2001; 
Lyskov, Ponomarev, Sandstrom, Mild, & Madvedev, 1998) recordings. Indeed, 
psychophysical work has shown that flicker above the CFF threshold can still 
lead to adaptation effects (Shady, MacLeod, & Fisher, 2004), and that the 
conscious experience of flicker arises following binocular fusion (Andrews et al, 
1996). Flicker perception is therefore unlikely to be the property of neurons in 
early visual cortex; instead, it may result from the activity of neuronal 
‘coalitions’ (e.g., Crick & Koch, 2003) operating at later stages of visual 
processing.
The evidence cited above implies that the CFF threshold is not the point 
where neurons in visual cortex can no longer match the temporal frequency of 
the stimulus, but rather the point where sensory registration and perceptual 
awareness are dissociated. Most previous neuroimaging studies of flicker have 
not attempted to compare activity related to the different subjective percepts 
evoked by flickering stimuli. Rather, they used PET (Fox & Raichle, 1984, 1985) 
or fMRI (Singh, Smith, & Greenlee, 2000; Hagenbeek, Rombouts, van Dijk, & 
Barkhof, 2002) to characterize the relationship between temporal frequency and 
evoked activation in visual cortex, employing frequencies above and below the 
CFF threshold and finding a peak of activation around 8 Hz, far below the
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threshold. The only study that used fMRI to explicitly compare flickering and 
fused percepts (Zafiris, Kircheis, Rood, Boers, Haussinger, & Zilles, 2004) used 
frequencies below and above the threshold, respectively. In contrast, here it was 
possible to avoid confounding physical stimulation and perceptual outcome by 
characterizing brain activity associated with different conscious percepts 
(flickering or fused), but evoked by physically identical stimuli (flicker at the 
CFF threshold).
The consistent finding that neurons in early visual cortex can reflect 
frequencies far above the CFF threshold (Gur & Snodderly, 1997; Hermann, 
2001; Krolak-Salmon et al, 2003; Rager & Singer, 1998; Lyskov et al, 1998; 
Shady et al, 2004) suggests that perception of flicker at threshold frequencies 
may depend instead on activity in higher cortical regions. Specifically, 
fluctuations of attention-related activity in these higher-level regions might 
determine whether the same stimulus will lead to a flicker or fused percept. The 
hypothesis I examined here was therefore that the frontal and parietal regions 
known to mediate attention and previously implicated in non-temporal aspects of 
awareness (see Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005; Rees et al, 2002 for reviews) would 
also be involved in conscious awareness of flicker.
4.3 Method
Participants: Thirteen healthy volunteers (11 female, mean age 26.4, range 
23-34) gave written informed consent to participate in the study. All participants 
had normal or corrected to normal vision.
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fMRI scanning parameters: A 3T Siemens Allegra system was used to 
acquire both T1 weighted anatomical images and T2-weighted echoplanar (EPI) 
images with Blood Oxygenation Level Dependent (BOLD) contrast. Each EPI 
image comprised forty 3 mm axial slices with an in-plane resolution of 3x3 mm 
positioned to cover the whole brain. Participants performed between two and 
four runs, each consisting of 276 volumes. The first six volumes of each run were 
discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects. Volumes were acquired 
continuously with a TR of 2.6 s per volume.
Stimuli and apparatus: Participants lay supine in the MRI scanner. On each 
trial, they fixated a single red LED (CIE chromaticity coordinates x=0.655, 
y=0.344), placed at the centre of the head end of the scanner bore, approximately 
70 cm from the participants’ head. The LED was viewed through a mirror 
mounted on the head coil and subtended 0.3° visual angle. On each trial, the LED 
flickered for 500 ms (square-wave flicker, 1:1 duty cycle; luminance 29 cd/m2 at 
30 Hz). The foveal presentation and brief duration minimized temporal 
adaptation effects (Curran & Wattis, 1998). To aid fixation, four fluorescent 
nonius lines (at right angles to each other in a ‘+’ configuration) were placed 
around the LED. The room was completely dark apart from the LED and nonius 
lines. On each trial, participants reported by button press whether they perceived 
the light as flickering or not.
Behavioural threshold measurement: To observe the neural correlates of 
the percept (flickering or fused) while keeping the physical stimulus constant, the 
CFF threshold (the frequency at which a flickering light has an equal probability
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of being perceived as flickering or fused) was first assessed for each participant 
individually. The threshold was assessed at the beginning of the experimental 
session, in the scanner (but prior to scanning), using the procedure described in 
Section 3.2.2. The only differences to the assessment procedure used in the 
behavioural experiments of Chapter 3 were that the duration of each flicker event 
was 500 (rather than 200) ms, and responses were given using an MR-compatible 
response box (rather than a standard keyboard).
fMRI scanning procedure: As in Chapter 3, three frequencies were used in 
the experimental conditions in order to eliminate the tendency to adopt a constant 
response if only a single stimulus were to be used repeatedly: The pre-assessed 
threshold (rounded to the nearest whole number), and frequencies 1 Hz lower 
and 1 Hz higher. Null events, in which no stimulus appeared, were also included. 
There were an equal number of threshold frequency, threshold minus 1 Hz, 
threshold plus 1 Hz and null event trials. In addition, to further monitor for any 
response bias, each scanner run contained a small number of catch trials in which 
the frequency was reliably above or below CFF threshold; either 8 Hz higher 
(5% of trials) or 8 Hz lower (5% of trials).
During each scanner run participants were presented with 120 trials. Stimuli 
belonging to different conditions (threshold, threshold ± 1 Hz, catch trials and 
null events) appeared in random order. Each flicker event lasted 500 ms with a 
stimulus onset asynchrony of 5.85 s. Similar to the threshold assessment, 
participants reported their percept (flicker or fused) by pressing a response box 
key. Participants were informed that the LED would sometimes flicker, but were
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not told that they would be presented with different frequencies, that the same 
frequency may lead to different percepts, or that there would be catch trials.
Data analysis: Responses were recorded on each trial. If the participant 
made more than one key press, gave no response (except on null-event trials, 
where that was the correct response), or responded within less than 150 ms from 
stimulus onset, the trial was excluded and not used as one of the ‘flicker’ or 
‘fused’ trials in the subsequent fMRI analysis.
Functional imaging data were analyzed using Statistical Parametric Mapping 
software (SPM2, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, UCL). All 
image volumes were realigned to the first, and temporally corrected for slice 
acquisition time (using the middle slice as reference). Resulting volumes were 
spatially normalized to a standard EPI template volume based on the MNI 
reference brain in the space of Talairach and Toumoux (1988). Normalized 
image volumes were smoothed with an isotropic 6mm FWHM Gaussian kernel.
An event-related random-effects model was used for statistical analysis. For 
each participant, voxels activated in the experimental conditions were identified 
using a statistical model which contained regressors representing the transient 
responses evoked by individual trials in each condition. The event-related 
changes in evoked activity were modelled by convolving a synthetic 
haemodynamic impulse response function with trains of unitary events 
corresponding to trial onsets. Each component of the model served as a regressor 
in a multiple regression analysis that included all nine experimental conditions 
(three frequencies by two possible percepts, plus two types of catch trial, and null 
events), as well as motion correction parameters (as effects of no interest). The
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data were high-pass filtered (cut-off frequency 0.0078 Hz) to remove low- 
frequency signal drifts. Global changes in activity were removed by proportional 
scaling, and the data were corrected for temporal auto-correlations. For each 
voxel, the resulting parameter estimates for the six conditions of interest 
(threshold frequency, 1 Hz below threshold and 1 Hz above threshold with two 
perceptual outcomes -  flicker or fused -  for each) were then entered into a 
second level analysis where each participant served as a random effect in a 
within-subjects ANOVA. The main effects of percept (flicker or fused) and 
frequency (threshold -  1 Hz, threshold, threshold + 1 Hz) and any interaction 
between these factors were specified by appropriately weighted linear contrasts 
on a voxel-by-voxel basis.
Eye position monitoring: During scanning, eye position was continually 
sampled at 60Hz using long-range infrared video-oculography (ASL 504LRO 
Eye Tracking System, Mass). The measures recorded were x and y coordinates of 
gaze direction (later combined to calculate the distance of fixation from the LED 
the participants were instructed to fixate on), and pupil diameter. Data were 
initially preprocessed to temporally detrend the signal and remove blinks. The 
average distance of fixation from the LED and the average pupil diameter were 
then computed for each 500 ms trial. In order to see whether eye-position or 
pupil diameter differed systematically between the flicker and fused conditions, 
the mean distance from fixation and the pupil diameter in each condition were 
subjected to a two-tailed paired t-test. A similar test was also performed on the 
standard deviations of the distance from fixation in each condition, to see 
whether either percept (flicker or fused) was associated with greater variance in
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eye-position. The iow temporal (60Hz) and spatial (-0.25° degrees) resolution of 
the eye-tracker, and the relatively low signal-to-noise ratio (due to the distance of 
the infra-red illuminant and optics from the eye), all currently necessitated by 
long-range eye tracking in scanning environments, precluded any formal 
assessment of fixational eye movements (microsaccades, drifts and tremor).
4.4 Results
Behaviour: Mean flicker fusion threshold was 29.85 Hz across participants 
(range 24Hz - 35Hz). Flicker percepts were reported on 41% of trials (range 
29%-66%), so there were large numbers of both flicker and fused percepts for all 
participants. Performance on catch trials was nearly perfect, with a mean of 0.43 
mis-categorizations (range 0-3) per 12 catch trials in each fMRI run. Participants 
were therefore attending to the task rather than responding in a random manner.
fMRI: A within-subject random effects ANOVA was used to reveal brain 
areas associated with effects of percept (flicker or fused), frequency (threshold 
minus 1 HZ, threshold, and threshold plus 1 Hz) and their interaction. In voxels 
where there was a significant effect of percept, t-tests were used to determine its 
direction. Physically identical trials evoking flicker (versus fused) percepts were 
associated with greater activation in predicted parietal and frontal regions 
(Figure 4.1 and Table 4.1) e.g. intraparietal sulcus (Brodmann area 7, BA7), the 
inferior parietal lobule (BA40), the inferior (BA44), middle (BA46) and medial 
(BA6) frontal gyri, the anterior insula and the cingulate sulcus (BA32).
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tFigure 4.1. Experiment 10: Flicker > Fused. A number of the frontal and parietal areas where 
event-related activity was greater for flicker than for fused percepts are superimposed on sagittal 
and coronal sections of a T1-weighted anatomical template image in MNI space. All peaks of 
activation reaching statistical significance are listed in Table 4.1. A statistical threshold o f Z = 
2.58 (corresponding to p<0.005, uncorrected) and a cluster-size threshold o f at least 10 voxels 
was used for display purposes in this and the following image. The MNI coordinate 
corresponding to the section’s plane is indicated on each section. IPS: intraparietal sulcus, MFG: 
middle frontal gyrus, Ins: insula.
Activation was bilateral in frontal regions, but lateralized to the left in the 
parietal lobe.
In contrast, fused percepts were associated with activation in several brain 
regions (Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2), especially occipital extrastriate cortex. 
Activation was bilateral, but the most significant activations were observed in the 
right hemisphere. No brain areas showed a significant main effect of frequency 
or an interaction between frequency and percept. The absence of any interaction 
rules out the possibility that the differential brain activity associated with 
different percepts, described above, could be due to the different frequencies 
used. It is conceivable, for example, that the contrast flicker > fused would 
reflect an effect mostly present for the threshold -  1 Hz frequency, and that the
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Table 4.1. Experiment 10: Loci and t-scores of cluster maxima in which
there was significantly higher activation for flicker than for fused percepts
Region Brodmann area Hemisphere X y z t-score
Inferior parietal lobule 40 L -57 -30 39 4.42
Inferior frontal gyrus 44 L -60 9 21 4.11
Intraparietal sulcus 7 L -39 -42 48 3.94
Middle frontal gyrus 46 L -45 45 18 3.80
46 R 48 48 9 3.57
Anterior insula - R 30 24 0 3.75
- L -39 18 -3 3.61
Cingulate sulcus 32 L -6 30 30 3.75
Medial frontal gyrus 6 L -12 -6 57 3.59
Parieto-occipital fisure 7 L -12 -75 45 3.55
Superior frontal gyrus 6 R 21 -18 66 3.48
Shown are significantly activated voxels in frontal and parietal cortex, at a threshold of p < 0.001, 
uncorrected (because o f the prior hypothesis regarding these areas). Even at this uncorrected 
threshold, all activated loci fell within regions previously associated with visual awareness 
(Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005). Coordinates in this and the next table are given in standard MNI 
space. R: right hemisphere; L: left hemisphere.
contrast fused > flicker would reflect an effect mostly present for the Threshold + 
1 Hz frequency. However, this would lead to a significant interaction of 
frequency and percept in the voxels where the main effect of percept was found. 
Furthermore, an observation of the effects in activated regions, as Figure 4.3 
illustrates, shows that there was no significant or consistent effect of frequency.
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tFigure 4.2. Experiment 10: Fused > Flicker. Sagittal and coronal sections of a Tl-weighted 
anatomical template image in MNI space, with superimposed areas where event-related activity 
was greater for fused than for flicker percepts. Most of this activity occurred in occipital 
extrastriate regions. The full list of activation peaks reaching statistical significance is given in 
Table 4.2. MO: middle occipital gyrus, FO: fourth occipital gyrus, Fus: fusiform gyrus, Cun: 
cuneus.
Eye monitoring: Eye monitoring data were available for eight of the thirteen 
participants, and showed no significant differences between flicker and fused 
percepts for either mean distance from fixation (t(7) = 0.832, SEM = 1.29, ns) or 
the standard deviation of distances (t(7) = 1.224, SEM = 3.27, ns). This rules out 
any effect of saccades or variance in eye position on the neuroimaging findings, 
but it remains possible that microsaccades or other fixational eye movements 
could contribute to these findings.
In contrast to the distance measures, pupil diameter was significantly greater 
on flicker (versus fused) trials (t(7) = 4.217, SEM = 0.23, p = 0.004). However, 
this effect was extremely small (a difference of -0.05 mm, representing a change 
of -2%  in pupil area) and thus unlikely to result in differential activation in
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Table 4.2. Experiment 10: Loci and t-scores of cluster maxima in which
there was significantly higher activation for fused than for flicker percepts
Region Brodmann area Hemisphere X y z t-score
Middle occipital gyrus 18/19 R 33 -90 15 5.52
Cuneus 18/19 R 9 -93 18 5.19
19 R 12 -87 36 4.33
Lateral occipital sulcus 18/19 R 42 -75 3 4.96
Fusiform gyrus 37 L -36 -42 -15 4.83
Inferior frontal gyrus 45 R 54 30 12 4.61
Middle temporal gyrus 21 L -57 -33 0 4.56
21 L -66 -27 -3 4.04
Cerebellum, posterior lobe - L -24 -66 -21 4.56
Anterior occipital sulcus 18/19 L -30 -75 -6 4.46
Postcentral gyrus 1 L -39 -21 42 4.32
Insula - L -30 6 18 4.24
Posterior transverse 18/19 L -21 -72 -6 4.46
collateral sulcus
Superior occipital gyrus 18/19 R 15 -102 6 4.15
Inferior occipital gyrus 18/19 R 30 -87 -15 4.14
18/19 R 18 -99 -6 4.10
Transverse occipital sulcus 18/19 R 30 -81 18 4.07
18/19 R 30 -84 9 4.04
18/19 R 39 -75 21 3.98
Cerebellum (vermis) - 0 -63 -3 4.05
As no prior hypothesis was defined regarding areas that would be activated when participants 
failed to detect flicker, a corrected threshold of p < 0.05 (FDR-correction) was used for this 
contrast, as well as for the main effect of frequency and the interaction of frequency and percept, 
for which no significant activations were found (see main text). R: right hemisphere; L: left 
hemisphere.
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Figure 4.3. Experiment 10: Differences between the BOLD signals associated with flicker 
and fused percepts are similar for all three frequencies. BOLD signal change (percent 
difference) comparing flicker and fused percepts, for the three stimulus frequencies, averaged 
across the thirteen participants. For each panel, the y-axis shows the signal change for flicker 
minus signal change for fused; the x-axis shows the three frequencies (1 Hz below threshold, 
threshold, and 1 Hz above threshold), (a) the most significantly activated cluster maxima in the 
flicker > fused contrast; the subtraction should lead to positive values, (b) the most significantly 
activated voxels in the fused > flicker contrast; the subtraction should lead to negative values. As 
this figure illustrates, this is generally the case. This figure illustrates that there are no consistent 
trends or significant differences between the effects o f percepts (flicker or fused) at different 
frequencies. Error bars represent 1 standard error of the mean.
visual cortex. Indeed, activation in extrastriate cortex was lower, not higher, on 
trials in which flicker was perceived despite pupil diameter being slightly larger 
(Table 4.2). Importantly, the difference in pupil diameter was apparent from trial
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onset and remained similar in magnitude throughout the trial (as indicated by the 
first pupil diameter measurement in a trial: t(7)=4.667, SEM = 0.21, p=0.002; and 
also by dividing the trial into 100-ms bins: flicker > fused in all bins, main effect 
of flicker versus fused F(i,7)=18.28, MSE = 1.014, p=0.004; all t(7 ) scores for the 
separate bins > 4.166, p = 0.004; no interaction between bin and percept, F< 1, 
ns).
4.5 Discussion
Flickering and fused percepts were associated with distinct patterns of 
activation in response to physically identical flickering stimuli. Specifically, 
perception of flicker was associated with greater activation in bilateral frontal 
and left parietal cortex. This cortical network has previously been associated with 
awareness in tasks that did not specifically examine the temporal aspects of 
subjective experience in a non-spatial task, as studied here (Beck et al, 2001, 
2006; Dehaene et al, 2001; Driver & Mattingley, 1998; Eriksson et al, 2004;
Kjaer et al, 2001; Kleinschmidt et al, 1998; Lumer et al, 1998; Lumer & Rees, 
1999; Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005; Portas et al, 2000; Rees et al, 2002; Rizzo & 
Vecera, 2002; Sterzer et al, 2002; Turatto et al, 2004). These new findings 
demonstrate that this network is also involved in awareness of temporal non- 
spatial properties of the visual environment, and may therefore play a general 
role in visual awareness.
Patients with right parietal damage are impaired in temporal discrimination 
(distinguishing flicker onsets from offsets), but have no impairment in flicker
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detection (Battelli, Cavanagh, Martini, & Barton, 2003). This is consistent with 
the current finding of left parietal activation for flicker detection. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that right parietal damage may be associated with the 
disruption of an attentional process devoted to relative timing (Battelli et al,
2003) but not with the detection of temporal patterns, which may be functionally 
preserved in the intact left parietal lobe.
Neurons in visual cortex represent flicker at much higher frequencies than the 
CFF threshold (Gur & Snodderly, 1997; Hermann, 2001; Krolak-Salmon et al, 
2003; Rager & Singer, 1998; Lyskov et al, 1998; Shady et al, 2004), consistent 
with the finding that there was no interaction of frequency and percept (Figure 
4.3). Fronto-parietal activity related to the percept of flicker may thus be 
associated with processes linked to awareness rather than sensory processing per 
se. The present findings are also consistent with theories of visual awareness in 
which awareness is constrained not by the properties of early visual neurons, but 
rather by a higher-level network comprising neuronal ‘coalitions’ or serving as a 
‘global neuronal workspace’. In such views, consciousness arises from the 
interaction of widespread networks across the brain, rather than from activity in 
early sensory cortex (Baars, 2002; Crick & Koch, 2003; Dehaene, Kerszberg, & 
Changeux, 1998; Dehaene & Naccache, 2001).
As a single point source of light was used in this study, shifts of spatial 
attention cannot account for these findings (unlike many previous studies of 
visual awareness: Beck et al, 2001, 2006; Dehaene et al, 2001; Driver & 
Mattingley, 1998; Eriksson et al, 2004; Kjaer et al, 2001; Kleinschmidt et al, 
1998; Lumer et al, 1998; Lumer & Rees, 1999; Portas et al, 2000; Rizzo & 
Vecera, 2002; Sterzer et al, 2002; Turatto et al, 2004). However, the data also
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raise the intriguing and rather different possibility that non-spatial attention, 
known to be associated with similar fronto-parietal activation as found here 
(Wojciulik & Kan wisher, 1999) is involved in conscious flicker perception. 
Functional imaging data cannot determine whether fronto-parietal activation 
plays a causal role in flicker detection, or whether it results from such detection. 
For example, perceived flicker may attract attention automatically due to the 
sharp luminance onsets, and fronto-parietal activity may reflect this. 
Alternatively, flicker detection may be facilitated when activity levels in fronto­
parietal cortex are high, consistent with a causal role for (non-spatial) attentional 
functions of frontoparietal cortex in flicker awareness.
Interestingly, the latter possibility is supported by the current finding that 
flicker percepts were associated with a slightly larger pupil diameter from trial 
onset. Pupil dilation has previously been associated with attention and effort 
(Kahneman, 1973) and pupil dilation induced by task difficulty has been 
associated with activity in frontal and parietal regions (Siegle, Steinhauer, 
Stenger, Konecky, & Carter, 2003). Speculatively, it is possible that the 
difference in pupil size observed here may therefore result from cortical activity 
related to attentional effort in the flicker detection task, reflecting a pre-existing 
brain state that may have determined the perceptual outcome of each trial. 
Attentional effort may have fluctuated between trials, with increases in attention 
leading both to better flicker detection and to pupil dilation. Importantly, 
attention would not be directed at spatial, but rather at temporal properties of the 
stimulus.
Such a notion receives support from recent behavioural work showing that 
temporal parsing of visual input is sensitive to attentional manipulation (Carrasco
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& McElree, 2001; VanRullen et al, 2005; Visser & Enns, 2001; and the results 
reported in Chapter 3 of this thesis). The fronto-parietal activity found here may 
reflect a general role of attention in enhancing the detection and selection of any 
target event (be it temporal or spatial), but it is important to note that since 
participants reported their percept on both flicker and fused trials, the ability to 
report the target cannot, in itself, account for observations of fronto-parietal 
activity associated with flicker perception.
In contrast to conscious perception of flicker, fused percepts were 
predominantly associated with activation of occipital cortex. The foveal 
presentation of the flicker stimulus and the random-effects analysis (which 
necessarily averaged across participants) do not permit determination of the 
precise retinotopic location of these activations. However, they fall clearly 
outside the calcarine sulcus and therefore are likely to reflect activity in 
extrastriate visual cortex (Dougherty, Koch, Brewer, Fischer, Modersitzki, & 
Wandell, 2003). The finding of activated extrastriate foci for physically identical 
(though perceptually distinct) stimuli is surprising but clearly rules out the 
possibility that successful flicker detection relies on activity in early visual cortex 
(either instead of or in addition to the fronto-parietal activity). It is well 
established that activity in visual cortex can more closely reflect phenomenal 
experience than physical stimulation (Ress & Heeger, 2003; Tong, 2003). The 
present findings suggest that such differences in activity of visual cortex may 
extend to situations where phenomenally different experience arises from 
different temporal parsing of visual input.
To conclude, frontal and parietal cortical regions were involved in detecting 
flicker in a single, small point source of light. As activity in similar cortical areas
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has previously been associated with visual awareness in a variety of other tasks 
that have not involved detection of a temporal pattern, these findings suggest that 




Working memory maintains perceptual 
biases during binocular rivalry
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5.1 Chapter Introduction
Chapters 2 and 3 established the role of perceptual load in visual awareness in 
presence/absence detection (Chapter 2) and temporal patterns (Chapter 3). In the 
present chapter I turn to examine the role that the active executive control 
mechanism postulated by load theory (Lavie, 2000; 2005; Lavie et al, 2004) 
plays in visual awareness. Load theory proposes that working memory maintains 
prioritization of current stimulus preferences, enabling the rejection of irrelevant 
distractors. In other words, working memory is required to maintain biases in the 
allocation of processing resources, in situations where stimuli compete for them 
(see Section 1.3.1).
Until recently there had been little direct behavioural evidence in healthy 
humans for the causal role of working memory in the top-down control of biased 
visual competition (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). In a series of studies, however, 
Lavie and colleagues demonstrated that reducing the availability of working 
memory by loading it in a concurrent unrelated task results in reduced ability to 
maintain task priorities, and greater interference from irrelevant distractors. High 
(compared to low) working memory load increased behavioural interference 
from irrelevant distractors in flanker tasks (Lavie et al, 2004), and Stroop-like 
tasks (De Fockert et al, 2001), as well as increasing interference from irrelevant, 
but salient distractors in attentional capture (Lavie & De Fockert, 2005). 
Additionally, a neuroimaging study showed that brain activity associated with 
ignored faces increased under high working memory load (De Fockert et al, 
2001; for a full review of these studies, see Section 1.3.3). Similar effects of 
working memory load, however, were not found for visual search (Logan, 1978;
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Woodman et al, 2001), suggesting that the deciding factor in whether or not 
working memory load will increase interference is not simply the presence of 
irrelevant stimuli, but competition between salient stimuli.
Does the role of executive processes in stimulus selection generalize to visual 
awareness as well? If working memory is indeed needed to act as a top-down 
control mechanism, biasing perception in all situations that involve visual 
competition among salient stimuli, then a specific task defining the 
behaviourally-relevant targets may not be necessary. If this is the case, then 
loading working memory should have an effect on the competition in binocular 
rivalry, a fundamental form of visual competition that occurs in the absence of an 
explicit attentional task. Specifically, loading working memory should reduce the 
visual system’s ability to maintain a stable and coherent percept in binocular 
rivalry.
As binocular rivalry is investigated in this and the next chapter, I will now 
briefly review the studies on binocular rivalry that set the context for the present 
studies.
5.2 Binocular rivalry
Binocular rivalry occurs when sufficiently dissimilar images are presented to 
corresponding retinal areas of each eye. Instead of a coherent, fused image being 
perceived, what normally transpires (after a brief period during which both 
images are perceived) is a pattern of shifts in perceptual dominance, with one 
image perceived at any given time and the other image suppressed (Figure 5.1).
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Changes in dominance typically occur quickly but not immediately, so brief 
periods of mixed percept are also experienced. Dominance alternates between the 
two images, with dominance phases typically lasting a few seconds. Though it 
has been claimed that practice can improve the ability to control shifts 
intentionally, this seems to be very difficult (Meng & Tong, 2004), and normally 
the length of dominance phases appears to be random. Like many other 
stochastic phenomena (such as alternations of perception for the Necker cube or 
the Rubin face-vase), the frequency histogram of phase-lengths closely resembles 
a mathematical function known as a gamma distribution (Figure 5.2, Blake,




Figure 5.1. An example of binocular rivalry. When viewed through anaglyph red-green 
goggles (shown left), the image containing a superimposed red house and green face (top) 
induces binocular rivalry, leading to an alternating pattern o f perceptual dominance (bottom). 





Figure 5.2. A histogram summarizing the durations of individual dominance phases during 
binocular rivalry. Observers reported their percepts by pressing one of two keys, and the 
individual durations were tabulated (put into fixed-width bins), normalized (each value was 
divided by the mean) and plotted as a frequency histogram. The solid line shows the gamma 
function fit to the actual data. From Kovacs et al (1996).
Binocular rivalry has attracted a great deal of interest, both because of its 
intrinsic value as an unusual perceptual phenomenon, and because of its possible 
usefulness as a tool for the investigation of visual awareness: It is widely 
accepted (Frith et al, 1999; Kanwisher, 2001; Rees et al, 2002) that research on 
awareness can benefit from the use of procedures in which physical stimulation 
is held constant while conscious experience changes, and binocular rivalry is a 
classic example of constant retinal input bringing about changes in subjective 
experience (Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Tong, 2001).
152
5.2.1 The neural locus of binocular rivalry
One of the major debates in the binocular rivalry literature concerns the locus 
of the competition: Does it take place ‘early’ (between monocular neurons in 
primary visual cortex or even the lateral geniculate nucleus) or ‘late’ (between 
representations in areas further along the visual stream). The new research 
presented in this chapter is not directly related to this debate, but does inform the 
discussion of whether rivalry should be viewed as a low-level perceptual 
phenomenon, or as a complex one involving several processing levels. As a great 
deal of what is known about rivalry was found in the context of the early-late 
debate, I shall briefly review the current literature. I will show that while there is 
evidence to support both possibilities, the terms of the debate may be 
oversimplified and a more refined view of rivalry may be required to fully 
understand it.
Behaviourally, it has been shown that when written words and line drawings 
are presented within the suppressed image, they are not processed semantically 
(not even at an implicit level), indicating an early locus of suppression (Blake, 
Ahlstrom, & Alais, 1999; Cave, Blake, & McNamara, 1998; Zimba & Blake, 
1983). On the other hand, motion after-effects elicited by motion presented to 
one eye reach their full magnitude even if they are rivalrously suppressed part of 
the time (Lehmkuhle & Fox, 1975; O’shea & Crassini, 1981), and motion 
presented within the suppressed image can bias the perception of motion in the 
dominant image (Andrews & Blakemore, 1999, 2002; Blake et al, 1999). This 
seems consistent with late suppression (at least as late as the motion-sensitive 
area V5/MT+), but could also indicate that various visual pathways are
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differentially effected by rivalry. Such a view is corroborated by fMRI findings 
that emotional faces, suppressed in rivalry, can still lead to activation in regions 
of the limbic system (e.g. the amygdala), which are known to be involved in 
emotional processing (Williams, Morris, McGlone, Abbott, & Mattingley, 2004; 
Pasley, Mayes, & Schultz, 2004). Both motion and emotion information are 
known to be processed by the tectopulvinar system, which contains pathways 
leading from the optic tract, via the superior colliculi, to the pulvinar and further 
to stimulus-specific regions (Pasley et al, 2004). Such information may therefore 
be fully processed in an ‘alternative route’ even if rivalry suppression occurs 
early in the geniculastriate pathway (e.g. in VI).
Furthermore, the possibility that representations of the suppressed image 
exist in ‘late’ parts of the ventral visual system is supported by behavioural 
evidence showing that interocular grouping can take place between the two 
images, allowing rivalry to occur between coherent representations constructed 
from parts of the rivalling images, and therefore indicating that rivalry occurs 
beyond the point where information from the eyes is combined (Kovacs, 
Papathomas, Ming, & Feher, 1996). Also, when the two images are rapidly 
switched between the eyes (so that each eye sees a rapid succession of the two 
images but the two eyes see a different image at any time), perceptual 
alternations can exhibit the same temporal dynamics as when static patterns are 
used: a single dominance phase may span multiple eye-altemations of the stimuli 
(Logothetis, Leopold & Sheinberg, 1996; Note, however, that this only happens 
when stimuli fall within a limited range of temporal and spatial parameters; 
otherwise, perception alternates with the eyes; Lee & Blake, 1999).
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It seems reasonable to assume that neural evidence would help to resolve the 
apparent contradictions noted above. However, this evidence has thrown up new 
contradictions, with conclusions seemingly dependent on the method used. 
Single-unit studies in monkeys have shown that the percentage of neurons whose 
activity correlates with perception during rivalry increases gradually from early 
to late visual cortex: 18% of the neurons examined in V1/V2 showed activity 
modulations that correlated with the monkeys’ reports, as did 38% of the neurons 
in V4 (Leopold & Logothetis, 1996), 43% of the neurons in area MT (Logothetis 
& Schall, 1989), and 90% in area IT (Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997). All but one 
of the neurons in areas VI A/2, V4 and MT, whose activity reflected rivalry, were 
binocular (in area IT all cells are binocular). These findings are interpreted as 
indicating that rivalry is very unlikely to be the result of monocular neurons in 
striate cortex being inhibited, as this would cause any representation of the 
suppressed image to be removed from subsequent regions -  which isn’t the case 
(Leopold & Logothetis, 1996). The results instead support the view that rivalry 
occurs between representations that are encoded in the activity of many neurons 
in different visual areas, attempting to establish a consensus (of relevance here, it 
is likely that such a consensus would have to be retained in working memory for 
the multiple areas involved to remain coordinated).
On the other hand, fMRI results ffom humans have tended to support a view 
of rivalry as competition occurring not between representations, but between the 
inputs from different eyes. Rivalry is fully resolved by the time the image 
reaches stimulus-specific regions of the ventral stream (Lumer et al 1998; Lumer 
& Rees, 1999; Tong, Nakayama, Vaughn, & Kanwisher, 1998). A face, for 
example, will activate the fusiform face area (Kanwisher et al, 1997) when it is
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dominant, and the activity will be reduced when it is suppressed. These changes 
are of the same magnitude as in real stimulus alternations. This is analogous to 
the single-unit finding that the majority of cells in area IT reflect visual 
awareness (Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997), but similar effects have been found 
earlier in the visual system: VI activity has been found to be coupled with 
perceptual alternations during binocular rivalry, increasing when subjects 
reported seeing a higher-contrast grating, and decreasing when they saw a lower- 
contrast one (Polonsky, Blake, Braun, & Heeger, 2000; fMRI responses in VI 
are known to increase monotonically with stimulus contrast -  Heeger, Huk, 
Geisler, & Albrecht, 2000 -  so the magnitude of the fMRI signal can serve as a 
‘tag’ for the two gratings in VI). Moreover, and in contrast to single-unit 
findings, fluctuations in VI activity were roughly equal to those in neighbouring 
visual areas (V2, V3, V3a, V4). In particular, there was none of the systematic 
increase in rivalry-related activity in later areas found in single-cell studies. The 
average amplitude of the fluctuations in VI activity during rivalry was 56% of 
that evoked by physical stimulus alternations. It has been claimed that this 
difference between rivalry-induced and physical alternations is due to the 
responses of only a subset of VI neurons (monocular neurons responding to 
input from a specific eye) being modulated by rivalry, whereas physical 
alternations affect all neurons.
Further research supporting this view (Tong & Engel, 2001) used fMRI to 
investigate binocular rivalry in the blind-spot representation of V1 (where all 
neurons are monocular, responding only to input from the ipsilateral eye). 
Activity in this region of VI increased when the grating presented to the 
ipsilateral eye was perceived, and decreased when the contralateral eye became
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dominant. This change was of the same magnitude in rivalry and in physical 
alternations, leading to the conclusion that binocular rivalry is resolved in 
monocular visual cortex -  which is in contrast not only to the gradual process 
observed in single-cell studies, but also to the previous findings of rivalry being 
mediated by binocular neurons (as blind-spot neurons are, by definition, 
monocular). A recent study (Haynes, Deichmann, & Rees, 2005) has even 
demonstrated that fMRI activity recorded from the LGN showed eye-specific 
modulation during rivalry. Regions of the LGN that showed strong eye 
preference also independently showed strongly reduced activity during binocular 
rivalry, when the stimulus presented to their preferred eye was suppressed.
The discrepancy between single-unit and fMRI findings on binocular rivalry 
may be due to a number of factors. First, the fMRI results do not, in themselves, 
mean that rivalry is resolved within VI or the LGN (Polonsky et al, 2000). The 
results could, for example, mean that neural events underlying rivalry originate 
in these early regions and are propagated to later areas, but also that those events 
are initiated at later stages and propagated via feedback to VI and the LGN. 
Furthermore, the two processes are not mutually exclusive. The correlative 
nature and poor temporal resolution of fMRI mean that the causal relation 
between activations in various areas cannot be deduced from the imaging data on 
its own, as demonstrated by findings on attention: Single unit studies (e.g. 
Motter, 1993; Reynolds, Pasternak, & Desimone, 2000) have shown attentional 
modulation of activity in extrastriate visual areas, but not in V I; this is 
inconsistent with a number of fMRI studies that showed robust attentional 
modulations of VI (Kastner, De Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1998; 
Kastner, Pinsk, De Weerd, Desimone, & Ungerleider, 1999; Kastner, Pinsk,
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Desimone, & Ungerleider, 2000; Ress & Heeger, 2003) and even LGN 
(O’Connor, Fukui, Pinsk, & Kastner, 2002) activity that demonstrate early 
attentional selection in the visual pathway. The contradiction was resolved by 
studies combining EEG with fMRI (Martinez, Vento, Sereno, Frank, Buxton, et 
al, 1999; Noesselt, Hillyard, Woldorff, Schoenfeld, Hagner, et al, 2002): EEG 
showed that the effects of attention on VI activity do not take place during the 
initial stimulus-related response (60-90 ms), but modulation that is consistent 
with activity changes detected by fMRI takes place in the time range of 150-250 
ms. In other words, VI is ‘reactivated’ 150-250 ms after exposure to a stimulus 
within the locus of spatial attention. Due to the slow emergence of the fMRI 
Blood-Oxygen-Level-Dependent (BOLD) signal, activity detected by fMRI 
seems to reflect both feedforward processes and later feedback influences from 
other areas. Feedback from other areas could therefore account for the activation 
seen in Vl/LGN with fMRI but lacking in single-cell studies of rivalry.
This ties in to recent findings concerning the relationship between single-unit 
neural activity and the BOLD response. The fMRI signal is roughly proportional 
to local average firing rates (Heeger et al, 2000; Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, 
Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001; Rees, Friston, & Koch, 2000). But there is also 
evidence that the BOLD contrast mechanism reflects not only spiking output (as 
single-unit recordings do) but also input from different brain regions and 
subthreshold synaptic activity, such as that arising from simultaneous excitation 
and inhibition (Logothetis et al, 2001; Logothetis, 2003); Such activity would be 
invisible to an extracellular electrode, but may be of crucial importance in
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rivalry; top-down feedback projected from neurons in other brain regions would 
therefore be picked up by fMRI but not necessarily by single-unit recordings.
Finally, the discrepancy may have resulted from the fact that single-unit 
studies (Leopold & Logothetis, 1996; Logothetis & Schall, 1989; Sheinberg & 
Logothetis, 1997) reported only the percentages of neurons whose activity was 
modulated by rivalry. The BOLD signal depends not only on the number of 
active neurons, but also on their firing rate. When single-unit data were 
reanalyzed (Polonsky et al, 2000), computing the average firing-rates during 
rivalry and physical alternations, the modulations in firing rate during rivalry 
(compared to physical alternation) were indeed similar in VI, V2 and V4 -  
though still only about half as large as those seen with fMRI. This new 
discrepancy can be explained by the fact that single-unit studies found different 
sub-populations of cells in areas MT, V4 and IT. Among these were cells whose 
responses correlated with reports during rivalry, and others whose responses anti­
correlated with the reports; fMRI data averages indiscriminately across sub­
populations, confounding the relative numbers of neurons in each category with 
their firing rates.
In conclusion, the differences between single-unit and fMRI findings are not 
as big as a first reading of the above results suggests. More importantly, the way 
the discrepancy may arise is directly related to the possible activity of top-down 
control mechanisms operating in a way that would be picked up by fMRI, but not 
by extracellular electrodes.
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5.2.2 Binocular rivalry and mechanisms of top-down control
The above review indicates that it is probably an oversimplification to think 
that rivalry is fully associated with any single part of the visual system. A more 
refined view emerging from the literature is that rivalry is not a unitary 
phenomenon, resolved in a single neural locus (Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Tong,
2001). Rather, a number of separate stages are probably involved, in different 
locations along the visual pathways. To understand the interactions that lead to 
the emergence and characteristics of binocular rivalry, it may prove fruitful to 
focus on the factors that affect the temporal dynamics of rivalry.
Manipulating low-level physical properties (such as luminance, contrast, 
contour density and velocity) can affect suppression times. ‘Stronger’ images 
(e.g., ones with higher contrast) are suppressed for shorter periods. Interestingly, 
this does not affect dominance phases, whose length is generally not altered by 
such manipulations (Blake, 2001; Blake & Logothetis, 2002). In contrast, higher- 
level attributes affect dominance times. An image will dominate for longer 
periods when it is more meaningful; for example, upright faces dominate for 
longer periods than inverted ones (Blake, 2001). Also, images dominate for 
longer periods if they are surrounded by a context that fits them well (e.g., 
gratings that are co-aligned with a rival grating) than if their context does not 
(e.g., gratings that are orthogonal to a rival grating; Blake & Logothetis, 2002). 
Suppression times are usually not effected by these factors -  context may 
maintain the dominance of a rival image, but will not encourage a suppressed 
image to escape from suppression (Sobel & Blake, 2002). The distinction 
between the effects of high- and low-level attributes on rivalry indicates that the
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processes responsible for implementing and maintaining suppression may be 
distinguishable from those selecting an image for dominance (Sobel & Blake,
2002). The latter may involve high-level control regions previously implicated in 
working memory and attentional control.
Support for this hypothesis comes from recent fMRI studies (Lumer et al, 
1998; Lumer & Rees, 1999), which identified a network of cortical regions 
whose activity covaried with perceptual switches during rivalry. The cortical 
regions involved included not only parts of the extrastriate cortex and the ventral 
visual pathway, but also ffonto-parietal regions (Figure 5.3) previously shown to 
be involved in processes of attention (e.g., Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 1999) and 
working memory (e.g., Courtney, Petit, Maisog, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1998; 
see also Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005). The studies included a binocular rivalry 
condition, as well as a control condition where physical alternations of 
monocular stimuli were presented (‘replay’). Whereas extrastriate regions were 
also activated by nonrivalrous perceptual changes in the replay condition, 
activity in frontoparietal cortex was specifically associated with the dominance 
shifts experienced during rivalry. It is worth noting that an fMRI study 
examining perceptual shifts of nonrivalrous bistable images, such as the Rubin 
face-vase, also found activity related to transitions in a similar network 
(Kleinschmidt et al, 1998).
These results were interpreted as suggesting a major role for ffonto-parietal 
areas in visual awareness. As these regions have previously been implicated in 
attention and working memory, their involvement in perceptual shifts may reflect 
the activity of a mechanism responsible for the selection of neuronal events for 
representation in awareness.
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Figure 5.3. Brain activity associated with binocular rivalry transitions. Medial and lateral 
brain surfaces, upon which are superimposed areas where activity was specifically related to 
perceptual transitions in binocular rivalry (red) or in the replay condition (green). Note the 
widespread activity o f a ffonto-parietal network involved in rivalry transitions. From Lumer et al 
(1998).
However, the nature of this postulated mechanism requires further 
elucidation. The activity itself does not reveal whether the role of the fronto­
parietal network might be to maintain current preferences, initiate shifts, or just 
monitor their occurrence. The possibility that activity in these regions is simply 
related to the generation of motor reports about perceptual shifts was ruled out in 
one of the studies mentioned above (Lumer & Rees, 1999), as that study only 
observed correlated activity between brain regions, without a task or perceptual 
report. However, the fronto-parietal activity could still be generated by a system 
registering perceptual changes, with no causal involvement in them. In addition, 
although the regions found to be involved in rivalry transitions are known to be
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involved in directing attention spatially, this may not be their role in binocular 
rivalry, as unlike selective attention, rivalry is not amenable to voluntary control 
(Blake & Logothetis, 2002; Brown & Norcia, 1997; Meng & Tong, 2004; 
Sheinberg & Logothetis, 1997; Tong, 2001). Spatial attention also engages other 
visual and motor areas, such as the frontal eye fields, which were not activated 
during rivalry (Lumer et al 1998).
A fronto-parietal network is known to be involved in working memory and 
spatial attention, leading to biased perception in attentional tasks (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2001; Pessoa et al, 2003). As binocular 
rivalry engages this network in the absence of an explicit attentional effort, it 
follows that fronto-parietal regions may play a general role of maintaining 
perceptual biases between competing stimuli. The competition itself may occur 
anywhere along the visual stream. It is likely, though, that the activity of the 
fronto-parietal network reflects not the competition itself, but the biasing signal 
required to maintain perceptual preferences -  just as is the case in selective 
attention (Kastner & Ungerleider, 2001; Pessoa et al, 2003).
Evidence supporting this notion comes from several sources. One is patient 
research: Various relevant abnormalities have been observed in patients with 
frontal or parietal lesions. These include a slowing-down of binocular rivalry 
compared to healthy controls (Pavlovskaya, Bonneh, Soroker, Sagi, & Ring, 
2001). Alterations in other bistable phenomena have also been reported. Left 
hemisphere damage is associated with less disappearance during motion-induced 
blindness (Pavlovskaya et al, 2001), and patients with frontal and parietal lesions 
are significantly impaired in discovering the alternative interpretations of 
ambiguous figures (Ricci & Blundo, 1990; Meenan & Miller, 1994).
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Another line of evidence is research on the involvement of memory 
mechanisms in rivalry. In a recent set of studies, Leopold’s group demonstrated 
that if bistable images (among them binocular rivalry) are physically removed, 
and shown again after a while, there is a very good chance that the initial percept 
will be the same as it was before the removal (Leopold, Wilke, Maier, & 
Logothetis, 2002). Interestingly, this is the case even if other bistable images are 
presented in the intervening period (Maier, Wilke, Logothetis, & Leopold, 2003), 
indicating that a form of perceptual memory is probably involved. Recent 
unpublished data (P. Sterzer and G. Rees, personal communication January 
2006) has shown that the magnitude of such perceptual memory effects is 
correlated with activity in regions of frontal cortex previously associated with 
working memory.
The above evidence provides strong support for the idea that a fronto-parietal 
network is responsible for the generation of top-down control signals that bias 
visual competition. However, neuroimaging only observes correlations between 
brain activation and behaviour; In order to ascertain that top-down control 
mechanisms indeed play a causal role in binocular rivalry, it would be necessary 
to manipulate such a system experimentally and observe the effect this has on 
perceptual alternations in rivalry. It has been previously shown that loading 
working memory impairs control of selective attention tasks (De Fockert et al, 
2001; Lavie, 2000; Lavie & De Fockert, 2005; Lavie et al, 2004). The following 




According to load theory (Lavie 2000; 2005; Lavie et al 2004), working 
memory is required whenever it is necessary to maintain priorities in order to 
deliberately ignore salient irrelevant stimuli. Here I propose that working 
memory may be required to actively maintain biases during competitive 
interactions in vision, not just when stimuli are deliberately ignored, but 
whenever visual competition requires the suppression of one stimulus in favour 
of another. This hypothesis was tested by manipulating working memory load 
during binocular rivalry.
If working memory is critical for active maintenance of perceptual biases 
during binocular rivalry, then high working memory load should alter the 
dynamics of this fundamental form (Blake, 2001; Blake & Logothetis, 2002) of 
visual competition, where one image is suppressed while another dominates 
awareness. Specifically, the ability to maintain a stable percept should be 
impaired, leading to a shortening of dominance phases (when a single monocular 
percept is experienced) and an increase in the duration of mixed-perception 
periods (when neither image is entirely suppressed, as typically occurs initially).
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5.3.2 Method
Participants: Twelve naive participants (8 female, mean age 26.08, range 
17-32) gave informed consent to participate in the experiment. All participants 
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Apparatus and stimuli: Participants sat in a dark sound-protected room, 
viewing a 20” screen (Sony GDM-F520, resolution 640*480, 60 Hz refresh rate) 
from a distance of 100 cm, and wearing headphones. Stimuli were created and 
presented using Matlab on a Dell PWS650. Participants wore LCD shutter 
goggles (stereoeyes by StereoGraphics inc.) that alternated at 60 Hz in synchrony 
with alternate presentations of each of the two binocular rivalry stimuli, so each 
eye saw a different image every screen refresh cycle.
During binocular rivalry, each eye was presented with achromatic diagonal 
(±45° from vertical) orthogonal Gabor patches (a sinusoidally modulated carrier 
of wavelength 0.31°, drifting at 2 cycles/sec, convolved with a Gaussian 
envelope with sd 0.51°), displayed at 100% contrast with the same average 
luminance as the grey background (60 cd/m2). Each participant viewed a single 
combination of Gabor orientation and drift direction, but all four combinations 
that comprise one leftward-drifting patch and one rightward-drifting patch were 
used across participants. Each Gabor was surrounded by nonius lines and a 
dartboard ring (diameter ~7.5°-14°) to promote stable binocular alignment. A 
small red fixation point was superimposed centrally.
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Design: Perceptual alternations in binocular rivalry were measured while load in 
a working memory task was varied (Figure 5.4). On each trial, participants first 
memorized digits spoken in either a fixed ascending order (low load) or in 
random order (high load). Then, during a memory-retention interval, two 
orthogonally oriented Gabor patches were presented dichoptically, resulting in 
binocular rivalry. Participants reported their percepts continuously while viewing 
the rivalry stimuli. An auditory memory probe followed visual stimulus offset.
To test the efficacy of the memory manipulation, accuracy rates and reaction 
times to the memory probe were recorded. To test the effect of the working 
memory manipulation on the temporal dynamics of binocular rivalry, two 
mathematically independent measures were obtained: The duration of the initial 
mixed period (the time from stimulus onset to the beginning of the first 
dominance phase, where one of the rivalling stimuli is entirely suppressed); and 
the duration of individual dominance phases.
Procedure: Each trial began with a blank grey screen. Participants were 
presented with the memory set through earphones: The word “ready” was 
followed by six digits, presented over six seconds. In the low load condition, the 
digits were always in the order 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. In the high load condition 0 was 
followed by the digits 1-5 in random order, with the constraint that sets could not 
include three or more consecutive digits. After an additional 500 ms, the 
binocular rivalry stimuli appeared and were presented continuously for 10 s. 
Participants pressed one of two keys (the left and right arrows) to indicate which 





Ready, 0 .3 ,1 , 4,2, 5"
Right eye
" T  ""
t /  2 sec for resptonse
Both eyes
Figure 5.4. Experiment 11: Sequence of events in a high working memory load trial. Under 
low load, the memory set was always ‘012345’. Under high load, sets could not include three or 
more consecutive digits. At test, participants were instructed to report the digit that followed the 
probe in the original memory set (e.g., for the trial illustrated, the correct response is “3”).
mixed periods where neither patch was entirely suppressed. At the end of the 
rivalry period the visual stimuli were replaced by a blank grey screen, and 
memory was tested: Participants heard the word “probe” followed by a digit
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chosen randomly from the original memory set. They then had 2 seconds to 
report the digit that followed the probe in the original memory set, by pressing 
the appropriate key on the keyboard’s number pad. The last digit in the memory 
set was never the probe, and all sets began with “0” in order to ensure that all 
five digits between 1 and 5 were used as responses in both conditions. A new 
trial began at the end of the two second response period. Rivalry dominance 
phases that were terminated by the end of the 10 second retention interval were 
discarded from the analysis. Trials with an incorrect memory response were 
eliminated from RT and rivalry analyses.
Each volunteer participated in two sessions on separate days. Each session 
began with a 16-trial practice period, followed by four consecutive experimental 
blocks. Each block contained 21 trials of either the high or low memory load 
condition, with a participant-terminated break between blocks. The blocks within 
a session were arranged in a high-low-low-high load or low-high-high-low load 
order. Each participant had one session of each kind. Session order was 
counterbalanced across participants.
5.3.3 Results and discussion
Working memory: RTs were significantly longer under high (M = 799 ms) 
than under low (M = 401 ms) working memory load (t(1i) = 11.926, SEM = 33.39, 
p < 0.001). In addition, accuracy rates were significantly lower under high (M = 
89%) than under low (M = 99%) working memory load (tai) = 6.075, SEM = 
0.016, p < 0.001).Taken together, these results confirm that the manipulation of 
memory load was effective.
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Figure 5.5. Experiment 11: High working memory load affects perceptual dynamics of 
binocular rivalry, (a) Mean differences for two dependent measures o f rivalry under two 
different working memory load conditions, averaged over twelve participants. High (versus low) 
working memory load increased the median duration o f the initial mixed period, and decreased 
the median duration o f dominance phases. Error bars represent one SEM. (b) Best-fit gamma 
functions for the frequency distribution of initial mixed percept (top) and overall dominance 
phases (bottom) are plotted for one illustrative participant. Dominance durations are well fitted 
by a gamma function that has a smaller mean and variance under high (versus low) working 
memory load. The opposite pattern is apparent for initial mixed period durations.
Binocular rivalry: Critically, high working memory load had a significant 
effect on the two independent measures of perceptual dynamics in the binocular 
rivalry task (Figure 5.5a). First, the median1 duration of the first mixed period 
increased with high (M = 1901 ms) versus low (M = 1696 ms) working memory 
load (t(n) = 2.434, SEM = 84.27, p = 0.03). Second, the median duration of
1 Medians, rather than means, were used in the analysis due to the skewed nature o f binocular 
rivalry durations (Blake, 2001). However, all results showed similar patterns for means as well.
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subsequent dominance phases was significantly shortened under high (M = 2035 
ms) versus low (M = 2206 ms) memory load ( t^  = 3.455, SEM = 49.39, p = 
0.005). As is typical in binocular rivalry, alternation rates varied widely between 
participants but paired sample correlations were very high (R=0.98 for both 
measures). Both phase duration measures were well fit by a gamma distribution, 
as is typical of stochastic bistable perceptual phenomena (Blake, 2001; Blake and 
Logothetis, 2002). High working memory load decreased both the mean and 
variance of the gamma functions for dominance phases, but increased them for 
initial mixed periods (Figure 5.5b). Importantly, the median durations of mixed- 
percept periods following the first one did not significantly differ comparing high 
(456 ms) and low (513 ms) load (t(n) = 0.996, SEM = 57.17, ns). The opposite 
trend to that found for the initial mixed period indicates that the shortening of 
dominance phases cannot be attributed to an increase in the duration of mixed 
periods between the dominance phases.
The results are therefore consistent with the prediction that high working 
memory load would alter the dynamics of binocular rivalry, by impairing the 
visual system’s ability to maintain a stable percept. Thus, under high memory 
load dominance phases were shortened and the duration of the initial mixed 
period increased. Due to technical limitations (the presence of the shutter 
goggles), it was not possible to monitor participants’ eyes during the experiment, 
so the possibility of differences in eye movements or pupil diameter under 
different memory load conditions could not be ruled out. However, because of 
the technical difficulties involved in eye-tracking during binocular rivalry there is 
currently no available evidence on any systematic effects such eye-related factors 
may have on rivalry. It is therefore impossible to predict the possible effects of
171
such differences. A different problem, which could be addressed within the 
current dataset, is the possibility of sampling bias, which is explored next.
Analysis with a fixed sampling window: The initial mixed periods of 
binocular rivalry were longer under high working memory load (vs. low load).
As the duration of binocular rivalry stimuli was fixed at 10 seconds under both 
load conditions, this meant that in each trial, there was less time left for 
dominance phases under high load than under low load. Potentially, this could 
have led to a systematic bias, where shorter dominance phases were more likely 
to be recorded under high load. This would account for the finding that 
dominance phases were shortened under high load. To rule out this possibility, a 
re-analysis of the experimental data was carried out, imposing a uniform 
sampling window (beginning at the end of the first mixed period of each trial) on 
both conditions, and using only trials that could fit the entire fixed window in. 
The duration of this window was chosen for each participant individually, to 
maximize the amount of data kept. On average, 74% (sd 10%) of the dominance 
phases in each condition were kept. Imposing the uniform-duration sampling 
window from the end of the first mixed period of each trial did not alter the effect 
of load on median dominance (M = 2161 ms and 1947 ms for low and high load, 
respectively; t(n) = 2.756, SEM = 77.43, p = 0.019).
To further rule out the possibility that the shortening of dominance phases 
under high load was an artifact of the longer initial mixed period, a 





Imposing a fixed sampling window on the binocular rivalry data of 
Experiment 11 showed that the shorter dominance phases under high working 
memory load are unlikely to have been due to the longer initial mixed period in 
this condition curtailing the sampling window for subsequent dominance phases. 
In order to further verify that the reduced sampling window under high working 
memory load could not account for the observed effect of load on dominance 
phase duration, a simple computational model was created. The model simulated 
the way changes in the sampling window would affect the average duration of 
dominance phases. The best-fit gamma distributions obtained for each 
participant’s data were used to create simulated trials of two kinds: ones where 
the initial mixed period was sampled from the low load distribution and ones 
where it was sampled from the high load distribution. Importantly, the remainder 
of a simulated 10-second period was then filled with dominance-phase durations 
sampled from the same (low load) dominance phase distribution. Therefore, if 
the difference between dominance durations under high and low load is indeed 
an artefact, it should arise in the simulation as well.
173
5.4.2 Method
For each participant’s data, the model took the best-fit gamma distribution 
parameters for the duration of the initial mixed phase under both high and low 
memory load, and the best-fit gamma distribution parameters for dominance 
phases under low load. Using these parameters, the model simulated 10 second 
‘trials’ for high and low working memory load. The initial mixed period was 
sampled randomly from either the high or low load gamma distribution, and the 
remainder of the time was filled by sampling randomly from the participant’s 
low load gamma distribution for dominance phases (using the same distribution 
for both working memory conditions). As in the rivalry experiment, dominance 
phases whose addition caused the duration of a simulated trial to exceed 10 
seconds were discarded (See Figure 5.6). Simulated trials were iteratively 
generated until 2000 dominance phases were collected for each working memory 
condition. The median length of these dominance phases was then calculated. 
This procedure was repeated 1000 times for each participant’s data, and the 
median dominance phases collected for each working memory condition were 
averaged. To verify that this simple model was indeed able to show effects of 
working memory load, the simulation was also run using the best-fit gamma 
distribution parameters for participants’ dominance phases under high load (in 
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Figure 5.6. Sampling and trial structuring in the computational simulation, (a) Durations for 
first mixed periods and for dominance durations were sampled from the appropriate gamma 
distributions for each of the subjects who participated in Experiment 11. The red lines indicate 
sampled durations o f first mixed periods, and the blue lines indicate sampled durations of 
dominance phases. Continuous lines are for durations sampled from the low load condition, and 
dashed lines indicate durations sampled from the high load condition, (b) Individual 10-second 
‘trials’ were created by sampling an initial mixed period from the appropriate first-mixed-period 
gamma distribution, and then filling the remainder of the 10-second period with dominance 
phases sampled from the appropriate dominance-phase gamma distribution.
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5.4.3 Results and discussion
If the difference found for dominance phases in the rivalry experiment were 
an artefact resulting from a difference in sampling windows, this difference 
should also arise in those conditions in the model where the only difference 
between ‘high’ and ‘low’ load was the initial mixed period. However, the 
simulation indicated that median dominance durations were almost identical 
under such conditions (M = 1826 ms vs. 1812 ms when the initial mixed period 
was sampled from low and high load distributions, respectively). The small 
numerical difference identified comparing high and low load was about an order 
of magnitude smaller than the experimentally observed effect.
When the simulation was run with initial mixed periods and dominance 
phases sampled from the high-load distributions, the mean difference between 
high and low load medians was now of similar magnitude to that obtained in the 
rivalry experiment (M = 1826 ms vs. 1704 ms for low and high load, 
respectively, a difference of 122 ms compared with 171 ms in Experiment 11).
Thus, a difference between high and low working memory load in the 
duration of the initial mixed percept cannot account for the difference found in 
the duration of subsequent dominance phases. A sampling bias, therefore, cannot 
account for the results of Experiment 11.
These results can also not be accounted for by high load leading to a more 
stringent criterion for reporting dominance. If this were the case, all mixed 
periods, not just the first, should have been longer under high memory load. 
Instead, these findings suggest that once the visual system began experiencing 
rivalry, the full sequence of perceptual transitions became quicker under high
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load. Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether high working memory load 
specifically reduces the ability to actively maintain perceptual choices in cases of 
visual competition (such as binocular rivalry), or whether it simply alters the 




Experiment 11 showed that under high working memory load, participants 
reported shorter dominance phases and longer initial mixed periods than under 
low working memory load. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
working memory is involved in maintaining perceptual biases in binocular 
rivalry. However, it remains possible that the above results may be due to a 
change in response characteristics under high (vs. low) working memory load, 
rather than a true perceptual alteration.
If the results of Experiment 11 were indeed due to high working memory 
load altering the characteristics of responses to visual events, then loading 
working memory should also have an effect on responses to gradual physical 
changes in a stimulus. Another experiment was therefore conducted, where 
participants responded to gradual physical transitions between orthogonally 
oriented Gabor patches presented in similar fashion to the rivalry experiment, 
except the same image was now presented to both eyes. These transitions did not
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involve competition, but otherwise kept the characteristics of binocular rivalry 
and produced a similar perceptual experience.
If high working memory load causes a change in response characteristics that 
brings about reports of shorter dominance phases in binocular rivalry, this should 
lead to a predictable pattern of results for physical transitions. Reported 
‘dominance’ phases (i.e. the presence of a single image) should be shorter under 
high working memory load. This would be due to either or both of two measures. 
Responses to the onset of gradual changes could occur earlier, and/or the 
reported durations of such transitions could be longer under high than under low 
working memory load. The effect of working memory load on the initial mixed 
period of binocular rivalry could, potentially, be due to a longer time taken to 
generate a response under high load, rather than a longer period required for the 
visual system to establish a dominant percept. If this were the case, then this 
difference should arise even when only a single image (rather than rivalrous 
ones) is presented at trial onset.
5.5.2 Method
Participants: Six new volunteers (2 female, mean age 27.83, range 22-32) 
participated in the experiment. All participants had normal or corrected-to- 
normal vision.
Apparatus and stimuli: Set-up was very similar to that of Experiment 11, 
except for a few important differences. The LCD shutter goggles worn by the 
participants were constantly transparent during the ten-second memory retention
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period; stimuli were presented binocularly and did not undergo rivalry. Each 
retention interval began with the presentation of a single Gabor patch, so there 
was no initial mixed period. The Gabor patch underwent a gradual physical 
transition, intermittently and randomly (1-3 occurrences per trial, at random 
times), being replaced by an orthogonally oriented Gabor. Physical stimulation 
parameters were kept identical to those of Experiment 11 by alternating the 
Gabor patches at 60 Hz. Gradual transitions were produced by decreasing the 
contrast of the original stimulus progressively (from 100% to 0) while the 
contrast of the newly visible orthogonal stimulus was increased (from 0 to 100%) 
over a period of 3150 ms. Such a gradual transition subjectively approximated 
the appearance and duration of the rivalrous transitions reported in Experiment 
11, giving rise to a very similar (but binocularly presented and non-rivalrous) 
mixed percept.
Design: The design was identical to that of Experiment 11, the only 
difference being that instead of the binocular rivalry stimulus, here the same 
Gabor patches underwent gradual physical alternations. As in Experiment 11, 
accuracy rates and reaction times to the memory probe were recorded to test the 
efficacy of the memory manipulation. Three dependent measures were recorded 
to test the effect of the working memory manipulation on patterns of response to 
non-rivalrous visual transitions: The reaction time to the onset of a physical 
transition between Gabor patches; the reported duration of mixed phases; and the 
time from trial onset (the presentation of the first Gabor patch at the beginning of 
the 10-second visual stimulation period) to the first perceptual report.
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Procedure: The procedure was identical to that of experiment 11, except that 
during each trial participants reported physical changes in the stimuli rather than 
phenomenal ones. As in Experiment 11, participants reported their percepts using 
two keys (the left and right arrows) to indicate exclusive perception of either 
orthogonal grating, with both keys raised indicating mixed perception. As there 
was no initial mixed period in this experiment (after presentation of the memory 
set, a single Gabor patch appeared), participants were instructed to press the 
appropriate key as quickly as possible after the onset of visual stimuli. Perceptual 
report data were only analyzed from correct working memory trials.
5.5.3 Results and discussion
Working memory: The manipulation of working memory load was again 
effective, and comparable to that in Experiment 11. Mean RTs to the memory 
probe were longer and accuracy lower under high working memory load (M = 
962 ms, 83% accuracy) than under low load (M = 471 ms, 99% accuracy; 
t(5)=15.734, p = 0.001 for the RTs, t(5)=4.637, p = 0.006 for the accuracy).
Binocular physical transition responses: Mean RTs to the onset of physical 
transitions were significantly longer under high versus low working memory load 
(1698 ms vs. 1643 ms, respectively; t(5)=3.440, SEM = 15.99, p=0.018). Note 
that this effect is in the opposite direction to that predicted if the results of 
Experiment 11 were due to changes in response characteristics under high 
working memory load. There was no significant effect of high versus low load on 
reports of mean duration of the mixed stimulus (800 ms vs. 824 ms, respectively;
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t(5)=0.625, SEM = 38.69, ns). Though not significant, the trend in the mixed- 
period duration reports is also in the opposite direction to that predicted if the 
results of Experiment 11 were due to changes in response characteristics under 
high working memory load. Working memory load, therefore, clearly does not 
simply speed up responses to visual events. Though such load does seem to have 
some effect on response characteristics, this effect is in the opposite direction to 
that found for binocular rivalry -  implying that the actual perceptual effect in 
rivalry may have in fact been larger than participants’ reports indicated.
The time taken to make the first response to the unambiguous stimuli at the 
beginning of each trial was longer under high than under low working memory 
load (622 ms vs. 554 ms, respectively; t(5)=3.560, SEM = 19.15, p=0.016), but 
this effect is much smaller than observed for initial mixed percepts in binocular 
rivalry (68 ms here vs. 205 ms in Experiment 11), suggesting the effect in rivalry 
reflects a real perceptual effect, rather than just a slowing of the first response 
under high working memory load.
5.6 Chapter Discussion
The results described in this chapter demonstrate that as anticipated by the 
load theory (Lavie, 2000; 2005; Lavie et al, 2004), working memory load plays a 
role in determining the competitive dynamics in binocular rivalry. The results 
also highlight the specificity of working memory load effects to rivalry (as 
opposed to the non-competitive physical transitions in Experiment 12). Loading 
working memory rendered it unavailable to exert top-down control maintaining 
the dominant percept in binocular rivalry. Thus the duration of the initial mixed
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percept was increased, the suppressed image escaped suppression more easily, 
and subsequent dominance phases were truncated. Working memory can 
therefore play a role in visual competition even in the absence of explicit 
instruction to ignore a distractor: These results imply that working memory may 
be essential in biasing visual competition whenever such competition arises, and 
not just in selective attention tasks as shown previously (De Fockert et al, 2001; 
Lavie, 2000; Lavie & De Fockert, 2005; Lavie et al, 2004).
These results also shed light on the mechanisms involved in binocular rivalry, 
favouring a view of it as a complex, multilevel phenomenon, rather than a purely 
low-level one: Even if the competition occurs in early stages of the visual stream 
(Polonsky et al, 2000; Tong & Engel, 2001), it can be systematically modulated 
by top-down signals. Unlike previous claims (Meng & Tong, 2004) binocular 
rivalry appears to be influenced by at least some level of top-down control.
The finding that working memory load leads to shorter dominance periods is 
in line with demonstrations that short-term memory plays a role in determining 
the percept in bistable images (including binocular rivalry). When such images 
are physically removed and then shown again after a while, the percept they 
evoke when shown again will typically be the same as it was before the removal 
(Leopold et al, 2002). Both findings indicate a role for memory in maintenance 
of the dominant percept. It is thus possible that the underlying mechanisms for 
the role of working memory in binocular rivalry overlap in the present study and 
these previous studies.
Though selective attention cannot prolong dominance phases indefinitely 
(Meng & Tong, 2004) or initiate perceptual transitions, it is still possible that it 
played a role in the present findings. Attention can modulate dominance
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durations to a certain extent (Ooi & He, 1999); therefore, it is possible that the 
effect of working memory is brought about by participants paying less attention 
to the currently dominant stimulus under high working memory load, leading to a 
reduction in dominance durations.
Finally, these findings have important theoretical implications, as they 
suggest a general role for working memory in visual awareness. Memorizing 
auditory digits has very little in common with visual perception, yet strong 
interference between auditory working memory load and visual perception was 
observed. This is consistent with a general role for working memory in visual 
awareness -  that of maintaining perceptual biases while constant incoming 
information works to destabilize them. We cannot be aware of all the visual 
information entering our eyes, so may depend on working memory to maintain 








The involvement of high-level brain regions and the top-down processes they 
mediate in the control of binocular rivalry has been widely debated (Blake & 
Logothetis, 2002; Tong, 2001). As reviewed earlier (Section 5.2.2), low-level 
physical properties of rivalling stimuli, such as contrast or luminance, influence 
suppression but not dominance durations. The opposite pattern is apparent for 
high-level features such as context or meaning (Blake, 2001; Blake &
Logothetis, 2002; Tong, 2001). This distinction implies that the processes 
implementing suppression may be distinguishable from those maintaining the 
dominance of an image (Sobel & Blake, 2002). The association of dominance 
durations with the high-level attributes of images indicates that such selection 
and maintenance may involve top-down processes mediated by brain regions 
outside occipital cortex.
The involvement of top-down cognitive processes in the maintenance of 
perceptual biases in binocular rivalry was confirmed in the previous chapter, by 
showing that loading working memory reduces the visual system’s ability to 
maintain a stable, biased percept in rivalry. However, to independently establish 
the role of high-level brain regions (as opposed to cognitive processes) in the 
control of rivalry, it is necessary to manipulate such regions directly. Previous 
fMRI studies (Lumer et al, 1998; Lumer & Rees, 1999) have demonstrated that a 
network comprising right-lateralized frontal and parietal areas is active during 
perceptual transitions in binocular rivalry. Though this implies that these regions 
may play a causal role in the control of rivalry, such a conclusion is precluded by 
the correlational nature of fMRI. As the low temporal resolution of fMRI makes
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it impossible to determine whether the activation preceded or followed 
perceptual transitions, the activation found could, for example, be merely the 
result of a transition being noticed and then drawing attention (although this is 
somewhat unlikely, since physical transitions did not lead to similar activation 
despite the use of a replay procedure that made them hard to distinguish from 
rivalry transitions).
Even if a causal role for right-parietal activity were to be inferred, the 
neuroimaging data do not afford a straightforward interpretation of the nature of 
this role. On the one hand, the fact that right fronto-parietal activity was time- 
locked to transitions (Lumer et al, 1998) suggests that a signal originating in 
these regions may initiate the transitions. Alternatively, such activity may be 
related to a surge of metabolic demands in inhibitory synapses (Heeger & Ress, 
2002; Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001; Mathiesen, 
Caesar, Akgoren, & Lauritzen, 1998), as the maintenance of a stable bias is 
terminated. A further (though not exclusive) possibility is that such activity may 
reflect an increase in the metabolic demands of a subset of neurons attempting to 
maintain the current perceptual state, just prior to a different subset (promoting 
dominance of the other image) taking over. Finally, it is possible that the relative 
crudeness of the standard univariate fMRI analysis may not reveal the whole 
story: Recent research employing more sensitive multivariate analysis techniques 
has revealed activity in parietal regions associated with particular perceptual 
states in an ambiguous rotating sphere, a different kind of bistable stimulus 
(Brouwer, van Ee, & Tong, 2006); whether this will also be found for rivalry 
remains to be seen. The association of right fronto-parietal activity with 
binocular rivalry transitions does not, therefore, lend itself to a straightforward
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interpretation. To clarify the role of these regions in rivalry it is necessary to 
employ a manipulative (rather than correlational) method such as Transcranial 
Magnetic Stimulation (TMS).
Previous studies using TMS to investigate binocular rivalry have not applied 
it to the right parietal region associated with perceptual transitions in fMRI. One 
study (Pearson, Tadin & Blake, 2006) applied single-pulse TMS at fixed time- 
intervals to occipital cortex while participants viewed a rivalrous stimulus, 
finding that the probability of a perceptual transition increased within the first 
post-stimulation second. This result suggests, unsurprisingly, that early visual 
cortex is critically involved in the processes underlying rivalry. However, it does 
not clarify what normal function is interrupted by the stimulation used. Such 
stimulation could, on the one hand, exacerbate local competitive interactions 
between neuronal subsets representing the competing stimuli, leading to faster 
resolution of the competition in favour of the suppressed stimulus; or it could, on 
the other hand, interrupt an external signal maintaining the current perceptual 
bias.
A different study (Miller et al, 2000) applied single-pulse TMS over left 
temporo-parietal cortex, time-locked to the onset of reported perceptual 
transitions in binocular rivalry. This led to a reversal of the transition (back to the 
pre-TMS percept; i.e. a very short dominance phase of the other image) for 
images presented to one of the two eyes, but not to the other. Again, this finding 
is difficult to interpret. First, time-locking the TMS pulses to reports of transition 
onsets means it is impossible to tell whether the reversals of the transitions were 
due to the interruption of a signal initiating the perceptual switch, or of a signal 
maintaining the new perceptual state. Furthermore, the left temporo-parietal
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TMS stimulation site was approximate and not based on co-registration with any 
specific brain region; this limits any conclusions regarding the functional 
neuroanatomy underlying the effect.
6.2 Experiment 13
The purpose of the present study was therefore to examine whether the 
superior right parietal cortex, which has been previously (Lumer et al, 1998; 
Lumer & Rees, 1999) associated with activity during rivalrous perceptual 
transitions (and carefully localized here by co-registering individual participants’ 
structural MRI scans to their heads), plays a causal role in the control of 
binocular rivalry. The parietal stimulation site was chosen rather than a frontal 
one as frontal TMS stimulation tends to cause discomfort to participants by 
stimulating the facial nerve. Working memory processes, such as those whose 
influence on rivalry was investigated in Chapter 5, are usually associated with 
frontal cortex activity. However, previous research actually shows that both 
working memory (Courtney et al, 1998) and visual short-term memory (Todd & 
Marois, 2004; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004) tasks are associated with activity in a 
network comprising both frontal and parietal regions, including the superior 
parietal region selected for TMS stimulation here. To avoid the uncertainties 
inherent in the use of online single-pulse TMS (see comments above on Miller et 
al, 2000; and Pearson et.al, 2006), this study employed repetitive TMS (rTMS), 
applied offline at 1 Hz for 30 minutes just prior to viewing the binocular rivalry 
stimulus. Such stimulation is believed to temporarily impair the normal activity
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of the cortex region below the stimulation site (Walsh & Pascual-Leone, 2003). 
To control for non-specific effects of TMS, the homologous location in the left 
hemisphere (which has not been associated with binocular rivalry transitions; 
Lumer et al, 1998) was stimulated in a separate session. Temporarily impairing 
the activity of superior right parietal cortex should shed light on the role it plays 
in binocular rivalry: If the role of such activity is to initiate perceptual transitions, 
then impairing it should interfere with the initiation of transitions and lead to 
longer dominance durations; Conversely, if right parietal activity is necessary for 
maintaining a bias during visual competition, the impairment will interfere with 
this maintenance and lead to shorter dominance durations. Finally, if right 
parietal lobe plays no causal role in binocular rivalry, TMS stimulation should 
have no effect on dominance durations.
6.3 Method
Participants: 8 healthy volunteers gave informed consent to participate in 
the experiment. All volunteers had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Two 
participants whose median dominance durations were over 2.5 standard 
deviations from the group mean (leading to a small sample of dominance 
durations) were regarded as outliers and their data were excluded from analysis. 
The remaining six participants had an average age of 30.2 (range 22-42). Three 
of them were female and all were right-handed.
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Visual stimuli and apparatus: Participants sat in a dark room, viewing an 
18” screen (Dell UltraScan P991, resolution 640*480, 60 Hz refresh rate) from a 
distance of 60 cm. Stimuli were created and presented using Matlab on a Sony 
Vaio PCV-RS144 computer. Participants wore LCD shutter goggles (stereoeyes 
by StereoGraphics inc) which alternated at 60 Hz in synchrony with alternate 
presentations of each of the two binocular rivalry stimuli, so each eye saw a 
different image every screen refresh cycle.
During binocular rivalry, each eye was presented with achromatic diagonal 
(±45° from vertical) orthogonal Gabor patches (a sinusoidally modulated carrier 
of wavelength 0.31°, drifting at 2 cycles/sec, convolved with a Gaussian 
envelope with sd 0.51°), displayed at 100% contrast with the same average 
luminance as the grey background (60 cd/m2). Each participant viewed a single 
combination of Gabor orientation and drift direction, but all four combinations 
that comprise one leftward-drifting patch and one rightward-drifting patch were 
used across participants. Each Gabor was surrounded by blue nonius lines and a 
dartboard ring (diameter ~7.5°-14°) to promote stable binocular alignment; a 
small blue fixation point was superimposed centrally (Figure 6.1).
TMS stimulation site localization: Each participant underwent an MRI 
session to obtain a structural scan. Structural MRIs were spatially normalized to 
a standard template based on the MNI reference brain (Talairach and Toumoux, 
1988), using Statistical Parametric Mapping software (SPM2, Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, UCL). The site in the superior right 
parietal lobe previously associated with perceptual switches in binocular rivalry 
(x=36, y=-45, z=51, Lumer et al, 1998, Figure 6.2) and its homologue in the left
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Figure 6.1. Experiment 13: The binocular rivalry stimulus. Each eye was presented with a 
drifting Gabor patch (shown here enlarged from the centre of the screen). The Gabors were 
oriented obliquely and orthogonally to each other. Fixation dots, nonius lines and dartboard rings 
helped maintain stable binocular alignment.
hemisphere (x =-36) were located and marked. The structural scans were then 
warped back to their original shape, and Brainsight software (Rogue Research, 
Montreal, Canada) was used to coregister each participant’s structural scan to 
their head and to identify the scalp loci closest to the stimulation sites.
TMS stimulation parameters: In each TMS session (see procedure below), 
a Magstim SuperRapid TMS machine and a double 70 mm figure of eight coil 
were used to deliver repetitive TMS (rTMS) pulses at 1 HZ for 30 minutes. The 
coil was held against the participant’s head by the experimenter, at an angle 
which would induce a current in a ventral-frontal direction (with the handle held
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Figure 6.2. Experiment 13: TMS stimulation site in right parietal cortex. Crosshairs in the 
coronal, sagittal and horizontal views o f a single participant’s brain, and in a rendered SPM2 3D 
brain, show the location o f MNI coordinates x=36, y=-45, z=51. The homologous site (x=-36) 
was stimulated in the left hemisphere. L: Left; R: Right.
up at an angle roughly 30° posterior from vertical). Stimulation intensity was 
determined individually for each participant before the experiment: The resting 
motor threshold was measured by stimulating left motor cortex and finding the 
minimum intensity which induced visible movement in the participant’s index 
finger on half of 8-10 trials. TMS stimulation intensity was then set to 90% of the 
motor threshold, rounded to the nearest whole number (mean motor threshold: 
51.7% of stimulator output, range 43-67%; mean stimulation intensity: 46.5% of 
stimulator output, range 39-60%).
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Design and procedure: To investigate the role of right superior parietal 
cortex in binocular rivalry, participants viewed a binocular rivalry display and 
reported their percepts under three conditions: (1) No TMS, (2) Following right 
parietal stimulation, and (3) Following left parietal stimulation. Right parietal 
stimulation was delivered to the location previously associated with perceptual 
transitions in rivalry (Lumer et al, 1998), and the homologous location in the left 
hemisphere was used as a control site. Due to the skewed distribution of 
dominance durations in binocular rivalry, the median dominance durations for 
each eye under each condition were taken as dependent measures.
To avoid any carry-over effects of TMS stimulation, the experiment was 
carried out over three consecutive days, with each condition run on a different 
day. Order of conditions was counterbalanced across participants. At the 
beginning of the first TMS session, the participant’s resting motor threshold was 
assessed (see TMS stimulation parameters above for assessment procedure), and 
TMS stimulation intensity was determined. Following this, and at the beginning 
of the second TMS session, the stimulation site for that session was located on 
the participant’s scalp. 1 Hz TMS was then administered for 30 minutes. 
Immediately upon completion of the TMS stimulation (or at the beginning of the 
session in the no TMS condition) participants viewed the binocular rivalry 
display for four 2.5 minute blocks, separated by 20-second rest intervals. 
Participants reported their percepts continuously, using the left (left eye 
dominant), right (right eye) and down (mixed percept) arrow keys on a computer 




Median binocular rivalry dominance durations (Table 6.1) were entered into a 
two-way repeated-measures ANOVA, in which the factors were condition (3 
levels: No TMS, right parietal TMS, left parietal TMS) and eye (2 levels: Right 
eye, left eye). The ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of condition (F(2,io) 
= 4.891, MSE = 457218.33 , p = 0.033). There was no main effect of eye (F(i,5) = 
1.4, MSE = 110696.38, ns) and no interaction between condition and eye (F<1, 
ns). Dominance durations were therefore collapsed across eyes for follow-up 
comparisons. Paired-sample t-tests were used to compare no TMS versus right 
TMS and no TMS versus left TMS (Figure 6.3a). Right TMS was found to 
significantly shorten dominance durations compared with no TMS (t(5)=2.761, 
SEM = 193, p=0.04), and compared with left TMS (though this comparison only 
reached significance at a one-tailed level; t(5)=2.317, SEM = 336, p=0.034, one­
tailed). There was no significant difference between left TMS and the no TMS 
condition (t(5 )= 1.041, SEM = 237, ns). Note that the trend for longer (rather
Table 6.1. Experiment 13: Means of median dominance durations. Durations 
are given in ms. Numbers in parentheses indicate 1 standard error of the mean.
No TMS Right TMS Left TMS
Right eye 3263 (330) 2657 (245) 3434 (348)
Left eye 3620 (634) 3037 (203) 3939 (624)
Both eyes 3365 (333) 2832 (166) 3611 (454)
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Figure 6.3. Experiment 13: Results. A. Mean differences of dominance duration medians for left and 
right TMS versus no TMS. Positive values indicate longer durations than under no TMS, and negative values 
indicate a shortening o f dominance durations compared with no TMS. Error bars represent 1 standard error of 
the mean. * p < 0.05. B. Median dominance durations o f individual participants in each TMS condition 
plotted as a fraction of their no-TMS median. Ratios greater than 1 indicate lengthening (compared to no 
TMS), and ratios smaller than 1 indicate shortening of dominance durations. Five o f six participants fall to the 
left o f the vertical dashed line, indicating a shortening of dominance durations under right TMS. All six fall to 
the left of the diagonal dashed line, indicating a shortening under right TMS compared to left TMS. Note that 
except for a single outlier (bottom left comer), there seems to be an inverse correlation between the effects of 
left and right TMS. R: Right TMS; L: Left TMS; No: No TMS. C. Best-fit gamma functions for the 
frequency distribution o f dominance durations, plotted for one illustrative participant. Under right TMS, the 
gamma function (red) has a smaller mean and variance than under no (blue) or left (green) TMS.
Duration (s)
—  NO TMS
—  Right TMS
—  LeftTMS
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than shorter) dominance durations under left TMS than under no TMS rules out 
the possibility that the significant shortening of dominance durations under right 
TMS is due to non-specific effects of TMS (see also Figure 6.3b). The above 
pattern of results was also evident in the parameters of the best-fit gamma 
distributions for dominance durations in the various conditions: Right TMS 
decreased both the central tendency measures and the variance of the gamma 
functions compared to no TMS, whereas left TMS had a smaller effect in the 
other direction (Figure 6.3c).
To rule out the possibility that the effect of the right TMS is due to an 
induced response bias (e.g. participants adopting a more stringent criterion for 
reporting dominance under right TMS stimulation), a repeated-measures 
ANOVA of mixed phase durations was also carried out. If the difference found 
were due to such a response bias, longer periods of reported mixed percept 
should be found under right TMS stimulation. However, there was no significant 
difference (F < 1, ns) between the mixed phase durations in all three conditions 
(average of medians: 1776, 1997 and 1647 ms for No TMS, right TMS and left 
TMS, respectively). The effect of right parietal TMS is also unlikely to be due to 
eye movement artefacts. Though the use of shutter goggles to create binocular 
rivalry precluded measurement of eye-movements, previous research has shown 
that such movements are not induced by TMS over posterior parietal cortex 
(Ashbridge, Walsh & Cowey, 1997; Wessel, Koempf, Klostermann & Moser, 
1991; for a review, see Walsh and Pascual-Leone, 2003). Furthermore, there is 
no reason to assume differential, asymmetrical effects of TMS over right and left 
parietal cortices with respect to eye movements -  yet an asymmetrical effect on 
binocular rivalry was found.
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6.5 Discussion
Previous fMRI findings have shown that perceptual transitions in binocular 
rivalry are associated with transient activation in right superior parietal cortex 
(Lumer et al, 1998). However, the correlational nature of fMRI has made it 
difficult to assert that this region plays a causal role in such transitions (it may, 
for example, simply respond to their occurrence). Even if a causal role were 
assumed, the precise nature of this role could not be inferred from neuroimaging 
data alone. The purpose of the present study was therefore to directly perturb the 
activity of the relevant region in order to make such inferences.
1Hz rTMS stimulation of the superior right parietal lobe led to a significant 
shortening of dominance durations in binocular rivalry, compared with no TMS 
stimulation. In contrast, stimulating the homologous site in the left hemisphere 
led to a non-significant trend in the opposite direction. These results have 
important implications for our understanding of the involvement of high-level 
brain regions in the control of binocular rivalry.
The present results confirm that right superior parietal cortex (unlike left 
parietal cortex, which was not significantly activated in fMRI either; Lumer et al, 
1998) does indeed play a causal role in the control of binocular rivalry, as 
disrupting its activity altered the temporal dynamics of rivalry. However, the 
results place critical constraints on our understanding of this role. Causing a 
temporary deficit in right parietal activity would have led to longer dominance 
durations if the role of such activity were to initiate perceptual transitions; it 
would lead to shorter dominance durations if right parietal activity was necessary
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for maintaining a bias during visual competition. The present results clearly 
favour the latter possibility.
The use of offline rTMS in this study avoided the interpretation difficulties 
that are inherent to the use of online, single-pulse TMS in investigating binocular 
rivalry (Miller et al, 2000; Pearson et al, 2006). The effects of online TMS on 
binocular rivalry are ambiguous as they may be attributed to either interference 
with the initiation of a perceptual transition on the one hand, or to the 
perturbation of a maintenance signal on the other. Creating a temporary (but 
relatively prolonged) deficit in cortical activity made it possible to make this 
distinction as the effect of offline TMS cannot be attributed to the interruption of 
a signal initiating transitions.
Interestingly, similar findings have been reported for offline disruption with 
unilateral caloric vestibular stimulation (i.e., pouring ice-water into the ear canal) 
prior to viewing binocular rivalry (Miller et al., 2000). Caloric stimulation is 
claimed to activate contralateral hemispheric structures (Bottini et al, 1994; Vitte 
et al, 1996) involved in attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990) and rivalry (Lumer 
et al, 1998). Indeed, dominance durations were shortened when ice water was 
poured into the right ear (this was interpreted as activating the left hemisphere, 
rather than as interfering with right hemisphere activity, which may also be the 
case). However, similar to the TMS results in another experiment in the same 
study, the effect of caloric stimulation was also confined to one eye. In contrast, 
the results of the present study show a similar effect for both eyes, supporting a 
view of right parietal involvement in rivalry as general, rather than limited to one 
of the rivalrous stimuli.
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The previous findings of fMRI activity during the perceptual transitions of 
rivalry, rather than during dominance phases (Lumer et al, 1998), appear at first 
to be at odds with the current findings. However, the TMS and fMRI findings 
can be reconciled by suggesting that the fMRI activity reflects increased 
metabolic demands in inhibitory synapses (Heeger & Ress, 2002; Logothetis et 
al, 2001; Mathiesen et al, 1998) during the termination of a stable bias; 
alternatively, such activity may result from elevated metabolism in neurons 
attempting to maintain the current perceptual state, just before the other image 
becomes dominant. And finally, sensitive multivariate fMRI analysis techniques 
may yet reveal activity in parietal regions associated with specific perceptual 
states in binocular rivalry, as has recently been demonstrated for a bistable 
rotating sphere (Brouwer et al, 2006).
The present findings are in line with the results presented in the previous 
chapter, which showed that loading working memory leads to a shortening of 
dominance durations in rivalry. Rendering top-down control systems unavailable 
to maintain perceptual biases impairs top-down control of visual competition 
(Desimone and Duncan, 1995, Lavie et al, 2004). This can occur either as a result 
of occupying these systems in a different task or of temporarily interfering with 
their activity using TMS. The correspondence between working memory, top- 
down control and right-parietal cortex is strengthened by previous findings 
showing that working memory (Courtney et al, 1998) and the visual short-term 
memory (Todd & Marois, 2004; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004) tasks are associated 
with activity in a network comprising frontal and parietal regions, including the 
superior parietal region which received TMS stimulation in this study.
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The present results imply that patients with unilateral neglect (following a 
right parietal lesion) might show shorter dominance durations (compared to 
controls) in binocular rivalry, since their lesion is in a similar location to the 
‘virtual lesion’ induced here by TMS. However, a recent study (Bonneh, 
Pavlovskaya, Ring, & Soroker, 2004) reported that dominance durations in 
neglect patients were about four times longer than those of healthy observers and 
right-hemisphere control patients without neglect. But unilateral neglect is often 
caused by damage to other cortical regions except parietal cortex, and indeed, 
among the six neglect patients examined, only two had parietal lesions. 
Furthermore, three patients (including the two who had parietal lesions) had 
frontal lesions. Such lesions are known to lead to perseveration. This may imply 
that the lengthening in rivalry dominance durations was due to a form of 
perseveration -  either perceptual or related to motor-responses -  rather than to 
the parietal mechanisms targeted in this study.
Interestingly, recent studies have shown that using TMS to perturb right 
superior parietal cortex (Beck et al, 2006) and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Turatto et al, 2004) increased error rates on a change detection task, establishing 
a causal role for these regions in change blindness. Change detection is assumed 
to require the ability to allocate attention to various elements of an image (in 
other words, to bias processing of visual stimuli) and to involve visual short-term 
memory. Such functions are also likely to be involved in binocular rivalry (Blake 
& Logothetis, 2002; Leopold et al, 2002). These converging lines of evidence 
attest to the potential general importance of superior parietal cortex in visual 
awareness. Neuroimaging studies employing a variety of tasks have associated 
parietal activity with visual awareness (Beck et al, 2001; Carmel, Lavie & Rees,
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2006; Eriksson et al, 2004; Kjaer et al, 2001; Kleinschmidt et al, 1998; Lumer et 
al, 1998; Lumer & Rees, 1999; Portas et al, 2000; Sterzer et al, 2002). The 
precise causal role of parietal cortex in awareness is beginning to emerge from 




7.1 Overview of findings
The research described in this thesis establishes major determinants of the 
top-down control of visual awareness. It also contributes to the understanding of 
the role of frontal and parietal cortex in the control of awareness.
7.1.1 Perceptual load and visual awareness: Presence/absence detection
Chapters 2 and 3 demonstrate that perceptual load affects visual awareness.
In Chapter 2 ,1 found that sensitivity in a presence/absence detection task was 
consistently reduced under high perceptual load. In all experiments, this effect 
could not be attributed to a difference in response criterion under different load 
conditions. The reduction in sensitivity under high perceptual load did not 
depend on the overall level of sensitivity (Experiments 1 and 2), nor was it due to 
the need to coordinate attention to certain locations with inhibition of others 
(Experiment 3). Importantly, for the effect of perceptual load to occur it was not 
even necessary for the stimuli for which load was manipulated to be presented 
concurrently with those for which awareness was assessed (Experiments 4 and 
5). While participants were processing the stimuli for which perceptual load was 
manipulated, their sensitivity to other stimuli was reduced. Critically, no such 
reduction was found for stimulus presentations occurring after such processing 
was over (Experiment 5), indicating that the effect was indeed due to load rather 
than to any change in strategy (e.g., a reduction in the priority of detection 
performance under high load).
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7.1.2 Perceptual load and visual awareness: Temporal patterns
In Chapter 3 I generalized the effect of perceptual load on visual awareness to 
the temporal domain, with experiments showing that when perceptual load was 
manipulated for a spatial search task, the subjective percept (rather than just 
sensitivity to whether or not a stimulus had been presented, as in Chapter 2) 
associated with a temporal pattern (flicker) was altered. Under high perceptual 
load participants were more likely to see the same flickering stimulus as steady, 
fused illumination (Experiment 6). This effect could not be due to different 
criteria for reporting flicker under different load conditions, as demonstrated 
using a 2IFC paradigm (Experiment 8). Possible alternative accounts, attributing 
the results to an effect of perceptual load on memory, were also ruled out by 
collecting the response to flicker before the search response (Experiments 7 and 
9).
7.1.3 Neural correlates of visual awareness: Temporal patterns
Activity in regions of frontal and parietal cortex has been found in previous 
neuroimaging studies of visual awareness. However, the involvement of these 
regions in awareness of temporal patterns, such as the luminance flicker 
examined in Chapter 3, had not been investigated previously. The attendonal 
modulation of flicker awareness found in Chapter 3 suggests that neural 
mechanisms associated with attention should indeed be involved in awareness of 
flicker. Specifically, I hypothesized that fronto-parietal regions previously 
implicated in awareness of other types of stimuli would be involved in flicker
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awareness as well. In Chapter 4 1 used fMRI, adapting the general approach of 
investigating awareness by presenting participants with physically identical 
stimuli that may be perceived in more than one way (e.g., Frith et al, 1999; Rees 
et all 2002) to investigating temporal visual awareness. This was achieved by 
presenting flicker at the critical flicker fusion threshold, where the same stimulus 
is equally likely to be perceived as flickering or as fused. Greater activity was 
found in bilateral frontal and left parietal cortex when participants perceived a 
single, fixated LED as flickering than when they perceived it as fused. 
Importantly, this activity was found in similar areas to those reported in previous 
awareness studies, indicating that a similar network of brain regions may play a 
general role in mediating all forms of visual awareness.
7.1.4 Working memory load and visual awareness: Binocular rivalry
In Chapter 5 I turned to investigate whether the activity of the control 
mechanism postulated by load theory (Lavie 2000; 2005; Lavie at al, 2004) 
generalizes to awareness. I examined the effects of working memory load on the 
temporal dynamics of binocular rivalry, a fundamental form of competition in 
visual awareness. I found that under high (compared to low) working memory 
load, the durations of dominance periods in rivalry were reduced and those of the 
initial mixed phase increased, indicating that loading working memory impaired 
the visual system’s ability to maintain a stable bias in visual awareness in the 
face of ongoing competition between equally-salient stimuli (Experiment 11). A 
computational simulation ruled out the possibility that the shortening of 
dominance periods was due to a sampling bias resulting from the difference in
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initial mixed-phase durations. The results were also not due to a difference in 
response characteristics under different working memory load conditions, as 
ascertained by presenting physical alternations rather than rivalrous ones 
(Experiment 12).
7.1.5 Parietal cortex and the control of visual awareness: Binocular rivalry
The results of Chapter 5 show that high level cognitive functions are involved 
in top-down control of binocular rivalry, and previous neuroimaging research 
(Lumer et al, 1998; Lumer & Rees, 1999) has suggested a role for right parietal 
cortex in such control. However, the correlational nature of neuroimaging data 
precludes the attribution of a causal role to this region in the control of binocular 
rivalry. In Chapter 6 I used TMS to investigate whether right parietal cortex 
indeed plays such a role. The results of Experiment 13 showed that applying 
TMS to right parietal cortex caused a shortening of dominance durations in 
binocular rivalry (compared to left parietal TMS and no TMS conditions). Taken 
together with the results of Chapter 5, this supports the conclusion that high-level 
brain regions and cognitive functions serve to maintain perceptual biases in 
binocular rivalry.
7.2 Implications for load theory
7.2.1 Relation to previous research
Load theory predicts that increasing perceptual load for particular stimuli 
should attenuate the perception of other stimuli (e.g., Lavie, 1995). The theory 
also predicts that increasing working memory load results in reduced ability to 
maintain biases in the allocation of processing resources in situations of 
competition between salient stimuli, and should therefore lead to increased 
interference from ignored stimuli (Lavie 2000; 2005; Lavie et al, 2004).
Previous research has supported these predictions. Increasing perceptual load 
has been found to decrease behavioural interference from irrelevant distractors in 
flanker (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & Cox, 1997; Maylor & Lavie, 1998) and Stroop- 
like (Lavie et al, 2003) tasks, and to eliminate negative priming (Lavie & Fox, 
2000). Neuroimaging studies have found that increasing perceptual load 
decreases neural activity associated with irrelevant stimuli in stimulus selective 
brain regions (Pessoa et al, 2002; Rees et al, 1997; Yi et al, 2004), early visual 
cortex (Schwartz et al, 2005) and even the LGN (O’Connor et al, 2002).
Increasing working memory load has been found to increase behavioural 
interference from irrelevant distractors in Stroop-like (De Fockert et al, 2001) 
and flanker (Lavie et al, 2004) tasks, and to increase attentional capture by 
salient, yet irrelevant stimuli (Lavie & De Fockert, 2005). Neural activity related 
to ignored face stimuli was found to increase under high (compared to low) 
working memory load (De Fockert et al, 2001).
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However, all of the research described above has employed indirect measures 
of perceptual processing, such as target RTs. These measures do not reveal 
anything about observers’ awareness of stimuli -  it is both a logical possibility 
and an established empirical finding (e.g., Marshall & Halligan, 1988; Rees et al, 
2000) that stimuli can be processed without reaching awareness. Though load 
theory predicts that both kinds of load should affect conscious perception, the 
experimental evidence described in the last few paragraphs may in fact reflect 
modulation of purely unconscious processing.
Two previous studies have provided promising preliminary evidence 
suggesting that the predictions of load theory would generalize to conscious 
awareness, assessed with the direct, explicit measure of participants’ reported 
percepts. Rees et al (1997) found that the duration of the motion after effect was 
reduced when participants performed a high (compared to low) perceptual load 
task while ignoring a moving stimulus. The motion after effect is a subjective 
visual experience, and participants reporting it are indeed reporting their 
conscious awareness. However, reports regarding an after effect do not reveal 
whether load modulated conscious perception of the moving stimulus during 
performance of the task.
In a different study, Cartwright-Finch and Lavie (2006) showed that 
increasing perceptual load exacerbated inattentional blindness. However, effects 
on inattentional blindness could be accounted for in terms of rapid forgetting 
(e.g., ‘inattentional amnesia’, Wolfe, 1999) or changes in observers’ criteria for 
reporting awareness of unexpected stimuli.
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7.2.2 Theoretical impact of the new findings
The purpose of the experiments reported in Chapters 2, 3, and 5 of this thesis 
was therefore to assess the effects of load on conscious awareness, employing 
experimental paradigms that would avoid the criticisms detailed above. In 
Chapters 2 and 3 I used direct, explicit measures of conscious awareness to 
conclusively demonstrate that perceptual load affects visual awareness for 
detection of both presence/absence and temporal patterns.
The findings presented in Chapter 5 showed that increasing working memory 
load shortened dominance durations and increased the initial mixed phase of 
binocular rivalry, implying that working memory is required to maintain biases 
in visual awareness during competition from other stimuli.
These experiments therefore substantially extend the scope of load theory’s 
predictions, showing that they apply not only to interference from task-irrelevant 
distractor stimuli in attentional tasks, but also to conscious awareness of visual 
stimuli. This corroborates the intuitive notion, described in the introduction to 
this thesis, that attention and awareness are intimately related. However, these 
results go beyond this intuition (which essentially views the concepts of attention 
and awareness as synonymous; see Lamme, 2003 for a critique of this 
conceptualization). Taken together, the results of perceptual and working 
memory load manipulations suggest a specific relationship between attention, 
executive control and awareness, in which attention serves as a gating 
mechanism to awareness, guided by executive control functions to select stimuli 
for representation in consciousness.
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7.3 Biases in visual competition
The idea that visual stimuli compete for neural representation and processing 
resources is not new. Desimone and Duncan’s (1995) biased competition model, 
for example, suggests that this competition takes place at many levels, in a 
widespread network of brain regions involved in processing visual input. A 
flexible bias, which can be directed at spatial locations, objects, simple visual 
features or conjunctions of features, can determine in a top-down manner which 
stimuli win the competition (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; see also Pessoa, 
Kastner & Ungerleider, 2003). In the next two subsections I discuss the 
implications of my findings for the understanding of biased competition.
7.3.1 Perceptual load and biased competition
The results of Experiments 4 and 5 in Chapter 2 widen the scope of what 
constitutes competition between visual stimuli, by showing that for perceptual 
load to modulate awareness the competing stimuli do not have to be 
simultaneous -  they just have to appear within the same temporal window in 
which processing and analysis take place. Competition, therefore, does not 
necessitate the simultaneous presence of stimuli in the visual field. Rather, the 
competition can be over a limited-capacity processing resource. While this 
resource is occupied due to ongoing processing of certain stimuli, it becomes 
unavailable to process others, regardless of whether they appeared 
simultaneously with the stimuli being processed or not.
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In addition, the results of Chapter 3 show that competition can occur between 
stimuli that require completely different types of processing. Despite previous 
suggestions that spatial and temporal aspects of stimuli are processed 
independently (Lehky, 1985; Wilson, 1980), manipulating perceptual load for 
stimuli that had to be found in one of several spatial locations and analyzed in 
terms of shape (letters) interfered with the analysis of a fixated stimulus that had 
to be analyzed in terms of its temporal pattern (flicker). The strong modulation of 
flicker awareness, observed when load in a letter search was manipulated, 
suggests that the competition can be for the top-down function that selects certain 
stimuli for further analysis, rather than the for the analysis of specific stimulus 
attributes.
7.3.2 Working memory, parietal cortex and biased competition
The biased competition model (Desimone & Duncan, 1995) also suggests 
that top-down selection templates are stored in working memory as short-term 
descriptions of currently-relevant information, so that inputs matching the 
description are favoured for further processing. This is consistent with the 
increased interference from irrelevant stimuli found under high working memory 
load in various response-competition tasks (De Fockert et al, 2001; Lavie et al, 
2004). However, it does not explain the absence of an effect of working memory 
load in visual search (Logan, 1978; Woodman et al, 2001), and the contrast 
between the finding that neural activity related to ignored stimuli in a Stroop-like 
task was modulated by working memory load (De Fockert et al, 2001), whereas
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activity associated with irrelevant (but not response-competitive) stimuli was not 
(Yi et al, 2004).
Load theory (e.g., Lavie, 2000; 2005) addresses this issue by proposing that 
in addition to maintenance of a target template, working memory serves as an 
executive control function, biasing perception in situations where there is conflict 
between stimuli (rather than simply many stimuli in the visual field). In Chapter 
5 ,1 found that loading working memory impairs the visual system’s ability to 
maintain a stable bias in binocular rivalry. This indicates that working memory 
indeed serves to maintain biases in situations where the visual system must 
choose between stimuli, even if there is no specific, behaviourally-relevant target 
template towards which priorities must be biased.
Furthermore, in Chapter 6 I found that applying TMS to right parietal cortex 
-  a region previously implicated in both working memory (Courtney et al, 1998; 
Todd & Marois, 2004; Vogel & Machizawa, 2004) and binocular rivalry 
transitions (Lumer et al, 1998; Lumer & Rees, 1999) -  also impaired the 
maintenance of biases in rivalry. Of course, it cannot be concluded that the 
neural site affected by TMS performs the function that was affected by the 
working memory manipulation, but the convergent results from different 
methodologies do support a role for high-level mechanisms, both cognitive and 
neural, in the control and maintenance of perceptual biases.
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7.4 Attention and visual awareness
7.4.1 Neural mechanisms of temporal attention
The precise nature of the neural mechanism mediating the effect of 
perceptual load on flicker awareness, found in Chapter 3, requires further 
elucidation. Previous studies (Yeshurun & Levy, 2003; Yeshurun, 2004) have 
proposed, on the basis of finding a deterioration of temporal resolution at cued 
locations, that attention increases parvocellular activity at cued locations in 
retinotopic cortex, which in turn inhibits magnocellular activity at these 
locations. As parvocellular neurons have smaller receptive fields than 
magnocellular ones, this leads to better spatial resolution. However, as 
parvocellular neurons also have longer response latencies than magnocellular 
ones, the improved spatial resolution comes at the expense of temporal 
resolution.
This is a compelling argument, but it clearly cannot account for the results 
obtained in Chapter 3. Higher perceptual load in the letter search would imply 
more attention being deployed to the periphery (at the expense of fixation, where 
the flickering LED was located). This should have led to less inhibition of 
magnocellular neurons at fixation, and therefore to improved temporal 
resolution, rather than to the impairment in flicker detection that was found. It 
could be suggested that cuing a location changes the ratio of parvocellular to 
magnocellular activity, but directing attention away from a particular location 
does not change the ratio at that location. However, this would still lead to the
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prediction that flicker detection should not be altered by perceptual load in a 
different location, rather than account for the impairment found here.
It is therefore likely that the neural mechanisms underlying the effect of 
perceptual load are different to those underlying the effects of spatial cuing. The 
previously-used spatial cuing paradigm (Yeshurun & Levy, 2003; Yeshurun, 
2004) assessed the effects of transient attention, which is drawn involuntarily in 
an exogenous bottom-up manner, peaks around 120 ms after cue onset and 
subsides around 250 ms from cue onset. The effects of perceptual load, on the 
other hand, are clearly not mediated by such a mechanism, but rather by an 
endogenous control process with longer lasting effects (as shown in Experiment 
4 and 5 of Chapter 2). They are therefore likely to be manifested neurally in an as 
yet unknown, entirely different way.
7.4.2 Attention to the temporal characteristics of a stimulus
The results of Chapter 3 demonstrated that an attentional manipulation can 
alter awareness of a temporal pattern. In Chapter 4, brain activity correlated with 
flicker detection was found in a network of frontal and parietal regions 
previously associated with awareness, but also with attention (Naghavi &
Nyberg, 2005; Wojciulik & Kanwisher, 1999). Though in many previous 
neuroimaging studies of visual awareness, findings of activity in this network 
could be attributed to shifts in spatial attention (e.g., Beck et al, 2001; 2006; 
Dehaene et al, 2001; Kjaer et al, 2001; Sterzer et al, 2002), in Chapter 4 the use 
of only a single, fixated LED with a very small spatial extent effectively rules out 
this possibility.
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An account involving attention is still plausible, but would suggest that 
attention can be specifically directed at the temporal, rather than the spatial, 
characteristics of a stimulus. Furthermore, the substantial overlap between the 
network of brain regions activated in this study and the areas activated in 
previous studies suggests that a common, highly flexible function, distributed 
throughout frontal and parietal cortex, is involved in directing attention to either 
spatial or temporal stimulus characteristics.
Though the fronto-parietal activity associated with awareness of flicker could 
reflect the deployment of attention to the flickering stimulus, this cannot be 
asserted with certainty as attention was not directly manipulated in this study. 
Therefore, even if this activity is attention-related, it remains unclear in what 
specific way. Random fluctuations in attention, positively correlated with fronto­
parietal activity, could have led to better flicker detection. Alternatively, the 
rapid onsets of flicker, on trials in which it was perceived, could have drawn 
attention and led to increased activation in the fronto-parietal network.
7.4.3 Parietal activity and visual awareness
In Chapter 4, fMRI activation associated with flicker awareness was found in 
both frontal and parietal cortex. This is in line with findings from previous 
imaging studies of visual awareness (Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005; Rees et al, 2002), 
and corroborates the view that for conscious experience to arise, activity in the 
dorsal stream, as well as the ventral stream, is required (e.g., Driver & 
Mattingley, 1998; c.f. Milner & Goodale, 1995).
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But whereas the frontal activation associated with flicker awareness was 
bilateral, parietal activation was lateralized to the left. In contrast, previous 
neuroimaging findings (Lumer et al, 1998; Lumer & Rees, 1999) as well as the 
TMS study in Chapter 6 of this thesis have implicated right parietal cortex in a 
different awareness-related phenomenon, binocular rivalry. Furthermore, in most 
neuroimaging studies of visual awareness to date, parietal activation has been 
bilateral; where it was not, it was right-lateralized (see Naghavi & Nyberg, 2005 
for a review).
The finding of left-lateralized parietal activation related to temporal 
awareness is therefore novel, and requires explanation. One possibility concerns 
the specifically temporal nature of the flicker stimulus used in Chapter 4. A study 
comparing attention to spatial locations with attention to time intervals (Coull & 
Nobre, 1998) established that while there was an overlap between neural systems 
involved in both kinds of attention, there were also hemispheric asymmetries, 
with right parietal cortex showing more activation during spatial attention, and 
left parietal cortex showing more activation during temporal attention. The task 
used in that study (involving orienting of attention towards particular time 
intervals in anticipation of target presentation) was very different from the 
experimental paradigm used here, and the temporal intervals used were much 
longer (300-1500 ms) than those whose detection is required for flicker 
perception. However, the present results support a theoretical framework within 
which the left hemisphere is specialized for temporal processing and analysis of 
serial (rather than spatial) information (e.g., Merzenich et al, 1996). Further 
research is required to assess the veracity of this distinction.
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7.5 Future research
7.5.1 Load and unconscious perceptual processing
The research presented in this thesis establishes the effect of perceptual load 
-  in other words, of an attentional manipulation -  on the degree to which a 
stimulus is consciously perceived. Though this indicates that the availability of 
attentional resources is a necessary condition for conscious perception, the 
relationship between perception, attention and awareness is likely to be more 
complex. There is evidence that perception can occur in the absence of 
awareness (for a review, see Merikle, Smilek & Eastwood, 2001), and attention 
can be oriented toward stimuli without awareness both in normal observers (e.g., 
McCormick, 1997) and in patients with blindsight (e.g., Kentridge, Hey wood & 
Weiskrantz, 1999).
This raises the question of whether there is a qualitative difference between 
consciously and unconsciously perceived stimuli. For example, does perceptual 
load determine the degree of perceptual processing that unconscious stimuli 
receive? By definition, investigating this possibility would have to rely on 
indirect measures of processing, such as effects of perceptual load on RTs or on 
after effects. For example, would after effects associated with oriented gratings 
suppressed from awareness (e.g., by continuous flash suppression, where 
monocularly-presented stimuli are masked by a dynamic pattern presented to the 
other eye; Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005) be modulated by perceptual load? If such 
modulation does indeed occur, this would imply that attention may control gating 
to awareness, but operates on levels of processing that precede it.
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7.5.2 Further effects of working memory load in visual awareness
Increasing working memory load leads to greater interference from irrelevant 
distractors (e.g., Lavie et al, 2004), and in Chapter 5 of this thesis I showed that it 
impairs maintenance of biases in binocular rivalry. This result implies that 
working memory may serve a general role in visual awareness -  that of 
controlling stimulus processing prioritization. However, in order to make this 
general claim about the role of working memory in awareness it is necessary to 
demonstrate similar effects in other paradigms assessing visual awareness. For 
example, the effect of working memory load in paradigms such as those used in 
Chapter 2 (presence/absence detection) and 3 (flicker awareness) could be 
investigates. Note, however, that as described in Section 7.3.2, working memory 
is only likely to have such effects if the stimuli used directly conflict with each 
other, as was the case for the binocular rivalry stimulus in Chapter 5.
An interesting possibility regards inattentional blindness. If loading working 
memory leads to poorer control over the selection of stimuli for processing, this 
leads to the counter-intuitive prediction that high working memory load should 
increase awareness of the unexpected task-irrelevant stimulus, reducing levels of 
inattentional blindness. Though inattentional blindness suffers from various 
limitations as an experimental paradigm (see Section 1.4.2), such an effect would 
still be a striking demonstration of the role of working memory in visual 
awareness. Furthermore, the result predicted by load theory would weaken the 
‘inattentional amnesia’ account of inattentional blindness (Wolfe, 1999). If 
inattentional blindness is indeed due to forgetting of the critical stimulus, then
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loading working memory should increase inattentional blindness (rather than 
decrease it, as predicted by load theory).
7.6 Conclusions
In this thesis I established the critical role of different types of load in 
determining visual awareness. I used direct, explicit measures of awareness to 
show that increasing perceptual load for certain stimuli impairs conscious 
awareness of other stimuli, both shapes and temporal patterns, even when these 
are fully expected and serve as targets. I found that presentation of these targets 
does not have to be simultaneous with those that perceptual load is manipulated 
for -  it is sufficient that they need to be processed within the same time window.
I also investigated the neural correlates of awareness of temporal patterns, 
finding that a fronto-parietal network previously associated with awareness is 
involved in this under-researched form of visual experience. I investigated the 
effects of working memory load on visual competition in awareness, by 
observing its effect on binocular rivalry, and found that increasing such load 
impaired the visual system’s ability to maintain a stable, top-down bias. Finally, I 
used TMS to establish a causal role for right parietal cortex in the maintenance of 
top-down bias in rivalry. Taken together, my findings extend the scope of 
Lavie’s load theory to visual awareness, and confirm the involvement of high- 
level brain regions in the top-down control of awareness.
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